The effect of the secret ballot on voter turnout rates
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Heckelman (1995) conjectures that electoral turnout falls as a consequence of the secret ballot.
“Heckelman (1995) conjectures that electoral turnout falls as a consequence of the secret ballot.”
From From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization (2012) · cites this paper as Heckelman (1995)
The secret ballot reduces electoral turnout by eliminating the vote market and one reason to vote, as demonstrated by Heckelman (1995).
“The logic behind this hypothesis is, we recall, that the secret ballot, by and large, eliminates the vote market and with it one reason to vote.This reduces electoral turnout, as …rst pointed out and demonstrated empirically by Heckelman (1995).”
From From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization (2012) · cites this paper as Heckelman (1995)
In US states, the secret ballot has a significant negative effect on turnout, reproducing Heckelman (1995).
“In column 1, we reproduce Heckelman's (1995) …nding that the secret ballot has a signi…cant, negative e¤ect on turnout, consistent with the hypothesis that before the secret ballot turnout is kept high because of vote buying.”
From From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization (2012) · cites this paper as Heckelman (1995)
In some US states, the secret ballot was not initially applied uniformly throughout the entire state.
“In some states, e.g., Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee, Texas, Missouri, and Wisconsin, the secret ballot was not initially applied uniformly throughout the entire state and the coding of these cases follow Heckelman (1995).”
From From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization (2012) · cites this paper as Heckelman (1995)
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government
Husted, T. A., & Kenny, L. W. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262065 · Cited by 330 · see citing works
From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization
Aidt, T. S., & Jensen, P. S. (2012) · Faculty of Economics · doi:10.17863/cam.1045 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
- Authors
- Heckelman, J. C.
- Affiliations
- University of Maryland, College Park (US)
- Corresponding author
- Heckelman, Jac C.
- ORCID
- Heckelman, Jac C.
- Venue
- Public Choice
- Published
- 1995-01
- Volume
- 82
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 107-124
- ISSN
- 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7101
- OpenAlex
- W2093419433
- Cited by
- 108
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 11.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Public Choice (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Keywords
- secret ballot, voter turnout, vote buying, rational voter model, voting costs, electoral law, gubernatorial elections, political parties
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