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A Theory of Justice: Original Edition
Open accessAbstract
John Rawls aims to express an essential part of the common core of the democratic tradition—justice as fairness—and to provide an alternative to utilitarianism, which had dominated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political thought since the nineteenth century. Rawls substitutes the ideal of the social contract as a more satisfactory account of the basic rights and liberties of citizens as free and equal persons. "Each person," writes Rawls, "possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override." Advancing the ideas of Rousseau, Kant, Emerson, and Lincoln, Rawls’s theory is as powerful today as it was when first published. Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls’s view, much of the extensive literature on his theory refers to the original. This first edition is available for scholars and serious students of Rawls’s work
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“For Rawls the Kantian inspiration on his notion of justice as fairness was profound; he devotes an entire section (s40) of his A Theory of Justice to the Kantian influence [5].”
From No Longer "Neutral Among Ends" - Liberal Versus Communitarian Ethics in Library and Information Science (2021) · cites this paper as [5]
In the citing paper
“Behind the veil, 'the parties… do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations' (Rawls 1971, 137).”
From Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment (2020) · cites this paper as Rawls 1971
In the citing paper
“He accepted the classical equity-efficiency dilemma and allowed inequalities to emerge from the incentive constraints of labor markets and taxation mechanisms.”
From What is the business of business? Who said we had to be greedy? (2021) · cites this paper as Rawls (1971)
In the citing paper
“philosopher John Rawls (1971) believed that individuals were required to support the just institutions, but within these settled rules of the game, were licensed to pursue their personal interest.”
From What is the business of business? Who said we had to be greedy? (2021) · cites this paper as Rawls (1971)
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Cited by
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
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Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking Social Initiatives by Business
Margolis, J. D., & Walsh, J. P. (2003) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/3556659 · Cited by 5,130
Parfit, D. (1986) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/019824908x.001.0001 · Cited by 5,045
Organizational Justice: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow
Greenberg, J. (1990) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/014920639001600208 · Cited by 3,651
Sen, A., & Foster, J. (1973) · doi:10.1093/0198281935.001.0001 · Cited by 3,429
Metadata
- Authors
- Rawls, J.
- Corresponding author
- Rawls, John
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Harvard University Press
- Published
- 1971-12-31
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 18
- Pages
- 21-29
- OpenAlex
- W3177243356
- Cited by
- 9,496
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 614 · 2025: 785 · 2024: 598 · 2023: 562 · 2022: 463 · 2021: 486 · 2020: 568 · 2019: 798 · 2018: 490 · 2017: 340 · 2016: 372 · 2015: 351 · 2014: 324 · 2013: 323 · 2012: 346
- FWCI
- 204.00
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Princeton University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Harvard University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Harvard University Press eBooks (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
- DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) (submittedVersion)
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Influence
- Keywords
- John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, political philosophy, justice, liberalism, social contract, original position, political liberalism, law of peoples
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Theory of Justice: Original Edition. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.4159/9780674042605
- The paper
- Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice: Original Edition. Princeton University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674042605
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.