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Cited by 706Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesAuction Theory and ApplicationsGame Theory and Voting Systems

A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments

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Dechenaux, Emmanuel, Kovenock, Dan, Sheremeta, Roman M.·2015·Experimental Economics
DOI 10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0
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Abstract

Abstract Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly effort while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a comprehensive review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, risk and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we review studies examining sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, group contests and gender, as well as field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests and suggest directions for future research.

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  • Empirical research on contests and tournaments contradicts Festinger's expectation that underachievers increase effort.

    “However, empirical research on contests and tournaments contradicts Festinger's expectation that underachievers increase effort.”

    From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests (2022) · cites this paper as Dechenaux et al., 2015

    The review does not present a general contradiction of the expectation. In §6.2, p. 30, it reports that participants who ranked worse than expected increased their performance and that contestants who lagged behind tended to increase effort. It also describes mixed findings on feedback, including quitting in some tournaments. (LLM, conf=0.88)

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  • Compared to piece-rate schemes, contests, all-pay auctions, and tournaments result in higher variance in individual effort.

    “Compared to piece-rate schemes, contests, all-pay auctions, and tournaments result in higher variance in individual effort (Cason et al., 2010;Dechenaux et al., 2015;van Dijk, Sonnemans, & van Winden, 2001).”

    From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests (2022) · cites this paper as Dechenaux et al., 2015

    Section 2.3 (p. 10) describes high variance in individual effort in rank-order tournaments. But it also reports that effort variance was comparable between tournaments and piece-rate schemes when their payoff functions were made similar. The cited paper therefore does not support the unqualified claim that tournaments—and contests and all-pay auctions generally—produce higher effort variance than piece rates. (LLM, conf=0.87)

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  • Contests and tournaments drive individual effort expenditure beyond what is rational.

    “Specifically, contests and tournaments, where financial rewards depend on rank performance, elicit more individual effort than piece-wise remuneration schemes and, in fact, drive individual effort expenditure beyond what is rational (Cason, Masters, & Sheremeta, 2010;Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014;Dechenaux, Kovenock, & Sheremeta, 2015;Dickinson & Isaac, 1998).”

    From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests (2022) · cites this paper as Dechenaux, Kovenock, & Sheremeta, 2015

  • Contests and tournaments with rank-dependent financial rewards elicit more individual effort than piece-rate remuneration schemes.

    “Specifically, contests and tournaments, where financial rewards depend on rank performance, elicit more individual effort than piece-wise remuneration schemes and, in fact, drive individual effort expenditure beyond what is rational (Cason, Masters, & Sheremeta, 2010;Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014;Dechenaux, Kovenock, & Sheremeta, 2015;Dickinson & Isaac, 1998).”

    From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests (2022) · cites this paper as Dechenaux, Kovenock, & Sheremeta, 2015

  • The IADC is an all-pay contest with a single mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.

    “The IADC is an all-pay contest with a single mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (Abbink et al., 2010; Dechenaux et al., 2015).”

    From Oxytocin promotes coordinated out-group attack during intergroup conflict in humans (2019) · cites this paper as Dechenaux et al., 2015

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Cites

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6 of the 383 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. Bandiera, O., Barankay, I. & Rasul, I. (2006). The evolution of cooperative norms: Evidence from a natural field experiment. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 6, 1-26.
  2. Bolle, F., Tan, J.H.W. & Zizzo, D.J. (2014). Vendettas. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6, 93-130.
  3. Fershtman, C. & Gneezy, U. (2011). The trade-off between performance and quitting in highpower tournaments. Journal of the European Economic Association, 9, 318-336.
  4. Kovenock, D. & Roberson, B. (2012). Conflicts with multiple battlefields. In Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict. Oxford University Press, New York.
  5. Lazear, E.P. (1999). Personnel economics past lessons and future directions -presidential address to the society of labor economists. Journal of Labor Economics, 17, 199-236.
  6. Nagel, R. (1995). Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study. American Economic Review, 85, 1313-1326.
  7. Otsubo, H. & Rapoport, A. (2008). Dynamic volunteer's dilemma in finite and discrete time: Theory and experimental evidence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52, 961-984.
  8. Riley, J.G., & Samuelson, W.F. (1981). Optimal auctions. American Economic Review, 71, 381392.
  9. Stracke, R., Höchtl, W., Kerschbamer, R. & Sunde, U. (2014). Optimal prizes in dynamic elimination contests: An experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 102, 43-58.

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Authors
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M.
Affiliations
  • Kent State University (US)
  • Chapman University (US)
Corresponding author
Sheremeta, Roman M.
ORCID
Venue
Experimental Economics
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2015-12
Volume
18
Issue
4
Pages
609-669
ISSN
  • 1386-4157 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-6938
DOI
10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0
OpenAlex
W2239954174
Cited by
706
References
383
Citations by year
2026: 21 · 2025: 35 · 2024: 35 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 64 · 2021: 52 · 2020: 56 · 2019: 67 · 2018: 81 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 56 · 2015: 53 · 2014: 39 · 2013: 28 · 2012: 11
FWCI
202.95
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Experimental Economics (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) (acceptedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Chapman University Digital Commons (Chapman University) (submittedVersion)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
  • Social Science Open Access Repository (GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
Keywords
contests, all-pay auctions, rank-order tournaments, Tullock contest, costly effort, spillover effects, externalities, heterogeneous players, risk, incomplete information, dynamic contests, sabotage, feedback, collusion, alliances, group contests, gender, field experiments

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