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Cited by 11Smart Grid Security and ResilienceNetwork Security and Intrusion DetectionIndustrial Automation and Control Systems

An Analytics Framework for Heuristic Inference Attacks Against Industrial Control Systems

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Choi, Taejun, Bai, Guangdong, Ko, Ryan K L, Dong, Naipeng, Zhang, Wenlu, Wang, Shunyao·2020·2020 IEEE 19th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom)
DOI 10.1109/trustcom50675.2020.00112
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Abstract

Industrial control systems (ICS) of critical infrastructure are increasingly connected to the Internet for remote site management at scale. However, cyber attacks against ICS - especially at the communication channels between human-machine interface (HMIs) and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) - are increasing at a rate which outstrips the rate of mitigation. In this paper, we introduce a vendor-agnostic analytics framework which allows security researchers to analyse attacks against ICS systems, even if the researchers have zero control automation domain knowledge or are faced with a myriad of heterogenous ICS systems. Unlike existing works that require expertise in domain knowledge and specialised tool usage, our analytics framework does not require prior knowledge about ICS communication protocols, PLCs, and expertise of any network penetration testing tool. Using `digital twin' scenarios comprising industry-representative HMIs, PLCs and firewalls in our test lab, our framework's steps were demonstrated to successfully implement a stealthy deception attack based on false data injection attacks (FDIA). Furthermore, our framework also demonstrated the relative ease of attack dataset collection, and the ability to leverage well-known penetration testing tools. We also introduce the concept of `heuristic inference attacks', a new family of attack types on ICS which is agnostic to PLC and HMI brands/models commonly deployed in ICS. Our experiments were also validated on a separate ICS dataset collected from a cyber-physical scenario of water utilities. Finally, we utilized time complexity theory to estimate the difficulty for the attacker to conduct the proposed packet analyses, and recommended countermeasures based on our findings.

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  • Simulation environments and tools have provided methods for analyzing threats such as stealthy attack, Heuristic Inference Attacks, related system vulnerabilities, and exploring protections such as Blockchain and AI algorithms for intrusion detection systems.

    “These simulation environments and tools have provided methods for analyzing various types of threats such as stealthy attack [180], or new family attacks such as Heuristic Inference Attacks [181], related system vulnerabilities as well as exploring new ways to protect critical infrastructures such as Blockchain [182] and implementation of AI algorithms for intrusion detection systems (IDS) such as”

    From SCADA Systems With Focus on Continuous Manufacturing and Steel Industry: A Survey on Architectures, Standards, Challenges and Industry 5.0 (2022) · cites this paper as [180]

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Authors
Choi, T., Bai, G., Ko, R. K. L., Dong, N., Zhang, W., & Wang, S.
Affiliations
The University of Queensland (AU)
ORCID
Venue
2020 IEEE 19th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2020-12
Pages
827-835
DOI
10.1109/trustcom50675.2020.00112
OpenAlex
W3132681228
Cited by
11
References
24
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 1
FWCI
1.50
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Griffith Research Online (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
Singapore University of Technology and Design
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
Keywords
industrial control systems, false data injection attacks, deception attacks, human-machine interaction, programmable logic controller, cyber-physical security, time complexity analysis, countermeasures

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