The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
MAC-in-the-Box: Verifying a Minimalistic Hardware Design for MAC Computation
Open accessAbstract
We study the verification of security properties at the state machine level of a minimalistic device, called the MAC-in-the-Box (MITB). This device computes a message authentication code based on the SHA-3 hash function and a key that is stored on device, but never output directly. It is designed for secure password storage, but may also be used for secure key-exchange and second-factor authentication. We formally verify, in the HOL4 theorem prover, that no outside observer can distinguish this device from an ideal functionality that provides only access to a hashing oracle. Furthermore, we propose protocols for the MITB’s use in password storage, key-exchange and second-factor authentication, and formally show that it improves resistance against host-compromise in these three application scenarios.
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“Second, the security of digital twin pipelines specifically, ensuring cryptographic provenance of telemetry data from field device through edge infrastructure to twin state has not been addressed within a unified Zero Trust framework anchored in hardware device identity.[9], [24], [35]”
From Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [24]
Citations
Cites
Universally composable security: a new paradigm for cryptographic protocols
Canetti, R. (2001) · Proceedings 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/sfcs.2001.959888 · Cited by 3,309
SHA-3 standard: permutation-based hash and extendable-output functions
National Institute of Standards and Technology (US) (2015) · doi:10.6028/nist.fips.202 · Cited by 783
The TAMARIN Prover for the Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols
Meier, S., Schmidt, B., Cremers, C., & Basin, D. (2013) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-39799-8_48 · Cited by 657
On the Indifferentiability of the Sponge Construction
Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., Peeters, M., & Van Assche, G. (2008) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-78967-3_11 · Cited by 425
Automated verification of selected equivalences for security protocols
Blanchet, B., Abadi, M., & Fournet, C. (2008) · The Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming · doi:10.1016/j.jlap.2007.06.002 · Cited by 346
Formal certification of code-based cryptographic proofs
Barthe, G., Grégoire, B., & Zanella Béguelin, S. (2009) · Proceedings of the 36th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages · doi:10.1145/1480881.1480894 · Cited by 268
Computer-Aided Security Proofs for the Working Cryptographer
Barthe, G., Grégoire, B., Heraud, S., & Béguelin, S. Z. (2011) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_5 · Cited by 256
Jasmin: High-Assurance and High-Speed Cryptography
Almeida, J. B., Barbosa, M., Barthe, G., Blot, A., Grégoire, B., Laporte, V., Oliveira, T., Pacheco, H., Schmidt, B., & Strub, P.-Y. (2017) · ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) · doi:10.1145/3133956.3134078 · Cited by 160
Hardware Implementation of Finite-Field Arithmetic
Deschamps, J. (2009) · Cited by 120
Formal certification of code-based cryptographic proofs
Barthe, G., Grégoire, B., & Zanella-Béguelin, S. (2009) · ACM SIGPLAN Notices · doi:10.1145/1594834.1480894 · Cited by 110
Cited by
Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems
Alagappan, V. (2026) · International Journal of Artificial Intelligence, Data Science, and Machine Learning · doi:10.63282/3050-9262.ijaidsml-v7i2p109
Metadata
- Authors
- Küennemann, R., & Nemati, H.
- Affiliations
- Helmholtz Center for Information Security (DE)
- ORCID
- Nemati, Hamed
- Venue
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- Published
- 2020
- Pages
- 525-545
- ISSN
- 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
- 1611-3349
- OpenAlex
- W3085431325
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- figshare.com
- Licence
- cc-by
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (vor)
- Locations
- Lecture notes in computer science (publishedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- CISPA Helmholtz Center
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Keywords
- message authentication codes, SHA-3, hardware security, formal verification, HOL4 theorem prover, key exchange, second-factor authentication
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: MAC-in-the-Box: Verifying a Minimalistic Hardware Design for MAC Computation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_26
- The paper
- Küennemann, R., & Nemati, H. (2020). MAC-in-the-Box: Verifying a Minimalistic Hardware Design for MAC Computation. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_26
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
