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Proof Theory and Meaning

Sundholm, Göran·1986·Handbook of Philosophical Logic
DOI 10.1007/978-94-009-5203-4_8
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Research works printed but not linked: 80

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Authors
Sundholm, G.
Corresponding author
Sundholm, Göran
Venue
Handbook of Philosophical Logic
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Published
1986
Pages
471-506
DOI
10.1007/978-94-009-5203-4_8
OpenAlex
W2125151981
Cited by
193
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 6
FWCI
22.78
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Springer eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Language and Linguistics › Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
Keywords
proof theory, meaning, Michael Dummett, normalization, proof-theoretic semantics, realism

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