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Mind—body identity, privacy and categories
Abstract
Current controversies about the Mind—Body Identity Theory form a case-study for the investigation of the methods practised by linguistic philosophers. Recent criticisms of these methods question that philosophers can discern lines of demarcation between ‘categories’ of entities, and thereby diagnose ‘conceptual confusions’ in ‘reductionist’ philosophical theories. Such doubts arise once we see that it is very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to draw a firm line between the ‘conceptual’ and the ‘empirical’ and thus to differentiate between a statement embodying a conceptual confusion and one that expresses a surprising empirical result. The proponent of the Identity Theory (by which I mean one who thinks it sensible to assert that empirical inquiry will discover that sensations (not thoughts) are identical with certain brain-processes) 1 holds that his opponents’ arguments to the effect that empirical inquiry could not identify brain processes and sensations are admirable illustrations of this difficulty. For, he argues, the classifications of linguistic expressions that are the ground of his opponents’ criticism are classifications of a language which is as it is because it is the language spoken at a given stage of empirical inquiry. But the sort of empirical results that would show brain processes and sensations to be identical would also bring about changes in our ways of speaking.
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Cited by
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Searle, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5834.001.0001 · Cited by 3,595
Metadata
- Authors
- Rorty, R.
- Venue
- The Mind-Brain Identity Theory
- Publisher
- Macmillan Education UK
- Published
- 1970
- Pages
- 187-213
- OpenAlex
- W2487911131
- Cited by
- 171
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 15.26
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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