Cited by 356Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsLeadership, Behavior, and Decision-Making StudiesNeural and Behavioral Psychology Studies

The Impact of Positive and Negative Affect and Issue Framing on Issue Interpretation and Risk Taking

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Mittal, Vikas, Ross, William T·1998·Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Abstract

Two studies examined the influence of transient affective states and issue framing on issue interpretation and risk taking within the context of strategic decision making. In Study 1, participants in whom transient positive or negative affective states were induced by reading a short story showed systematic differences in issue interpretation and risk taking in a strategic decision making context. Compared to negative mood participants, those in a positive mood were more likely to interpret the strategic issue as an opportunity and displayed lower levels of risk taking. Study 2 replicated and extended these results by crossing affective states with threat and opportunity frames. Results showed that framing an issue (as a threat or an opportunity) had a stronger impact on issue interpretation among negative affect participants than among positive affect participants. Affective states also moderated the impact of issue framing on risk taking: the effect of framing on risk-taking was stronger under negative rather than positive affect. These results are interpreted via information-processing and motivational effects of affect on a decision maker. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.

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Crossref · 10.1006/obhd.1998.2808

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  • Cognitive shortcutting is a common occurrence that simplifies cognitive processing demands.

    “The purpose of discussing information processing is to comprehend how incoming information and cognitive shortcutting are common occurrences that simplify cognitive processing demands [9,10,32,44,48,64,73].”
  • Prospect theory demonstrates that a decision maker's perceived utility can be subjectively influenced by the manner in which the information is framed (as a loss/gain or risk/no risk), what reference is being used to evaluate the options, and the relationship/salience of the alternative to the decision maker.

    “Prospect theory, however, demonstrates that a decision maker's perceived utility can be subjectively influenced by the manner in which the information is framed (as a loss/gain or risk/no risk), what reference is being used to evaluate the options, and the relationship/salience of the alternative to the decision maker [47,70-74].”
  • Heuristics are cognitive processes where full information processing requirements are bypassed and mental shortcutting occurs.

    “Heuristics are cognitive processes where full information processing requirements are bypassed and mental shortcutting occurs [66,71,73,94].”
  • In the Asian disease problem and replications, the majority of participants will select their program choices based on how the information regarding lives saved/fatalities rates is framed.

    “Consistently, the majority of participants will select their program choices based on how the information regarding lives saved/fatalities rates is framed [28,70,72-74].”
  • The utilization of heuristics in decision making is a robust source of influence in the assessment and judgment of decision options, such as the likelihood of contracting a disease, identifying probabilities of accidental fatalities, information identification, and pharmaceutical risk.

    “The utilization of heuristics in decision making has been shown to be a robust source of influence in the assessment and judgment of decision options, such as the likelihood of contracting a disease, identifying probabilities of accidental fatalities, information identification, and pharmaceutical risk [66,71,73,75].”

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Authors
Mittal, V., & Ross, W. T.
Affiliations
  • University of Pittsburgh (US)
  • Temple University (US)
Venue
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1998-12
Volume
76
Issue
3
Pages
298-324
ISSN
0749-5978 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2087274395
Cited by
356
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 52 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 19 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 14
FWCI
2.19
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Leadership, Behavior, and Decision-Making Studies
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
Keywords
positive affect, negative affect, mood induction, issue framing, threat framing, risk-taking, strategic decision-making, affective states, decision making under uncertainty

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