THE STORIES OF LOGIC AND INFORMATION

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Product update turns the current epistemic model M into a model MxA which can even be larger than M itself, recording information of different agents about base facts and what others know.

“This leads to a mechanism of product update , turning the current epistemic model M into a model MxA which can even be larger than M itself, recording information of different agents about base facts and what others know.”

• cites Baltag, Moss & Solecki 1998Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Gerbrandy 1999Not checked — no full text of the source
• cites van Benthem, van Eijck & Kooi 2006 sourceSupported

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Examples of this sort of approach include Dung 1995, Wassermann 2001, Gabbay, Kempson & Meyer Viol 2001, and Jago 2006.

“Examples of this sort of approach include Dung 1995 on dynamic logic of argumentation, Wassermann 2001 on belief revision over syntactic knowledge bases, Gabbay, Kempson & Meyer Viol 2001 on dynamic logic of grammars, and the earliermentioned Jago 2006.”

• cites Dung 1995 sourcePartly supported

  Section 1.5, “Relations to Other Approaches” (page not provided), describes this paper’s framework as an argumentational approach to the semantics of logic programming. That supports identifying Dung 1995 as an argumentation-based approach, but our copy does not identify it as a dynamic logic of argumentation. (LLM, conf=0.82)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites Wassermann 2001Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Jago 2006Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Current 'logic of proofs' (starting from Artemov 1994) is developing a general take on evidence combination.

“In this spirit, current 'logic of proofs' (starting from Artemov 1994) is developing a general take on evidence combination, and one can view the 'labeled deductive systems' of Gabbay 1996 as a program with similar ambitions.”

• cites Artemov 1994 sourceSupported

It may state two separate claims as one.

The complete logic with all the above S5 principles is decidable, be it computationally more complex than its propositional base. It is 'Pspace-complete', rather than 'NP-complete', giving it the same complexity as many games.

“The complete logic with all the above principles is decidable, be it computationally more complex than its propositional base. It is ' Pspace -complete', rather than ' NP -complete', giving it the same complexity as many games (Papadimitriou 1994)”

• cites Papadimitriou 1994Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

T is a subset of T' iff MOD(T) is a superset of MOD(T').

“T Õ T' iff MOD(T) ⊇ MOD(T')”

It may state two separate claims as one.

[]xφ does not imply K[]xφ; a situation's impersonal correlation knowledge need not be known to an external agent unless the agent observes x.

“If [] x f holds at some world s , must the agent know this fact: [] x f Æ K [] x f ? Not so: [] x f can be true at some worlds, and false at epistemically accessible ones. What a situation x 'knows' in the earlier impersonal sense of correlation need not be known to an external agent, unless this agent makes an observation about x .”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

The Mousetrap and other running examples are complex systems with a finite number of components cycling through a finite number of possible states according to a fixed scenario.

“The Mousetrap and other running examples are of this kind: a complex system with a finite number of components cycles through a finite number of possible states, according to some fixed scenario.”

It may state two separate claims as one.

In general assignment models, $x$yφ and $y$xφ are not equivalent, and neither captures the polyadic quantifier $xy· as defined.

“But in general assignment models, these expressions are no longer equivalent, as not all 'intermediate assignments' for x - or y -shifts need be present - and both fail to capture $ xy· as defined here.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

In the party example, {John, Mary} satisfies all requirements.

“Indeed, {John, Mary} satisfies all requirements.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

In doxastic logic as used in dynamic informational processes, one soon finds that mere beliefs are not sufficient for explaining agents' behaviour over time.

“In doxastic logic as used in dynamic informational processes, one soon finds that mere beliefs are not sufficient for explaining agents' behaviour over time.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: We now assume further semantic structure, in the form of a plausibility ordering of worlds as seen from some vantage point.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

Situation theory starts from a concrete reality, with concrete parts but no concrete alternatives.

“Situation theory starts from a concrete reality, with concrete parts but no concrete alternatives.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: There is a concrete reality with concrete parts but no concrete alternatives.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Agents exercise these powers interactively, in groups of agents, leading to behavioral equilibria that naturally invite study per se.

“they exercise these powers interactively, in groups of agents, leading to behavioral equilibria that naturally invite study per se.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Treatments of information as correlation focus on information reports, in which one state of affairs carries information about another.

“Treatments of information as correlation as mentioned in our Introduction focus on information reports, in which one state of affairs carries information about another; the way one thing indicates how another thing is; the way the x -ray turned out carries information about Gretchen's leg.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

Plausibility orderings can be viewed as representing agents' attitudes, or as the result of receiving soft information.

“These can be viewed as representing agents' attitudes, or as the result of receiving what might be called soft information .”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Lorenzen 1955 explained a valid consequence as a dialogical claim in an argumentation game, whose proponent has a winning strategy against any opponent granting the premises.

“Lorenzen 1955 famously explained a valid consequence as a dialogical claim in an argumentation game, whose proponent has a winning strategy against any opponent granting the premises.”

• cites Lorenzen 1955 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

Higher-order information about (lack of) information of ourselves and others is just as important as ground-level factual information.

