The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets
Abstract
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these markets, externalities such as complementarities and peer effects severely complicate the preference ordering of each agent. Further, research has shown that externalities lead to serious problems for market stability and for developing efficient algorithms to find stable matchings. In this paper we make the observation that peer effects are often the result of underlying social connections, and we explore a formulation of the many-to-one matching market where peer effects are derived from an underlying social network. The key feature of our model is that it captures peer effects and complementarities using utility functions, rather than traditional preference ordering. With this model and considering a weaker notion of stability, namely twosided exchange stability, we prove that stable matchings always exist and characterize the set of stable matchings in terms of social welfare. To characterize the efficiency of matching markets with externalities, we provide general bounds on how far the welfare of the worst-case stable matching can be from the welfare of the optimal matching, and find that the structure of the social network (e.g. how well clustered the network is) plays a large role.
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Citations
Cites
Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications
Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511815478 · Cited by 17,557
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827 · Cited by 5,985
Defining and identifying communities in networks
Radicchi, F., Castellano, C., Cecconi, F., Loreto, V., & Parisi, D. (2004) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0400054101 · Cited by 2,450
Cited by
Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
Manlove, D. F. (2013) · Series on Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1142/8591 · Cited by 515
Di, B., Song, L., & Li, Y. (2016) · IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications · doi:10.1109/twc.2016.2606100 · Cited by 444
Dynamic Task Offloading and Resource Allocation for Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Edge Computing
Liu, C.-F., Bennis, M., Debbah, M., & Poor, H. V. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Communications · doi:10.1109/tcomm.2019.2898573 · Cited by 435
Hierarchical Fog-Cloud Computing for IoT Systems: A Computation Offloading Game
Shah-Mansouri, H., & Wong, V. W. S. (2018) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2018.2838022 · Cited by 322
Metadata
- Authors
- Bodine-Baron, E., Lee, C., Chong, A., Hassibi, B., & Wierman, A.
- Venue
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publisher
- Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- Published
- 2011
- Pages
- 117-129
- ISSN
- 0302-9743 (ISSN-L)
- 1611-3349
- OpenAlex
- W2126137945
- Cited by
- 248
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 15.46
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Bodine-Baron, E., Lee, C., Chong, A., Hassibi, B., & Wierman, A. (2011). Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_12
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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