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Cited by 397

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation

McChesney, Fred S.·1988·The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_15
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Research works printed but not linked: 29

  1. George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” 2 Bell J. Econ. 3 (1971). · DOI · Paper page
  2. Sam Peltzman, “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” 19 J. Law & Econ. 211 (1976); · DOI · Paper page
  3. Gary S. Becker, “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,” 98 Q.J. Econ. 371 (1983). · DOI · Paper page
  4. Robert D. Tollison, “Rent-Seeking: A Survey,” 35 Kyklos 575, 592 (1982).
  5. The ‘consumerist’ measures of the last few years… are not an obvious product of interest group pressures, and the proponents of the economic theory of regulation have thus far largely ignored such measures.” Richard A. Posner. “Theories of Economic Regulation.” 5 Bell J. Econ. 335 (1974). · DOI · Paper page
  6. Migué also discusses regulations that are “difficult to reconcile with the economic theory of regulation.” Jean-Luc Migué. Controls versus Subsidies in the “Economic Theory of Regulation.” 20 J. Law & Econ. 213, 214 (1977). · doi:10.1086/466899
  7. Gordon Tullock, “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.” 5 W. Econ. J. 224 (1967); · DOI · Paper page
  8. Richard A. Posner, “The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation.” 83 J. Pol. Econ. 807 (1975). · DOI
  9. For a diagrammatic presentation of the theory, see Fred S. McChesney, “Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court’s Unanswered Questions and Questionable Answers,” 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 74–100 (1985). · doi:10.2307/3312092
  10. For example, Howard P. Marvel, “Factory Regulation: A Reinterpretation of Early English Experience.” 20 J. Law & Econ. 379 (1977); · DOI
  11. R. H. Coase, “Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting.” 22 J. Law & Econ. 269 (1979); · DOI
  12. Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick. “A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation.” 25 J. Law & Econ. 99 (1982); · DOI
  13. B. Peter Pashigian. “The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and Factor Shares.” 27 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1984); · doi:10.1086/467056
  14. Ann P. Bartel & Lacy Glenn Thomas. “Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA’s Impact,” 28 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1985). · DOI · Paper page
  15. For one of the few models based on political demands being made of private individuals, see William P. Welch, “The Economics of Campaign Funds.” 17 Pub. Choice 83, 84 (1974) (“[tjhe politician demands funds in exchange for political influence”).
  16. Robert E. McCormick. The Strategic Use of Regulation: A Review of the Literature, in The Political Economy of Regulation: Private Interests in the Regulatory Process 14 ( Robert A. Rogowsky & Bruce Yandle eds. 1984 ).
  17. Dairy interests pay handsomely for the continuation of congressional milk-price supports. Larry J. Sabato, PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees 133, 137 (1984). Physician and dentist “political action committees” (PACs) contribute large sums for continuation of self-regulation. Id. at 134–35.
  18. For an empirical demonstration of the harm to marginal firms from minimum-wage and union-pay increases; for example, see David E. Kaun, “Minimum Wages. Factor Substitution and the Marginal Producer,” 79 Q.J. Econ. 478 (1965); · doi:10.2307/1882711
  19. Oliver E. Williamson “Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspective.” 82 Q.J. Econ. 85 (1968). For discussion of other regulatory measures with different effects on firms, see the sources cited in note 9 supra. · doi:10.2307/1882246
  20. The effects of Third World government expropriations of private capital in diminishing the amount of investment made are analyzed in Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz. A Theory of Expropriation and Deviations from Perfect Capital Mobility, 94 Econ. J. 16 (1984). · DOI
  21. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985);
  22. Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Birth of a Transfer Society (1980).
  23. The rent-extraction model thus sheds light on the recurring controversy whether bureaucratic agencies “run amuck,” free of congressional or other constraints. The most recent study of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), for example, concludes that “the Commission remains largely unconstrained from without.” Kenneth W. Clarkson & Timothy J. Muris, Commission Performance, Incentives and Behavior, in The Federal Trade Commission since 1970: Economic Regulation and Bureaucratic Behavior 282 (1981). But Weingast and Moran present evidence of systematic congressional influence over FTC actions. Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran. “Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission.” 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765 (1983). The rent-extraction model suggests that neither view may fully capture the essence of Congress-agency relations. A politician has less incentive to monitor specialized agencies ex ante while they consider and adopt cost-imposing measures more cheaply than Congress itself could. There is more incentive for legislative surveillance of agency action ex post, in order to locate opportunities for alleviating those costs (for a fee). For a discussion and evidence of politicians’ intervention to remove the costs imposed by bureaucrats’ antitrust investigations and prosecutions, see Roger L. Faith, Donald R. Leavens, and Robert D. Tollison, “Antitrust Port Barrel,” 25 J. Law & Econ. 329 (1982). · DOI · Paper page
  24. Further, the appearance may not be purely illusory. Congressional monitoring of agencies is costly. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner. “An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,” 3 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1974). Some of what agencies do, therefore, will not be known to a legislator until constituents bring it to his attention. · doi:10.1086/467515
  25. L. G. Telser, “A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements,” 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980). · DOI · Paper page
  26. See, for example, Yoram Peles, “Rates of Amortization of Advertising Expenditures.” 79J. Pol. Econ. 1032 (1971): Robert Ayanian, “Advertising and Rate of Return.” 18 J. Law & Econ. 479 (1975). · doi:10.1086/259813
  27. Posner, supra note 7. See also Franklin M. Fisher, “The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation: Posner Reconsidered,” 93 J. Pol. Econ. 410 (1985); · doi:10.1086/261306
  28. W. P. Rogerson. “The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: A Game-theoretic Analysis,” 13 Bell J. Econ. 391 (1982). · DOI
  29. James Alm, “The Welfare Cost of the Underground Economy,” 24 Econ. Inquiry 243 (1985).

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Metadata

Authors
McChesney, F. S.
Venue
The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking
Publisher
Springer US
Published
1988
Pages
179-196
DOI
10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_15
OpenAlex
W1993270866
Cited by
397
References
2
FWCI
54.01
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

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McChesney, F. S. (1988). Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation. The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_15

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