“'Higher-order information' about (lack of) information of ourselves and others is just as important as ground-level factual information!”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

Epistemic logic has notions of group knowledge which are sui generis, with pride of place going to common knowledge.

“In particular, epistemic logic also has notions of group knowledge which are sui generis, with pride of place going to”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Information is always to be understood in connection with some dynamic process using and transforming it.

“information is always to be understood in connection with some dynamic process using and transforming it.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.

Information is brought to light in logical deduction or computation, and inferences are actions transforming the current state.

“Thus, on this view, information is brought to light in logical deduction or computation, and inferences are actions transforming the current state”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

The Distribution Axiom says that knowledge is closed under known implications, giving agents unlimited powers of stepwise inference from what they already know.

“For instance, the Distribution Axiom Kj ( fÆy ) Æ (K j fÆ Kj y ) says that knowledge is closed under known implications, giving agents unlimited powers of stepwise inference from what they already know.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

The Introspection Axioms give agents unlimited powers of self-reflection on what they know or do not know.

“Likewise, the Introspection Axioms give them unlimited powers of self-reflection on what they know or do not know.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Dretske defines knowledge as belief caused by information flow.

“Dretske then defines knowledge as belief caused by information flow.”

• cites Dretske 1981Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

It may state two separate claims as one.

Constraints in our environment correlate behaviour of spatio-temporally different situations, providing information channels between situations.

“Making sense of this aboutness calls attention to the 'constraints' in our environment, which correlate behaviour of spatio-temporally different situations. These constraints provide information channels between situations”

Probably not a substantial claim.

Our logical systems are social, in that basic scenarios have more than one agent together.

“They are also social , in that basic scenarios have more than one agent together.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

There is more to information flow than hard information, whether observed totally or partially, and the resulting knowledge.

“But there is more to information flow than hard information, whether observed totally or partially, and the resulting knowledge.”

It may state two separate claims as one.

Dretske builds on Shannon's theory of information transmission, but his account is qualitative and focuses on semantic content, not on the amount of information transmitted.

“Dretske builds on Shannon's theory of information transmission, but his account is qualitative and his focus is squarely on semantic content , not on the amount of information transmitted.”

• cites Dretske 1981Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.

Epistemic logic in its static and dynamic versions has a well-developed model theory and proof calculus, but it provides little information at a practical level about what might be called the art of modeling.

“Epistemic logic in its static and dynamic versions has a well-developed model theory and proof calculus, but it provides little information at a practical level about what might be called the 'art of modeling'.”

Probably not a substantial claim.

These correspondences provide a refined logical view of what information can flow in a given setting, given the nature of a source and that of the recipient.

“These correspondences provide a refined logical view of what information can flow in a given setting, given the nature of a source and that of the recipient.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

There is a link between the KK principle Kφ → KKφ and transitivity of accessibility.

“the much-discussed link between the ' KK principle' K f Æ KK f and transitivity of accessibility”

Probably not a substantial claim.

Inference is now just one of several information-producing processes entangled in even the simplest scenarios of information flow.

“inference is now just one of several information-producing processes entangled in even the simplest scenarios of information flow”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

In situation theory we distinguish between having and carrying information.

“Furthermore, in situation theory we distinguish between having and carrying information.”

It may state two separate claims as one.

Situation theory originated in the 1980s as a foundational framework for situation semantics, but has come to study the notion of information from a much more general point of view.

“It originated in the 1980's (Barwise & Perry 1983) as a foundational framework for 'situation semantics', but in its underlying situation theory , the program has come to study the notion of information from a much more general point of view”

• cites Barwise & Perry 1983Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

The distribution axiom K(φ → ψ) → (Kφ → Kψ) has sparked debates about Logical Omniscience.

“the distribution axiom K( f Æ y ) Æ (K f Æ K y ) has sparked debates about Logical Omniscience”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

The greater one's range of options for what the real world is like, the less information one has.

“The greater one's range of options for what the real world is like, the less information one has.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

This requires conditional belief.

“This requires conditional belief”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: We now assume further semantic structure, in the form of a plausibility ordering of worlds as seen from some vantage point.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Our logical systems are dynamic, treating informational actions and events on a par with static information structures.

“They are dynamic , treating informational actions and events on a par with static information structures.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Working with equivalence relations does validate some much-debated epistemic features of agents like 'positive' and 'negative introspection' concerning one's own knowledge.

“Working with equivalence relations does validate some much-debated epistemic features of agents like 'positive' and 'negative introspection' concerning one's own knowledge.”

Probably not a substantial claim.

There are several competing logical accounts of information, ranging from semantic to syntactic.

“Information is also a widely used term in logic, but a similar diversity repeats itself: there are several competing logical accounts of this notion, ranging from semantic to syntactic.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

This notion of information is found in epistemic logic and related semantic paradigms.

“This notion of information is found in epistemic logic and related semantic paradigms which we will discuss below in Sections 3 and 4.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

The universal quantifier in information as range provides a rather poor analysis of knowledge in the philosopher's demanding sense.

