The “Big Picture” of Insider IT Sabotage Across U.S. Critical Infrastructures
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
A study conducted by the U.S. Secret Service and the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute CERT Program analyzed 150 insider cyber crimes across U.S. critical infrastructure sectors. Follow-up work by CERT involved detailed group modeling and analysis of 54 cases of insider IT sabotage out of the 150 total cases. Insider IT sabotage includes incidents in which the insider’s primary goal was to sabotage some aspect of the organization or direct specific harm toward an individual. This paper describes seven general observations about insider IT sabotage based on our empirical data and study findings. We describe a System Dynamics model of the insider IT sabotage problem that elaborates complex interactions in the domain and unintended consequences of organizational policies, practices, technology, and culture on insider behavior. We describe the structure of an education and awareness workshop on insider IT sabotage that incorporates the previously mentioned artifacts as well as an interactive instructional case.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
An intrusion detection and prevention system in cloud computing: A systematic review
Patel, A., Taghavi, M., Bakhtiyari, K., & Celestino Júnior, J. (2013) · Journal of Network and Computer Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2012.08.007 · Cited by 425
“It is very difficult to detect internal attacks, meanwhile the insiders’ threats are increasing (Moore et al., 2008).”
Understanding Insider Threat: A Framework for Characterising Attacks
Nurse, J. R. C., Buckley, O., Legg, P. A., Goldsmith, M., Creese, S., Wright, G. R. T., & Whitty, M. (2014) · 2014 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops · doi:10.1109/spw.2014.38 · Cited by 212
“This term was initially seen in the insider-threat literature in Moore et al. [40], and has also aptly been called the ‘tipping point’ [33].”
Detecting Insider Threat via a Cyber-Security Culture Framework
Georgiadou, A., Mouzakitis, S., & Askounis, D. (2022) · Journal of Computer Information Systems · doi:10.1080/08874417.2021.1903367 · Cited by 65
An Empirical Validation of Malicious Insider Characteristics
Liang, N. (., Biros, D. P., & Luse, A. (2016) · Journal of Management Information Systems · doi:10.1080/07421222.2016.1205925 · Cited by 48
Metadata
- Authors
- Moore, A. P., Cappelli, D. M., & Trzeciak, R. F.
- Venue
- Advances in Information Security
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Published
- 2008-03-06
- Pages
- 17-52
- ISSN
- 1568-2633 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2126536038
- Cited by
- 72
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 18.44
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The “Big Picture” of Insider IT Sabotage Across U.S. Critical Infrastructures. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/978-0-387-77322-3_3
- The paper
- Moore, A. P., Cappelli, D. M., & Trzeciak, R. F. (2008). The “Big Picture” of Insider IT Sabotage Across U.S. Critical Infrastructures. Advances in Information Security. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-77322-3_3
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.