Cited by 482Cryptographic Implementations and SecurityCoding theory and cryptographyCryptography and Residue Arithmetic

Related-Key Cryptanalysis of the Full AES-192 and AES-256

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Biryukov, Alex, Khovratovich, Dmitry·2009·Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Crossref · 10.1007/978-3-642-10366-7_1

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  • The analysis of AES with local collisions is only applicable to the related-key model.

    “So far the most well-known attempt is the analysis of AES with local collisions [8][9][10][11], but it is only applicable to the relatedkey model.”

    From Biclique Cryptanalysis of the Full AES (2011) · cites this paper as [9]

    The Introduction and Conclusions describe the paper’s local-collision attacks on AES-192 and AES-256 as related-key attacks. Section 4.1 explains the related-key model used. The paper does not establish the broader claim that analysis of AES with local collisions is only applicable in that model; page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)

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  • In weaker attack models, related-key cryptanalysis was applied to the full versions of AES-192 and AES-256.

    “The situation is different in weaker attack models, where the related-key cryptanalysis was applied to the full versions of AES-192 and AES-256 [9], and the rebound attack demonstrated a non-random property in 8-round AES-128 [25,30].”

    From Biclique Cryptanalysis of the Full AES (2011) · cites this paper as [9]

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Research works printed but not linked: 12

  1. Bellare, M., Kohno, T.: A theoretical treatment of related-key attacks: Rka-prps, rka- prfs, and applications. In: Biham, E. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2656, pp. 491-506. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
  2. Biham, E.: New types of cryptanalytic attacks using related keys. J. Cryptol- ogy 7(4), 229-246 (1994)
  3. Biham, E., Dunkelman, O., Keller, N.: The rectangle attack -rectangling the Ser- pent. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 340-357. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
  4. Biham, E., Dunkelman, O., Keller, N.: Related-key boomerang and rectangle at- tacks. In: Cramer, R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2005. LNCS, vol. 3494, pp. 507-525. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
  5. Biryukov, A., Khovratovich, D., Nikolić, I.: Distinguisher and related-key attack on the full AES-256. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 231-249. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
  6. Chabaud, F., Joux, A.: Differential collisions in SHA-0. In: Krawczyk, H. (ed.) CRYPTO 1998. LNCS, vol. 1462, p. 56. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
  7. Daemen, J., Rijmen, V.: The Design of Rijndael. AES -the Advanced Encryption Standard. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
  8. Gilbert, H., Minier, M.: A collision attack on 7 rounds of Rijndael. In: AES Can- didate Conference, pp. 230-241 (2000)
  9. Kelsey, J., Kohno, T., Schneier, B.: Amplified boomerang attacks against reduced- round MARS and Serpent. In: Schneier, B. (ed.) FSE 2000. LNCS, vol. 1978, pp. 75-93. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
  10. Kim, J., Hong, S., Preneel, B.: Related-key rectangle attacks on reduced AES-192 and AES-256. In: Biryukov, A. (ed.) FSE 2007. LNCS, vol. 4593, pp. 225-241. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
  11. Lucks, S.: Ciphers secure against related-key attacks. In: Roy, B., Meier, W. (eds.) FSE 2004. LNCS, vol. 3017, pp. 359-370. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
  12. Wagner, D.: The boomerang attack. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) FSE 1999. LNCS, vol. 1636, pp. 156-170. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)

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Authors
Biryukov, A., & Khovratovich, D.
Affiliations
University of Luxembourg (LU)
Venue
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Published
2009
Pages
1-18
ISSN
  • 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
  • 1611-3349
OpenAlex
W1597699498
Cited by
482
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 30 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 34 · 2020: 29 · 2019: 29 · 2018: 25 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 28 · 2014: 40 · 2013: 31 · 2012: 36
FWCI
30.50
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Lecture notes in computer science (publishedVersion)
Funders
Université du Luxembourg
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Coding theory and cryptography
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
Keywords
related-key attacks, AES-192, AES-256, boomerang attack, key recovery attack, block cipher, cryptanalysis

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