“It was soon found that the universal quantifier in information as range provides a rather poor analysis of knowledge in the philosopher's demanding sense, where the quest for a satisfactory definition of knowing that P involves finding the right sort of 'robustness' in addition to the obvious features of truth of P and belief in P .”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.

Information states are stages in a dynamic process of deduction, and informational moves are proof steps or computation steps.

“Information states are then stages in a dynamic process of deduction, and the corresponding informational moves are proof steps, or more general computation steps.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Knowledge may be a context-dependent term for the strictest attitude in the current setting.

“'Knowledge' may then be a contextdependent term for 'the strictest attitude in the current setting'.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

Situation theory adopts the same guiding idea as Dretske, though dropping the probabilities, and it encompasses not only natural but also conventional signals and others.

“Situation theory adopts the same guiding idea - though dropping the probabilities -, and it encompasses not only natural but also conventional signals and others.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

Information is a pervasive aspect of reality, prior to cognitive action.

“Information is a pervasive aspect of reality, prior to cognitive action.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Information is a pervasive aspect of reality, prior to cognitive action.

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

It is crucial that our beliefs can be false.

“It is crucial that our beliefs can be false.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: We now assume further semantic structure, in the form of a plausibility ordering of worlds as seen from some vantage point.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

The abilities of omniscience and introspection have been questioned in much of the philosophical and computational literature, though no alternative consensus model of bounded rationality has emerged so far.

“These abilities of 'omniscience' and 'introspection' have been questioned in much of the philosophical and computational literature though no alternative consensus model of 'bounded rationality' has emerged so far.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

One often takes the ~i to be equivalence relations, but this is not crucial to epistemic logic.

“One often takes the ~ i to be equivalence relations, but this is not crucial to epistemic logic.”

Probably not a substantial claim.

Belief is semantically less demanding than knowledge, in the sense of 'truth in the most plausible options'.

“we can now define belief semantically as less demanding than knowledge, in the sense of 'truth in the most plausible options'”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: We now assume further semantic structure, in the form of a plausibility ordering of worlds as seen from some vantage point.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Epistemic logic has never offered a definition of knowledge of comparable sophistication to philosophical definitions.

“Even though epistemic logic has never offered a definition of knowledge of comparable sophistication, the very mismatch with the richer philosophical tradition has been much more exciting than many happy marriages, leading to clarification and fruitful debate.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

Situation theory is committed to there being situations, but need not be committed to there being a largest total situation of which the rest are parts.

“Situation theory is committed to there being situations, but need not be committed to there being a largest total situation of which the rest are parts.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

The best-known paradigm incorporating information as semantic range is epistemic logic.

“The best-known paradigm incorporating information as semantic range is epistemic logic”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Everything that exists, happens, or is true has its status because of the nature of this reality.

“But ultimately everything that exists, everything that happens, everything that is true, has its status because of the nature of this reality.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Everything that exists, happens, or is true has its status because of the nature of this reality.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

According to situation semantics, meaning arises from the interaction of organisms and their information-rich environment.

“According to situation semantics, meaning arises from the interaction of organisms and their information-rich environment.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

Information really comes into its own only in a dynamic setting of communication and information flow.

“As in other information theories, such as Shannon's quantitative account of channel transmission (cf. the chapters by Harremoes & Topsoe and by Grunwald & Vitanyi in this Handbook), information really comes into its own only in a dynamic setting of communication and information flow .”

Probably not a substantial claim.

Extra information does not add things: it rather shrinks the current range of options for what the real situation might be.

“It takes an 'inverse view' where extra information does not add things: it rather shrinks something, viz. the current range of options for what the real situation might be.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

Situation theory offers a rich apparatus for modeling challenging phenomena, but so far it has not yet generated canonical calculi of reasoning with the same sweep and wide application as epistemic logic.

“Situation theory does a kind of converse. It offers a rich apparatus for modeling challenging phenomena - but so far, it has (with a few exceptions to be noted below) not yet generated canonical calculi of reasoning with the same sweep and wide application as epistemic logic.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

Situations are rich in structure, and support a variety of schemes, suited or unsuited to various needs.

“Rather, situations are rich in structure, and support a variety of schemes, suited (or unsuited) to various needs.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Distributed knowledge is a natural form of group knowledge referring to what a group might come to know if it pooled the information available to individual members.

“Another natural form of group knowledge is 'distributed knowledge' referring to what a group might come to know if it pooled the information available to individual members (cf. Fagin et al., 1995, van Benthem 2006B).”

• cites Fagin et al., 1995Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites van Benthem 2006BNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

More generally, one situation carries information about another situation connected to it in some way, by some channel of information, in virtue of a regularity or constraint: perhaps a natural law, a convention, or something else.

“More generally, one situation carries information about another situation connected to it in some way, by some channel of information, in virtue of a regularity or constraint: perhaps a natural law, a convention, or something else.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Agents have powers of inference, observation, introspection, and self-correction, maybe not all to the same degree.

