The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Abstract
What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? This book addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. This book provides explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. It also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area.
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Citations
Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Optimization by Vector Space Methods
(1970) · Students Quarterly Journal · doi:10.1049/sqj.1970.0088 · Cited by 6,004
Myerson, R. B. (1981) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.6.1.58 · Cited by 5,920
Principles of mathematical analysis
Hammer, C. (1953) · Journal of the Franklin Institute · doi:10.1016/0016-0032(53)90617-6 · Cited by 3,985
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6 · Cited by 3,306
Multipart pricing of public goods
Clarke, E. H. (1971) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01726210 · Cited by 3,246
(2010) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/(issn)1467-937x · Cited by 2,966
Satterthwaite, M. A. (1975) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2 · Cited by 2,821
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0 · Cited by 2,504
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
Cited by
Multi-Principal Assistance Games
Fickinger, A., Zhuang, S., Hadfield-Menell, D., & Russell, S. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2007.09540 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Börgers, T., Krähmer, D., & Strausz, R.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2015-05-21
- OpenAlex
- W869594549
- Cited by
- 379
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 13.66
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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