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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

What Is It Like to Be a Bat?

Nagel, Thomas · 1974 · The Philosophical Review

Abstract

Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction. But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored.

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Metadata

Authors
Nagel, T.
Corresponding author
Nagel, Thomas
Venue
The Philosophical Review
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1974-10
Volume
83
Issue
4
Pages
435
ISSN
0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2072267104
Cited by
7,440
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 457 · 2025: 518 · 2024: 459 · 2023: 358 · 2022: 344 · 2021: 347 · 2020: 298 · 2019: 415 · 2018: 308 · 2017: 272 · 2016: 221 · 2015: 195 · 2014: 230 · 2013: 212 · 2012: 172
FWCI
1.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
The Philosophical Review (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
mind-body problem, consciousness, materialism, reductionism, what it is like, philosophy of mind

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: What Is It Like to Be a Bat? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2183914
The paper
Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? The Philosophical Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914

Data sources

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.