“Agents have powers of inference, observation, introspection, and self-correction, maybe not all to the same degree”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Situation theory is the only program in modern logic that treats information as its central notion, shaking up the usual agenda of research.

“We now turn to the only program in modern logic that treats information as its central notion, shaking up the usual agenda of research.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.

We do not (yet) have one unified notion of information coming out of all this, and thus logic shows the same diversity one finds with the notion of information in general.

“But we do not (yet) have one unified notion of information coming out of all this - and thus logic shows the same diversity one finds with the notion of information in general in this Handbook.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

In the logic, the additional axioms for CG bring out the reflexive fixed-point character which common knowledge has intuitively.

“In the logic, the additional axioms for CG bring out the 'reflexive' fixed-point character which common knowledge has intuitively:”

Probably not a substantial claim.

Dretske's Information Content: to an agent with prior knowledge k, signal r carries the information that s is F iff Pr(s is F | r and k) = 1, but Pr(s is F | k) < 1.

“Information Content To an agent with prior knowledge k , signal r carries the information that s is F iff Pr (s is F | r and k) = 1 , but Pr(s is F | k) &lt; 1.”

• cites Dretske 1981Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim.

The Xerox Principle: if A carries the information that B and B carries the information that C, then A carries the information that C.

“Xerox Principle If A carries the information that B and B carries the information that C , then A carries the information that C.”

• cites Dretske 1981Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim.

Information as correlation involves connections between different situations.

“information tends to be about something that is relevant to us, and hence it crucially involves connections between different situations: my own, and others.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

The dynamic knowledge axiom [!P]Kiφ ↔ (P → Ki(P → [!P]φ)) involves an interchange between the dynamic operator [!P] and the epistemic Ki.

“The dynamic knowledge axiom [!P]K i f ´ (P Æ Ki (P Æ [!P] f)) also involves an interchange between the dynamic operator [!P] and the epistemic Ki .”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

Logic can cast information as what flows in communication, and more generally, as the lubricant of intelligent interaction.

“Thus, logic can also cast information as what flows in communication, and more generally, as the lubricant of intelligent interaction.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Agents know what is true throughout their current range of uncertainty.

“Agents know what is true throughout their current range of uncertainty:”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Current epistemic logic - broadly understood - is the 'information theory' that goes with information as range.

“In our view, current epistemic logic - broadly understood - is the 'information theory' that goes with this.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Notions of knowledge based on epistemic logic have penetrated other areas, notably computer science, witness the interdisciplinary TARK conferences since the early 1980s.

“Notions of knowledge based on epistemic logic have penetrated other areas, notably computer science, witness the interdisciplinary TARK conferences since the early 1980s (Fagin et al. 1995), with their current companion event LOFT.”

• cites Fagin et al. 1995Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Situations determine whether a given state of affairs or its dual is a fact.

“Situations determine whether a given state of affairs or its dual is a fact.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

Information as range and information as correlation are compatible semantic notions and can be merged.

“information as range and information as correlation are compatible semantic notions, and we show later how they can be merged”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

The axiom Kφ → KKφ has sparked debates about Positive Introspection.

“the axiom K f Æ KK f about Positive Introspection”

Probably not a substantial claim.

Some situations will leave the relevant issue unresolved, making neither a state of affairs nor its dual factual.

“Some situations will leave the relevant issue unresolved, making neither s nor its dual factual.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

Notions of information must eventually be understood in terms of the dynamic processes which that information is used for.

“that notions of information must eventually be understood in terms of the dynamic processes which that information is used for.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Situation theory is a logical account of information in distributed systems (including reality itself as parsed by agents) which models information as correlation.

“Situation theory is a logical account of information in distributed systems (including reality itself as parsed by agents) which model information as correlation.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

Dynamic epistemic logic made informational events a key feature, and situation theory involved event scenarios for making use of information.

“Dynamic epistemic logic made informational events a key feature. Likewise, situation theory involved event scenarios for making use of ('harnessing') information, such as The Mousetrap in Section 5.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

Other well-established formats that have been linked with modeling information flow are logic programming and resolution theorem proving, and more general unification-based inferential mechanisms.

“Other well-established formats that have been linked with modeling information flow are logic programming and resolution theorem proving (cf. Kowalski 1979), Doets 1994), and more general unification-based inferential mechanisms (cf. Rounds 1997).”

• cites Kowalski 1979 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Doets 1994Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Rounds 1997 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

Situation theory brings along its own agenda of technical issues, which include formal theories of circularity in modeling and the associated reasoning apparatus, and a general account of relations between situations and of the channels along which information can flow.

“It brings along its own agenda of technical issues, which include formal theories of circularity in modeling and the associated reasoning apparatus, and a general account of relations between situations and of the channels along which information can flow.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Modeling agents that can reason about their world would require a good account of 'inferential information'.

“Now in general, modeling agents that can reason about their world would require a good account of ' inferential information', which is not an easy notion to capture in a satisfactory manner”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

These facts are about how situations are classified.

“These facts are about how situations are classified .”

It may state two separate claims as one.

