Rule utilitarianism, rights, obligations and the theory of rational behavior
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Citations
Cites
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition
Rawls, J. (1971) · doi:10.4159/9780674042605 · Cited by 9,496
Johnson, K., & Nozick, R. (1975) · The Western Political Quarterly · doi:10.2307/447864 · Cited by 7,692
Nozick, R. (2018) · Princeton Readings in Political Thought · doi:10.2307/j.ctv19fvzzk.69 · Cited by 6,631
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
Harsanyi, J. C. (1955) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257678 · Cited by 2,876
Self-citationCardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility
Harsanyi, J. C. (1980) · Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-9327-9_2 · Cited by 2,140
Self-citationCardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking
Harsanyi, J. C. (1953) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257416 · Cited by 1,156
Self-citationCardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking
Harsanyi, J. C. (1980) · Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-9327-9_1 · Cited by 703
Self-citationMorality and the Theory of Rational Behavior
Harsanyi, J. C. (1977) · Social Research: An International Quarterly · Cited by 679
Self-citationSpieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit
Selten, R. (1965) · Cited by 559
Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation
Harsanyi, J. C. (1976) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-9327-9 · Cited by 501
Self-citationSchneider, H. W., & Ross, S. W. D. (1940) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2017823 · Cited by 250
Rule utilitarianism and decision theory
Harsanyi, J. C. (1977) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/bf00169843 · Cited by 211
Self-citationBayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics
Harsanyi, J. C. (1978) · American Economic Review · Cited by 177
Self-citationEssays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation.
Sen, A., & Harsanyi, J. C. (1978) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2231987 · Cited by 159
Self-citationBayesian Decision Theory, Rule Utilitarianism, And Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
Harsanyi, J. C. (1979) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9532-1_8 · Cited by 45
Self-citation
Cited by
Evolution of the Social Contract
Skyrms, B. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139924825 · Cited by 743
THEORIES OF COMMITMENT, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY: EVIDENCE FROM LINEAR PUBLIC GOODS GAMES
CROSON, R. T. A. (2007) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2006.00006.x · Cited by 427
A Theory of Participation in Elections
Feddersen, T., & Sandroni, A. (2006) · The American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282806779468571 · Cited by 402
A Group Rule—Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence
Coate, S., & Conlin, M. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828043052231 · Cited by 335
Economic Theories of Voter Turnout
Dhillon, A., & Peralta, S. (2002) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00049 · Cited by 172
“Following Harsanyi (1980), they view voters as rule utilitarians, who think of social welfare rather than their individual bene ts from voting.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Harsanyi, J. C.
- Venue
- Theory and Decision
- Published
- 1980-06
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 115-133
- ISSN
- 0040-5833 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7187
- OpenAlex
- W2076903580
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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