Reliability in communication systems and the evolution of altruism
Abstract
The evolution of a communication system depends on the existence of individuals which gain from it, that is the senders of the signals and their receivers. These two share a common interest about which they communicate. Common interests of this kind form the basis of the communication between such individuals as a sexual pair, parents and their offspring, and members of a flock or group which feed, roost or breed together. It is less often realised that individuals which are usually regarded as conflicting in their interests — for example, prey and predator, sexual rivals, a parasite and its host — may also share a common interest which may form the basis for the evolution of a communication system between them. Warning coloration, warning calls and other signals which are given by a prey species towards a predator (Smythe, 1970; Alcock, 1975) and also threat display among rivals, are some examples of signals exchanged between individuals which mainly conflict in their interest.
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Costly signaling theory proposes that humans engage in costly behaviors to broadcast surplus genetic fitness and abundance of resources.
“Costly signaling theory (Grafen, 1990;Zahavi, 1977) proposes from an evolutionary psychology perspective that humans engage in costly behaviors, that is, behaviors that are not immediately necessary for the survival of the individual, to broadcast to others that they have surplus genetic fitness and abundance of resources.”
From Sustainable clothing: Why conspicuous consumption and greenwashing matter (2023) · cites this paper as Zahavi, 1977
Cites
Mate selection—A selection for a handicap
Zahavi, A. (1975) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(75)90111-3 · Cited by 5,251 · see citing works
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Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity
Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573 · Cited by 673 · see citing works
Open Problems in Cooperative AI
Dafoe, A., Hughes, E., Bachrach, Y., Collins, T., McKee, K. R., Leibo, J. Z., Larson, K., & Graepel, T. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2012.08630 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
Sustainable clothing: Why conspicuous consumption and greenwashing matter
Apaolaza, V., Policarpo, M. C., Hartmann, P., Paredes, M. R., & D'Souza, C. (2023) · Business Strategy and the Environment · doi:10.1002/bse.3335 · Cited by 92 · see citing works
- Authors
- Zahavi, A.
- Corresponding author
- Zahavi, A.
- Venue
- Evolutionary Ecology
- Publisher
- Macmillan Education UK
- Published
- 1977
- Pages
- 253-259
- OpenAlex
- W189760034
- Cited by
- 132
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Developmental Biology › Animal Vocal Communication and Behavior
- Keywords
- evolution of communication, altruism, aposematism, alarm calls, threat display, predator-prey interactions, sexual conflict, host-parasite interactions, costly signaling
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