Van Benthem 2005 shows that the modal constraint logic can be faithfully embedded into the first-order logic of dependent variables, and vice versa.

“Van Benthem 2005 shows how the above modal constraint logic can be faithfully embedded into the first-order logic of dependent variables, and also vice versa.”

• cites Van Benthem 2005 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

In first-order logic, the polyadic quantifier $xy·φ is equivalent to $x$yφ and to $y$xφ in any order.

“In first-order logic, $ xy· f is just short-hand for $ x $ y f or $ y $ x f in any order.”

It may state two separate claims as one.

In set-theoretic approaches to situation theory, situations are usually modeled as sets of tuples, but self-referring situations cannot be naturally modeled as sets in the standard Zermelo universe.

“in set-theoretic approaches to situation theory, situations are usually modeled as sets of tuples (standing for the infons supported by the situation), but self-referring situations cannot be naturally modeled as sets in the standard Zermelo universe.”

It may state two separate claims as one.

Information as correlation and information as range co-exist happily inside one formal modeling, and in more than one way.

“To summarize, information as correlation and information as range co-exist happily inside one formal modeling, and that even in more than one way.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

The commutativity law $x$yφ → $y$xφ expresses that a Diamond Property should hold.

“E.g., the commutativity law $ x $ y f Æ $ y $ x f says that a Diamond Property should hold:”

Probably not a substantial claim.

The notions of information flow presented in the previous section involve facts of the form s |= T, where s is a situation and T a type.

“The notions of information flow presented in the previous section involve facts of the form s |= T , where s is a situation and T a type.”

Probably not a substantial claim.

The Principle of Persistence: all information supported by a situation s1 must be supported by any other situation s2 that extends s1.

“A guiding principle here is the Principle of Persistence: all information supported by a situation s 1 must be supported by any other situation s 2 that extends s 1 .”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.

An account of having information is being in a state that plays two roles: the agent's being in the state carries certain information relative to a constraint, and the agent's being in that state has an effect, triggering an action relative to some other constraint appropriate given the information.

“What we want then is an account of having information as being in a state that plays two roles (Israel &amp; Perry 1991). First, the agent's being in the state carries certain information relative to a constraint. Second, an agent's being in that state has an effect, i.e., it triggers an action relative to some other constraint, that is appropriate given the information.”

• cites Israel & Perry 1991Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Standard mathematical Proof Theory uses natural deduction and associated calculi of type theory.

“Standard mathematical Proof Theory (Troelstra &amp; Schwichtenberg 1996, Feferman 2000, Tennant 1978) uses natural deduction and associated calculi of type theory.”

• cites Troelstra & Schwichtenberg 1996Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Feferman 2000Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Tennant 1978Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim.

Information as correlation and information as range form a natural and compatible pair.

“Though distinct, the two phenomena obviously form a natural and compatible pair.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Most regularities to which agents are attuned hold only within some regions of reality.

“Now, most regularities to which agents are attuned hold only within some regions of reality.”

Probably not a substantial claim.

This notion of information flow is relative to a channel, and hence to an analysis of a whole distributed system into its parts.

“This notion of information flow is relative to a channel -and hence, to an analysis of a whole distributed system into its parts.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

When F(X) = P(X), an F-coalgebra turns out to be just a modal relational Kripke frame.

“As a simple but important example, when we take F(X) = P ( X ), an F -coalgebra turns out to be just a modal relational Kripke frame.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Inference by its nature is more tied to details of syntactic representation, either on formulas per se, or some abstraction thereof.

“Inference by its nature is more tied to details of syntactic representation, either on formulas per se, or some abstraction thereof.”

Probably not a substantial claim.

It is in virtue of constraints (relations on types) that concrete situations, being of certain type, can act as carriers of information.

“It is in virtue of constraints (relations on types) that concrete situations, being of certain type, can act as carriers of (concrete or general) information.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

An observation that the state is P is not an internal system event, because it affects an outside agent's view of the system.

“This is not an internal 'system event', as it affects an outside agent's view of the system.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

We need to understand how epistemic logic and situation theory can live together in modeling actual phenomena.

“we need to understand how epistemic logic and situation theory can live together in modeling actual phenomena.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

There are two ways a situation s can fail to make a given state of affairs σ factual: s may make the dual of σ factual, or s may fail to resolve the σ-issue one way or the other.

“Hence, there are two ways a situation s can fail to make a given state of affairs s factual. Namely, s may make the dual of s factual, or s may fail to resolve the s -issue one way or the other.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

A situation x which satisfies p 'settles' the truth of p, plus all repercussions this has for other situations in the system.

“Intuitively, a situation x which satisfies p 'settles' the truth of p , plus all repercussions this has for other situations in the system.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Interpreted systems also involve stepwise action by agents.

“Interpreted systems also involve stepwise action by agents, but more on this below.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

This is like 'distributed knowledge' for groups in epistemic logic, describing what whole sets of agents may be said to 'know implicitly'.

“This is like 'distributed knowledge' for groups in epistemic logic, describing what whole sets of agents may be said to 'know implicitly'.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Information as correlation leads to static and dynamic constraint logics.

