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The Regulation of Entry

Open access
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. · 2002 · The Quarterly Journal of Economics

The DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 13 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Abstract

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Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This paper assembles a new cross-country dataset on business entry regulation in 75 countries and uses it to compare the helping-hand, capture, and tollbooth theories of regulation. The evidence is most consistent with the tollbooth view: heavier entry regulation is associated with more corruption, a larger unofficial economy, and less representative, more autocratic governments.

Key findings

  • Across the 75-country sample, the number of entry procedures ranges from 2 in Canada to 20 in Bolivia, with a sample average of 10.17 procedures; the average official time is 63.05 business days and the average cost is 0.34 of GDP per capita.
  • The number of procedures is strongly correlated with time and cost: the paper reports correlations of 0.75 with log time and 0.62 with log cost.
  • The helping-hand tests do not support a beneficial-regulation story: in Table IV, more procedures are associated with lower ISO quality standards (e.g. coefficient -0.2646) and larger unofficial economy measures (e.g. coefficient 13.6277 for size of unofficial economy; 19.8763 for employment in the unofficial economy), while pollution and health outcomes do not improve.
  • The tollbooth evidence is stronger: Table VI reports that more procedures are associated with worse corruption scores, with a coefficient of -3.2809 (and -1.7249 with GDP per capita controls) for the corruption regressions.
  • In Table VIII, better government is associated with lighter regulation; the paper states that countries with more limited and representative governments have statistically significantly fewer procedures using 5 out of 6 measures of better government, and that more autocratic countries regulate more heavily.

Methods

  • The paper builds a new database on entry regulation for 75 countries, focusing on the legal requirements, official time, and official cost for a standardized start-up firm.
  • Data were gathered from written government sources, World Bank- and USAID-sponsored studies, government web pages, direct contacts with agencies, and independent double-checks in 73 countries via local consulting reports; the remaining 2 countries were double-checked through government contacts.
  • The main analysis uses cross-country OLS regressions relating entry regulation measures to outcomes such as quality, pollution, unofficial economy, corruption, political institutions, legal origin, and GDP per capita; the paper also reports correlations and test-of-means comparisons across income quartiles.

Limitations

  • The paper itself notes that the capture-theory tests are based on crude measures and that the data are probably least suited to test the capture hypothesis.
  • The authors say the data almost surely underestimate the cost and complexity of entry because they focus on the capital city, omit industry-specific requirements and foreign-ownership steps, and ignore some informal delays and bribes.
  • Evident from the text: the study is cross-sectional and based on official procedures/costs, so causal interpretation is limited and informal corruption/bureaucratic delays are not directly measured except indirectly through correlations.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1162/003355302753399436

Cites

39 of 39 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 Valid · 3 Not valid · 13 Not checked · 114 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Show all 39 references

Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. McLiesh Caralee, 2001, NBER Working Paper No., 8288
  2. Kaufmann Daniel, 1997, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 239
  3. Fred, 1987, Journal of Legal Studies, 101
  4. Olson, Mancur, "Autocracy, Democracy, and Prosperity," in Richard Zeckhauser, ed., Strategy of Choice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
  5. Vishny Robert W., 1993, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 617
  6. George, 1971, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 3
  7. 1967, Western Economic Journal, 232
  8. World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2001, Klaus Schwab et al., eds. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A.
Affiliations
  • World Bank (US)
  • National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
2002-02-01
Volume
117
Issue
1
Pages
1-37
ISSN
  • 0033-5533
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W2139896179
Cited by
3,956
References
30
Citations by year
2026: 223 · 2025: 185 · 2024: 157 · 2023: 120 · 2022: 140 · 2021: 150 · 2020: 151 · 2019: 161 · 2018: 157 · 2017: 162 · 2016: 166 · 2015: 193 · 2014: 200 · 2013: 183 · 2012: 193
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
Licence
other-oa
Locations
  • World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • The World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (World Bank) (publishedVersion)
  • National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
  • OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) (submittedVersion)
  • The World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (World Bank) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Keywords
start-up firms, bureaucratic procedures, corruption, informal economy, democracy, government size, public choice theory, public interest theory

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Regulation of Entry. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/003355302753399436
The paper
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002). The Regulation of Entry. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399436

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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