The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction
Open accessAbstract
We study the war of attrition and the all-pay auction when players' signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. We (a) find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies; and (b) examine the performance of these auction forms in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller. Under our conditions the war of attrition raises greater expected revenue than all other known sealed bid auction forms.
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Cites
Evolution and the Theory of Games
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COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
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A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Becker, G. S. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886017 · Cited by 4,117
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
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Evolution and the theory of games
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Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
Crémer, J., & McLean, R. P. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913096 · Cited by 894
Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
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Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction
Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. G. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_18 · Cited by 491
Cited by
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
Athey, S. (2001) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00223 · Cited by 567
All pay auctions and group size: Grading on a curve and other applications
Andreoni, J., & Brownback, A. (2017) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.017 · Cited by 18
Metadata
- Authors
- Krishna, V., & Morgan, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1997-02
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 343-362
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2038280165
- Cited by
- 323
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 6.42
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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