“Likewise, information as correlation leads to static and dynamic constraint logics.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

The two styles of thinking (information as range and information as correlation) are very congenial.

“we do show that the two styles of thinking are very congenial.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

States of affairs are special infons: those whose set of parameters is empty.

“Notice that states of affairs are special infons: those whose set of parameters is empty.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Natural language as a medium for communication sometimes involves utterances about the very same situation in which they are made.

“Natural language as a medium for communication sometimes involves utterances about the very same situation in which they are made.”

It may state two separate claims as one.

The meet of a set of infons and the existentialization of an infon with respect to a parameter comply with persistence.

“Two important constructs that comply with persistence are the meet of a set of infons and the existentialization of an infon with respect to a parameter.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

No situation will make both a state of affairs and its dual factual.

“No situation will make both s and its dual factual”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Some situation will make a given state of affairs or its dual factual.

“Some situation will make s or its dual factual”

It may state two separate claims as one.

Imposing special conditions such as the Diamond Property makes models much like full function spaces, and the complete first-order logic of independence becomes undecidable.

“Imposing such special conditions makes models much like full function spaces, and the complete first-order logic (of independence) becomes undecidable .”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

There is a unique set with the self-referential or circular specification W = { W }.

“E.g., there is a unique set with the self-referential or circular specification W = { W }”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

The tuple modalities [] x involve an intersection of accessibility relations [] x for single situations x.

“The tuple modalities [] x involve an intersection of accessibility relations [] x for single situations x .”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

The availability of information depends on the existence of regularities between connected parts of a distributed system.

“(1) The availability of information depends on the existence of regularities between connected parts of a distributed system.”

It may state two separate claims as one.

The extended modal constraint language has a decidable complete logic with modal S5 for each tuple modality, plus all axioms of the forms U f Æ [] x f, and [] x f Æ [] y f whenever y Õ x.

“More generally, the extended modal constraint language has a decidable complete logic with modal S5 for each tuple modality, plus all axioms of the forms U f Æ [] x f , and [] x f Æ [] y f whenever y Õ x .”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Natural modifications of other rules from Barwise & Seligman 1997 would also yield principles such as those involving f[G].

“Natural modifications of other rules from Barwise &amp; Seligman 1997 would also yield principles such as”

• cites Barwise & Seligman 1997Not checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim.

Information as range gave rise to both static and dynamic epistemic logics.

“Information as range gave rise to both static and dynamic epistemic logics.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

So far, the question of what 'legitimately infer' means in this setting has not been satisfactorily answered.

“But what does 'legitimately infer' mean in this setting? So far this question has not been satisfactorily answered.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Main themes in this new direction are the duality between algebras, inductive definitions and smallest fixed points on one hand, and coalgebras, coinductive definitions and largest fixed points on the other hand.

“Main themes in this new direction are the duality between algebras, inductive definitions and smallest fixed points on one hand, and coalgebras, coinductive definitions and largest fixed points on the other hand (Jacobs &amp; Rutten 1997).”

• cites Jacobs & Rutten 1997Not checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

Information is used by agents to guide their actions, and is relative to the manner in which an agent is adapted to the world.

“Typically, information is used by agents to guide their actions, and thus, it is relative to the manner in which an agent is adapted to the world.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

The two paradigms (epistemic logic and situation theory) seem compatible and congenial both technically and conceptually.

“Indeed, the two paradigms seem compatible and congenial both technically and conceptually - and they share a common cause.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Dependence of various kinds is a major theme in foundations of first-order logic these days.

“Dependence of various kinds is a major theme in foundations of first-order logic these days (Abramsky 2006, Väänänen 2007).”

• cites Abramsky 2006Not checked — no full text of the source
• cites Väänänen 2007Not checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Simple constraints do not make explicit the kind of connection that exists between the constituents of the two types involved.

“Simple constraints do not make the kind of connection explicit that exists between the constituents of the two types involved.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.

In that case, the agent not only carries but has the information.

“In that case, the agent not only carries but has the information.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

The precise notion of 'information' behind the many calculi of inference in modern logic - and an optimal level of abstraction for it - seems even less established than in logical semantics.

“For a start, the precise notion of 'information' behind the many calculi of inference in modern logic - and an optimal level of abstraction for it -, seems even less established than in logical semantics.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

Information as correlation and information as range are different notions, and the difference is one of agency.

“Intuitively, information as correlation and information as range seem different notions. The difference is one of agency .”

Probably not a substantial claim.

For information to be of use to an agent or device, it is not enough that the states carry the information; the agent or device must have the information.

“Clearly, for information to be of use to some agent, or to enable a device to do what it is supposed to, it is not enough that the states of the agent or device carry the information. The agent or device must in some sense have the information.”

Probably not a substantial claim.

The idea of harnessing information is that some state of the agent that carries the information that P should trigger the action A.

“The idea of harnessing information is now simple: some state of the agent that carries the information that P should trigger the action A .”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

In many natural forms of reasoning, such as probability theory, variables can be dependent, in the sense that changes in one variable's value must co-occur with changes in another's.

