The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
Open accessAbstract
ConclusionThis paper investigates one of the possible weakening of the (too demanding) assumptions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Namely we deal with a class of voting schemes where at the same time the domain of possible preference preordering of any agent is limited to single-peaked preferences, and the message that this agent sends to the central authority is simply its ‘peak’ — his best preferred alternative. In this context we have shown that strategic considerations justify the central role given to the Condorcet procedure which amounts to elect the ‘median’ peak: namely all strategy-proof anonymous and efficient voting schemes can be derived from the Condorcet procedure by simply adding some fixed ballots to the agent's ballots (with the only restriction that the number of fixed ballots is strictly less than the number of agents).Therefore, as long as the alternatives can be ordered along the real line with the preferences of the agents being single-peaked, it makes little sense to object against the Condorcet procedure, or one of its variants that we display in our characterization theorem.An obvious topic for further research would be to investigate reasonable restrictions of the domain of admissible preferences such that a characterization of strategy-proof voting schemes can be found. The single-peaked context is obviously the simplest one, allowing very complete characterizations. When we go on on to the two-dimensional state of alternatives the concept of single peakedness itself is not directly extended and a generalization of our one-dimensional results seems to us to be a difficult but motivating goal.
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Citations
Cites
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
Gibbard, A. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914083 · Cited by 3,202
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
Black, D. (1948) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/256633 · Cited by 2,439
Fishburn, P. C. (2015) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400868339 · Cited by 700
Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
Gibbard, A. (1977) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911681 · Cited by 443
The Decisions of a Committee Using a Special Majority
Black, D. (1948) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907278 · Cited by 136
Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
Gibbard, A. (1978) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914235 · Cited by 112
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An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Börgers, T., Krähmer, D., & Strausz, R. (2015) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001 · Cited by 379
Approximate mechanism design without money
Procaccia, A. D., & Tennenholtz, M. (2009) · Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce · doi:10.1145/1566374.1566401 · Cited by 307
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
Chevaleyre, Y., Endriss, U., Lang, J., & Maudet, N. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-69507-3_4 · Cited by 261
This Thing Called Fairness: Disciplinary Confusion Realizing a Value in Technology
Mulligan, D. K., Kroll, J. A., Kohli, N., & Wong, R. Y. (2019) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3359221 · Cited by 111
Moral Machine or Tyranny of the Majority?
Feffer, M., Heidari, H., & Lipton, Z. C. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2305.17319 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Moulin, H.
- Venue
- Public Choice
- Published
- 1980
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 437-455
- ISSN
- 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7101
- OpenAlex
- W2083397025
- Cited by
- 867
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 13.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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