The Regulation of Entry
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record, with a small difference in title or year; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 13 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.
Abstract
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Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This paper assembles a new cross-country dataset on business entry regulation in 75 countries and uses it to compare the helping-hand, capture, and tollbooth theories of regulation. The evidence is most consistent with the tollbooth view: heavier entry regulation is associated with more corruption, a larger unofficial economy, and less representative, more autocratic governments.
Key findings
- Across the 75-country sample, the number of entry procedures ranges from 2 in Canada to 20 in Bolivia, with a sample average of 10.17 procedures; the average official time is 63.05 business days and the average cost is 0.34 of GDP per capita.
- The number of procedures is strongly correlated with time and cost: the paper reports correlations of 0.75 with log time and 0.62 with log cost.
- The helping-hand tests do not support a beneficial-regulation story: in Table IV, more procedures are associated with lower ISO quality standards (e.g. coefficient -0.2646) and larger unofficial economy measures (e.g. coefficient 13.6277 for size of unofficial economy; 19.8763 for employment in the unofficial economy), while pollution and health outcomes do not improve.
- The tollbooth evidence is stronger: Table VI reports that more procedures are associated with worse corruption scores, with a coefficient of -3.2809 (and -1.7249 with GDP per capita controls) for the corruption regressions.
- In Table VIII, better government is associated with lighter regulation; the paper states that countries with more limited and representative governments have statistically significantly fewer procedures using 5 out of 6 measures of better government, and that more autocratic countries regulate more heavily.
Methods
- The paper builds a new database on entry regulation for 75 countries, focusing on the legal requirements, official time, and official cost for a standardized start-up firm.
- Data were gathered from written government sources, World Bank- and USAID-sponsored studies, government web pages, direct contacts with agencies, and independent double-checks in 73 countries via local consulting reports; the remaining 2 countries were double-checked through government contacts.
- The main analysis uses cross-country OLS regressions relating entry regulation measures to outcomes such as quality, pollution, unofficial economy, corruption, political institutions, legal origin, and GDP per capita; the paper also reports correlations and test-of-means comparisons across income quartiles.
Limitations
- The paper itself notes that the capture-theory tests are based on crude measures and that the data are probably least suited to test the capture hypothesis.
- The authors say the data almost surely underestimate the cost and complexity of entry because they focus on the capital city, omit industry-specific requirements and foreign-ownership steps, and ignore some informal delays and bribes.
- Evident from the text: the study is cross-sectional and based on official procedures/costs, so causal interpretation is limited and informal corruption/bureaucratic delays are not directly measured except indirectly through correlations.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 3 Not valid · 13 Not checked · 114 Own results and interpretations
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Very few entry regulations cover tax and labor issues.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“The data show that the numbers of entry and of labor market regulations are positively correlated across countries, contrary to the substitutes hypothesis.”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Djankov et al., 2000
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It often takes the form of screening procedures.”
- Also stated in: § III. Basic Results. · plain
“Instead, much of what governments do to regulate entry falls into the category of screening procedures.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § III. Basic Results. · plain
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“First, the cost-to-per-capita-GDP ratio decreases uniformly with GDP per capita.”
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In contrast, countries in the other three quartiles of per capita income are not statistically different from each other in terms of the number of procedures and the time required to fulfill them.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
49 more claims
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- Probably not a substantial claim. 21
- It may state two separate claims as one. 54
- The quote only partly states this claim. 26
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Our findings suggest an explanation for the low level of incorporation in Italy: the average direct cost associated with fulfilling the bureaucratic regulations for registering a new corporation in Italy is 20% of per capita GNP compared to 10% of per capita GNP on average for other G-7 European countries.”
From Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship (2006) · cites this paper as Djankov et al. (2002)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Given the explicit link made by Djankov et al . (2002) between the speed and ease with which businesses may be established in a country and its economic performance - and the enthusiasm with which this link has been grasped by European Union policy makers - our findings imply this link needs reconsidering.”
From The Effect of Business Regulations on Nascent and Young Business Entrepreneurship (2007) · cites this paper as Djankov et al . (2002)
Citations
Cites
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
Self-citationThe Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (1971) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.2307/3003160 · Cited by 8,098
Journal of Economic Literature
(2019) · AEA Papers and Proceedings · doi:10.1257/pandp.109.633 · Cited by 7,468
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Kuznets, S. (2024) · Business Cycle Theory, Part I Volume 4 · doi:10.4324/9781003549741-8 · Cited by 7,176
La Porta, R. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222 · Cited by 5,699
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Pigou, A. C. (1933) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2224491 · Cited by 5,137
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Peltzman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466865 · Cited by 4,729
Moffitt, R. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.2.660 · Cited by 4,694
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118402 · Cited by 3,778
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 8
- McLiesh Caralee, 2001, NBER Working Paper No., 8288
- Kaufmann Daniel, 1997, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 239
- Fred, 1987, Journal of Legal Studies, 101
- Olson, Mancur, "Autocracy, Democracy, and Prosperity," in Richard Zeckhauser, ed., Strategy of Choice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
- Vishny Robert W., 1993, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 617
- George, 1971, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 3
- 1967, Western Economic Journal, 232
- World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2001, Klaus Schwab et al., eds. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Cited by
Law, finance, and economic growth in China
ALLEN, F., QIAN, J., & QIAN, M. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.010 · Cited by 4,446
Faccio, M. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282806776157704 · Cited by 4,059
The law and economics of self-dealing
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.02.007 · Cited by 3,486
Self-citationThe great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00125-9 · Cited by 3,327
“1, we graph the Djankov et al. (2002) measure of the number of procedures in different countries to start a business (a measure of the direct barriers to entry) against the size of equity markets relative to GDP in that country.”
An institution-based view of international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies
Peng, M. W., Wang, D. Y. L., & Jiang, Y. (2008) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400377 · Cited by 3,286
“…Perspective paper has: (1) suggested that an institution-based view of IB strategy has emerged; (2) argued that this view complements the existing industry-and resource-based views to collectively sustain a strategy tripod; and (3) outlined as exemplars four diverse areas of research on emerging…”
Metadata
- Authors
- Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A.
- Affiliations
- World Bank (US)
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- ORCID
- Djankov, S.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2002-02-01
- Volume
- 117
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-37
- ISSN
- 0033-5533
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2139896179
- Cited by
- 3,956
- References
- 30
- Citations by year
- 2026: 223 · 2025: 185 · 2024: 157 · 2023: 120 · 2022: 140 · 2021: 150 · 2020: 151 · 2019: 161 · 2018: 157 · 2017: 162 · 2016: 166 · 2015: 193 · 2014: 200 · 2013: 183 · 2012: 193
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Licence
- other-oa
- Locations
- World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks (publishedVersion)
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- The World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (World Bank) (publishedVersion)
- National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) (submittedVersion)
- The World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (World Bank) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
- Keywords
- start-up firms, bureaucratic procedures, corruption, informal economy, democracy, government size, public choice theory, public interest theory
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Regulation of Entry. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/003355302753399436
- The paper
- Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002). The Regulation of Entry. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399436
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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