“But in many natural forms of reasoning, e.g., in probability theory, variables x, y can be dependent, in the sense that changes of value for one must co-occur with changes of value for the other.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

There is a great variety of logical systems for deduction and proof, with very different formats.

“In line with this, there is a great variety of logical systems for deduction and proof, with very different formats.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

The combined dynamic constraint language describes constraints on the current state, and its event modalities record what happens as the system moves in the space of all its possible developments.

“This language describes constraints on the current state, but its event modalities also record what happens as the system moves in the space of all its possible developments.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

The current information flow complies with Dretske's Xerox Principle, in the sense that we can compose channels.

“The current information flow complies with Dretske's Xerox Principle, in the sense that we can compose channels.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

These regularities are relative to how the system is analyzed into parts.

“(2) These regularities are relative to how the system is analyzed into parts.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.

A graph with its childless nodes labeled by urelements represents a set, and each set can be represented as a labeled graph.

“A graph with its childless nodes labeled by urelements represents a set, and each set can be represented as a labeled graph.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Situation theory has been applied to information flow involving self-reference.

“Situation theory has been applied to information flow involving self-reference.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.

In the interpreted systems paradigm, epistemic worlds are vectors of local states for individual agents, and epistemic accessibility between worlds s,t for agent i is component-wise equality (s)i=(t)i.

“In the paradigm of 'interpreted systems'(Fagin, et al. 1995), epistemic worlds are vectors of 'local states' for individual agents, and epistemic accessibility between worlds s , t for agent i is just component-wise equality ( s ) i = ( t ) i .”

• cites Fagin, et al. 1995Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

It may state two separate claims as one.

First-order logic has no genuine dependencies between variables; in any assignment, shifting the value of one variable leaves all other variables' values unchanged.

“first-order logic has no genuine dependencies between variables.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Both aspects of information (range and correlation) are relevant in practice.

“since both aspects of information are relevant in practice”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

The resulting normal forms provide an attractive abstract level of information structure beyond brute details of syntax.

“The resulting normal forms provide an attractive abstract level of information structure beyond brute details of syntax, and in the setting of linear logic, Girard 1987, 1989 has emphasized how proof normalization steps may be seen as communication moves, and hence as a form of information flow.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

This is also very system-dependent.

“But it is also very system-dependent.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

Inference steps construct proofs, and hence they transform information at a syntactic level in a process of elucidation.

“Inference steps construct proofs, and hence they transform information at a syntactic level in a process of elucidation.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

van Benthem 2006A shows how this also works for contextualist views of information, with # as an operation of 'context merge' reminiscent of situation theory.

“Incidentally, van Benthem 2006A shows how this also works for contextualist views of information - as discussed in the chapter by Dretske in this Handbook. In that case the crucial law is”

• cites van Benthem 2006ANot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Van Benthem 1996B proposes a 'modal theory of information' over models of abstract information stages ordered by inclusion.

“Van Benthem 1996B proposes a 'modal theory of information' over models of abstract information stages ordered by inclusion (cf. also the 'data semantics' of Veltman 1984, Landman 1986)”

• cites Van Benthem 1996BNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Veltman 1984Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Landman 1986 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

Natural tasks show a clear interplay of update through observation, or recollection, or whatever source, with more combinatorial inferential steps.

“Natural tasks show a clear interplay of update through observation, or recollection, or whatever source, with more combinatorial inferential steps.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

In the setting of linear logic, Girard 1987, 1989 has emphasized how proof normalization steps may be seen as communication moves, and hence as a form of information flow.

“The resulting normal forms provide an attractive abstract level of information structure beyond brute details of syntax, and in the setting of linear logic, Girard 1987, 1989 has emphasized how proof normalization steps may be seen as communication moves, and hence as a form of information flow.”

• cites Girard 1987 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Girard 1989 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

The widely used method of natural deduction is an elegant calculus putting together, linking, and repackaging pieces of evidence with their dependencies.

“In particular, the widely used method of natural deduction is an elegant calculus putting together, linking, and repackaging pieces of evidence with their dependencies.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

One can view the 'labeled deductive systems' of Gabbay 1996 as a program with similar ambitions.

“In this spirit, current 'logic of proofs' (starting from Artemov 1994) is developing a general take on evidence combination, and one can view the 'labeled deductive systems' of Gabbay 1996 as a program with similar ambitions.”

• cites Gabbay 1996Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

van Benthem 1993 proposed merging epistemic logic with a 'calculus of evidence'.

“To have both views together then, van Benthem 1993 proposed merging epistemic logic with a 'calculus of evidence'.”

• cites van Benthem 1993Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Two- and many-level views also occur at the interface of logic and cognitive science (Castelfranchi & Lorini 2007) in realistic modeling of the many cognitive processes involved when humans process information.

“Two- and many-level views also occur at the interface of logic and cognitive science (Castelfranchi &amp; Lorini 2007) in realistic modeling of the many cognitive processes involved when humans process information.”

