The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Semantic Framework for the Security Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts
Open accessAbstract
Smart contracts are programs running on cryptocurrency (e.g., Ethereum) blockchains, whose popularity stem from the possibility to perform financial transactions, such as payments and auctions, in a distributed environment without need for any trusted third party. Given their financial nature, bugs or vulnerabilities in these programs may lead to catastrophic consequences, as witnessed by recent attacks. Unfortunately, programming smart contracts is a delicate task that requires strong expertise: Ethereum smart contracts are written in Solidity, a dedicated language resembling JavaScript, and shipped over the blockchain in the EVM bytecode format. In order to rigorously verify the security of smart contracts, it is of paramount importance to formalize their semantics as well as the security properties of interest, in particular at the level of the bytecode being executed. In this paper, we present the first complete small-step semantics of EVM bytecode, which we formalize in the F* proof assistant, obtaining executable code that we successfully validate against the official Ethereum test suite. Furthermore, we formally define for the first time a number of central security properties for smart contracts, such as call integrity, atomicity, and independence from miner controlled parameters. This formalization relies on a combination of hyper- and safety properties. Along this work, we identified various mistakes and imprecisions in existing semantics and verification tools for Ethereum smart contracts, thereby demonstrating once more the importance of rigorous semantic foundations for the design of security verification techniques.
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Cites
MedRec: Using Blockchain for Medical Data Access and Permission Management
Azaria, A., Ekblaw, A., Vieira, T., & Lippman, A. (2016) · 2016 2nd International Conference on Open and Big Data (OBD) · doi:10.1109/obd.2016.11 · Cited by 2,526
A Survey of Attacks on Ethereum Smart Contracts (SoK)
Atzei, N., Bartoletti, M., & Cimoli, T. (2017) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-54455-6_8 · Cited by 1,553
Cited by
Smart Contract Development: Challenges and Opportunities
Zou, W., Lo, D., Kochhar, P. S., Le, X.-B. D., Xia, X., Feng, Y., Chen, Z., & Xu, B. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering · doi:10.1109/tse.2019.2942301 · Cited by 727
Using Blockchain for Electronic Health Records
Shahnaz, A., Qamar, U., & Khalid, A. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2946373 · Cited by 590
Osiris: Hunting for Integer Bugs in Ethereum Smart Contracts
Torres, C. F., Schütte, J., & State, R. (2018) · Proceedings of the 34th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference · doi:10.1145/3274694.3274737 · Cited by 440
KEVM: A Complete Formal Semantics of the Ethereum Virtual Machine
Hildenbrandt, E., Saxena, M., Rodrigues, N., Zhu, X., Daian, P., Guth, D., Moore, B., Park, D., Zhang, Y., Stefanescu, A., et al. (2018) · 2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) · doi:10.1109/csf.2018.00022 · Cited by 418
Empirical review of automated analysis tools on 47,587 Ethereum smart contracts
Durieux, T., Ferreira, J. F., Abreu, R., & Cruz, P. (2020) · Proceedings of the ACM/IEEE 42nd International Conference on Software Engineering · doi:10.1145/3377811.3380364 · Cited by 409
Metadata
- Authors
- Grishchenko, I., Maffei, M., & Schneidewind, C.
- Venue
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- Published
- 2018
- Pages
- 243-269
- ISSN
- 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
- 1611-3349
- OpenAlex
- W2788841915
- Cited by
- 200
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 10.92
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Grishchenko, I., Maffei, M., & Schneidewind, C. (2018). A Semantic Framework for the Security Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89722-6_10
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