Stealthy Deception Attacks Against SCADA Systems
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
SCADA protocols for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are vulnerable to network attacks such as session hijacking. Hence, research focuses on network anomaly detection based on meta--data (message sizes, timing, command sequence), or on the state values of the physical process. In this work we present a class of semantic network-based attacks against SCADA systems that are undetectable by the above mentioned anomaly detection. After hijacking the communication channels between the Human Machine Interface (HMI) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), our attacks cause the HMI to present a fake view of the industrial process, deceiving the human operator into taking manual actions. Our most advanced attack also manipulates the messages generated by the operator's actions, reversing their semantic meaning while causing the HMI to present a view that is consistent with the attempted human actions. The attacks are totaly stealthy because the message sizes and timing, the command sequences, and the data values of the ICS's state all remain legitimate. We implemented and tested several attack scenarios in the test lab of our local electric company, against a real HMI and real PLCs, separated by a commercial-grade firewall. We developed a real-time security assessment tool, that can simultaneously manipulate the communication to multiple PLCs and cause the HMI to display a coherent system--wide fake view. Our tool is configured with message-manipulating rules written in an ICS Attack Markup Language (IAML) we designed, which may be of independent interest. Our semantic attacks all successfully fooled the operator and brought the system to states of blackout and possible equipment damage.
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Citations
Cites
The 2015 Ukraine Blackout: Implications for False Data Injection Attacks
Liang, G., Weller, S. R., Zhao, J., Luo, F., & Dong, Z. Y. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2016.2631891 · Cited by 1,248
Accurate modeling of modbus/TCP for intrusion detection in SCADA systems
Goldenberg, N., & Wool, A. (2013) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2013.05.001 · Cited by 323 · cited 5×
“Goldenberg & Wool [18] developed a model-based approach (the GW model) for Network anomaly detection based on the normal traffic pattern in Modbus SCADA networks using a Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) to represent the cyclic traffic.”
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Cited by
Digital Twin: A Comprehensive Survey of Security Threats
Alcaraz, C., & Lopez, J. (2022) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2022.3171465 · Cited by 340
Kravchik, M., & Shabtai, A. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2021.3050101 · Cited by 224
An Analytics Framework for Heuristic Inference Attacks Against Industrial Control Systems
Choi, T., Bai, G., Ko, R. K. L., Dong, N., Zhang, W., & Wang, S. (2020) · 2020 IEEE 19th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom) · doi:10.1109/trustcom50675.2020.00112 · Cited by 11
Anomaly Detection based on Robust Spatial-temporal Modeling for Industrial Control Systems
Li, S., Liu, J., Pan, Z., Lv, S., Si, S., & Sun, L. (2022) · 2022 IEEE 19th International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Smart Systems (MASS) · doi:10.1109/mass56207.2022.00058 · Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Kleinmann, A., Amichay, O., Wool, A., Tenenbaum, D., Bar, O., & Lev, L.
- Venue
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- Published
- 2017-12-22
- Pages
- 93-109
- ISSN
- 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
- 1611-3349
- OpenAlex
- W2732665834
- Cited by
- 38
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 7.98
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Kleinmann, A., Amichay, O., Wool, A., Tenenbaum, D., Bar, O., & Lev, L. (2018). Stealthy Deception Attacks Against SCADA Systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72817-9_7
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