• cites Castelfranchi & Lorini 2007Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

This process can be described in the same sort of dynamic logic format used for epistemic logic in Section 3.

“This process can be described in the same sort of dynamic logic format used for epistemic logic in Section 3.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Information states of agents have two different levels: (a) the current range of models or possible worlds, and (b) some current set of sentences true in these models which the agent has available right now.

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.

One coherent philosophical interpretation of these combined systems still remains to be found.

“This is all fine, but it has to be admitted that one coherent philosophical interpretation of these combined systems still remains to be found.”

Probably not a substantial claim.

There may be other 'intermediate' actions with something of both internal inference and external observation.

“But the interesting point of the combination is that there may be other 'intermediate' actions with something of both.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. The quote only partly states this claim.

The epistemic Distribution Axiom becomes the more informative statement that [formula] where # is some natural sum operation on proofs or pieces of evidence.

“Then, e.g., the ubiquitous (though philosophically controversial; Egré 2004) epistemic Distribution Axiom Ki (fÆ y) Æ (K i f Æ K i y) becomes the more informative statement that”

• cites Egré 2004Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim.

Deduction seems informative only for people engaged in certain tasks.

“Thus, deduction seems informative only for people engaged in certain tasks”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Information is not just about what things are like in some situation, but also how to get things done.

“As pointed out in Israel &amp; Perry 1991, this notion is not just about what things are like in some situation, but also how to get thing things done.”

• cites Israel & Perry 1991Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Logical syntax might have natural information content where syntactic manipulation can increase information.

“All this is clever, and it suggests that logical syntax might have natural information content where syntactic manipulation can increase information.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Other versions of this problem are known in the philosophy of science.

“Other versions of this problem are known in the philosophy of science.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

In response to the challenge of information flow through deduction, various answers have been given.

“In response to the challenge of information flow through deduction, various answers have been given.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

Inferences that stay close to the original syntax contain only 'surface information', those requiring full processing into normal form carry 'depth information'.

“Inferences that stay close to the original syntax contain only 'surface information', those requiring full processing into normal form carry 'depth information' - notions which have been elaborated in some numerical detail.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.

In practice, reasoning often trumps update.

“In practice, reasoning often trumps update.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.

Agents play an essential role in information, and information is taken alone but more importantly in interaction with others.

“We also emphasized the essential role of agents, and the ways in which agents take information : alone, but much more importantly, in interaction with others.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.

So far, no coherent and generally useful notion of syntax-based information has evolved - partly because we have no general theory of syntax, abstracting away from details, which would provide the vehicle for this.

“So far, no coherent and generally useful notion of syntax-based information has evolved - partly because we have no general theory of syntax, abstracting away from details, which would provide the vehicle for this.”

Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Inference is much like computation.

“Inference is much like computation, and one issue running through the chapter by Abramsky in this Handbook is how computation can provide information, and how abstract semantics can provide a handle on this.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.

In the earlier-mentioned dialogue games of Lorenzen 1955, proof rules are game moves, and proofs are winning strategies for players.

“For instance, in the earlier-mentioned dialogue games of Lorenzen 1955, proof rules are game moves , and proofs are winning strategies for players.”

• cites Lorenzen 1955 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim.

There is no consensus on the precise integration of inferential and semantic views of information structure and information dynamics.

“Despite the abundance of promising ideas recorded in Sections 7 and 8, there is no consensus on the precise integration of inferential and semantic views of information structure and information dynamics.”

Probably not a substantial claim.

Logic offers a view of information as code through proof systems and syntactic calculi that elucidate implicitly available semantic information by computing on suitable data structures.

“Finally, logic offers another major view of information as code through its proof systems and other syntactic calculi which elucidate implicitly available semantic information by computing on suitable data structures.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Constructive proofs are both ways of seeing that a conclusion is true and methods for constructing the relevant objects.

“Indeed, ever since Euclid's 'Elements', constructive proofs are both ways of seeing that a conclusion is true and methods for constructing the relevant objects.”

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

The 'logic of proofs' of Artemov 1994, 2005 is a modal language enriched with proof- or evidence-labeled assertions [x] f.

“Even closer to the epistemic logics of Sections 2, 3, the 'logic of proofs' of Artemov 1994, 2005 is a modal language enriched with proof- or evidence-labeled assertions [x] f.”

• cites Artemov 1994, 2005Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Proof theory has its own natural levels of abstraction for dealing with information in type theory or category theory, making room for a variety of logics: classical, intuitionistic, or sub-structural.

“Moreover, it has its own natural levels of abstraction for dealing with information in type theory or category theory, making room for a variety of logics: classical, intuitionistic, or sub-structural (Prawitz 1965, Belnap 1982, Restall 2000).”

• cites Prawitz 1965Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Belnap 1982 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Restall 2000Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.

Jago 2007 presents an alternative take enriching possible worlds with non-standard valuations eliminated successively through inferential steps.

“49 Jago 2007 presents an alternative take on this, however, enriching the set of possible worlds with worlds carrying 'non-standard valuations' which are eliminated successively from the set of candidates through inferential steps.”

• cites Jago 2007Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.