The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Economies as an Anti-Trust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs
Abstract
Suppose that a merger (or other combination) is proposed that yields economies but at the same time increases market power. Can the courts and antitrust agencies safely rely, in these circumstances, on a literal reading of the law which prohibits mergers ‘where in any line of commerce or any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly’, 1 or does this run the risk of serious economic loss? In the usual merger where both effects are insubstantial this problem is absent. 2 But in the occasional case where efficiency and market power consequences exist, can economies be dismissed on the grounds that market power effects invariably dominate ? If they cannot, then a rational treatment of the merger question requires that an effort be made to establish the allocative implications of the scale economy and market power effects associated with the merger.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
(2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.7.i · Cited by 5,406
Schoeffler, S., & Bain, J. S. (1957) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.2307/1247273 · Cited by 2,721
Allocative efficiency vs. X-Efficiency
Leibenstein, H. (1966) · American Economic Review · Cited by 2,709
Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in Manufacturing Industries
Bain, J. S. (1956) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.4159/harvard.9780674188037 · Cited by 2,553
The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market
Stigler, G. J. (1951) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257075 · Cited by 1,630
Productivity Trends in the United States
Derksen, J. B. D., & Kendrick, J. W. (1961) · Revue de l'Institut International de Statistique / Review of the International Statistical Institute · doi:10.2307/1401957 · Cited by 1,092
Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size
Williamson, O. E. (1967) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259258 · Cited by 1,043
Self-citationThe Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm
Alchian, A. A., & Williamson, O. E. (1965) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1910367 · Cited by 973
Self-citationThe Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm.
O'Connell, J., & Williamson, O. E. (1965) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2552785 · Cited by 580
Self-citation
Cited by
The Effects of Banking Mergers on Loan Contracts
Sapienza, P. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00424 · Cited by 623
Using Big Data to Estimate Consumer Surplus: The Case of Uber
Cohen, P., Hahn, R., Hall, J., Levitt, S., & Metcalfe, R. (2016) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w22627 · Cited by 354
The Co-Evolution of Organizational Value Capture, Value Creation and Sustainable Advantage
Pitelis, C. N. (2009) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840609346977 · Cited by 277
Innovating big tech firms and competition policy: favoring dynamic over static competition
Petit, N., & Teece, D. J. (2021) · Industrial and Corporate Change · doi:10.1093/icc/dtab049 · Cited by 109
“Productivity and Prices in Manufacturing during an Era of Rising Concentration”
Peltzman, S. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3168877 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Williamson, O. E.
- Venue
- Readings in Industrial Economics
- Publisher
- Macmillan Education UK
- Published
- 1972
- Pages
- 111-135
- OpenAlex
- W72568110
- Cited by
- 467
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 5.63
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Economies as an Anti-Trust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/978-1-349-15486-9_7
- The paper
- Williamson, O. E. (1972). Economies as an Anti-Trust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs. Readings in Industrial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15486-9_7
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.