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Cited by 19Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationCorruption and Economic DevelopmentPolitical Theory and Democracy

From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization

Open access
Aidt, T.S., Jensen, P.S.·2012·Faculty of Economics
DOI 10.17863/cam.1045
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Abstract

The secret ballot is one of the cornerstones of democracy. We contend that the historical process of modernization caused the switch from open to secret ballot with the underlying mechanism being that income growth, urbanization, and rising education standards undermined vote markets and made electoral corruption uneconomical. We undertake event history studies of ballot reform in Western Europe and the Americas during the 19th and 20th centuries to establish that modernization was systematically related to ballot reform. We study electoral turnout before and after ballot reform amongst the US states and British parliamentary constituencies to substantiate the hypothesis that modernization made vote buying uneconomical.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper argues that modernization made vote buying uneconomical and thereby drove the adoption of the secret ballot. It supports this with a formal model, event-history studies of ballot reform in three historical samples, and turnout tests in US states and British constituencies.

Key findings

Modernization variables positively predict the timing of de facto secret ballot adoption in Western Europe plus offshoots, US states, and Latin America; instrumental-variable estimates support a causal modernization link. In Western Europe, a one-standard-deviation rise in real GDP per capita raised the predicted reform probability from 0.4% to 2.6%; in US states, a one-standard-deviation rise in real income per worker raised it from 0.23% to 0.33%.

  • The franchise hypothesis receives weak or mixed support: electorate/adult population is positive but significant only when GDP is excluded, US suffrage restrictions had little impact, and Latin American literacy tests sometimes have negative coefficients. Landholding inequality is negative and significant in US states, while income inequality is unrelated in Western Europe.
  • Turnout falls after the secret ballot, but the fall is smaller where modernization has advanced. In US states, the baseline secret-ballot coefficient is −6.08, and interactions with income, schooling, and urbanization are positive and individually significant; they are jointly significant at 1%. In Great Britain around the 1872 Ballot Act, the density interaction is positive with p=0.06, and the change-in-density coefficient is negative.
  • The model’s mechanism is the vote market: open voting lets buyers verify vote contracts, while modernization raises transaction costs and reservation prices, shrinks bribery, reduces the elite’s electoral advantage, and makes reform more likely and a veto less likely.

Methods

A rational-choice model of ballot reform with two parties, open versus secret ballot, vote buying, and a veto stage generates three testable hypotheses.

  • Event-history/duration logit models estimate the conditional probability of de facto secret ballot adoption in Western Europe plus offshoots (1820–1938, 14 countries), US states (1840–1950, up to 48 states), and Latin America (independence to 1958, 12–13 countries); IV estimates use distance-weighted GDP, lagged electorate/adult population, revolutionary threat, and US regional dummies.
  • Turnout tests use a panel of US states from 1870 to 1950 with state and year fixed effects, and a sample of one-seat British parliamentary constituencies in 1868 and 1874 around the Ballot Act.

Limitations

The paper states that dating de facto secret ballot required judgment, especially for France, Germany, the USA, and Sweden, and that Latin American dates are more uncertain because corruption persisted after de jure reform. It also notes data limitations preventing study of education in Western Europe plus offshoots, sparse Latin American socioeconomic data, and less robust rare-events estimates there.

  • For Great Britain, the direct reform effect cannot be identified separately from common time effects, and the test is limited to one-seat constituencies because votes do not equal voters in multi-seat races.
  • The US turnout model holds the expressive benefit of voting constant, so a possible countervailing increase in that benefit is not explained; the franchise evidence is also mixed, and some IV specifications are restricted to Western Europe.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

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DataCite · 10.17863/cam.1045

Cites

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Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

1 of 75 cited sources checked · 1 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingown data

    Modernization was systematically related to ballot reform.

    “We undertake event history studies of ballot reform in Western Europe and the Americas during the 19th and 20th centuries to establish that modernization was systematically related to ballot reform.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingnone given

    The same modernization variables cannot predict the timing of reforms that extended the suffrage to broader segments of the male population.

    “In contrast, the same (modernization) variables cannot predict the timing of reforms that extended the su¤rage to broader segments of the male population.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data

    Modernization affected the timing of secret ballot adoption in Western Europe plus offshoots, Latin America, and US states.

    “In all cases, we …nd strong evidence, which is robust to instrumental variable estimations, that modernization a¤ected the timing of the secret ballot.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data

    Real GDP per capita and urbanization rate are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.75.

    “The two variables are positively correlated, with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.75”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data

    There is no evidence that social learning was important in the adoption of the secret ballot.

    “Despite the fact that the adoptions of the secret ballot cluster in the 1870s, we …nd no evidence that social learning was important.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims. 57
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 47

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Using King and Zeng's rare-events logit estimator, the two modernization variables remain individually significant and jointly significant when entered together.

    “In columns 5 to 7, we report results using this estimator.The two modernization variables remain individually signi…cant and jointly signi…cant when entered together.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites King and Zeng (2001) source

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In US states from 1870 to 1950 and British parliamentary constituencies before and after the Ballot Act of 1872, the evidence is consistent with the proposed causal mechanism.

    “In both cases, we …nd evidence consistent with the proposed causal mechanism.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The first principal component of real GDP per capita and urbanization rate correlates strongly and positively with both and has a positive and statistically significant coefficient.

    “The …rst principal component, which correlates strongly and positively both with real GDP per capita and with urbanization rate, has a positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingreasoning

    A fall in the private marginal value of income (a fall in R), brought about by rising income levels, increases the price of a vote, increases the cost of bribery for party E, and causes it to buy fewer votes.

    “Secondly, a fall in the private marginal value of income (a fall in R ), brought about by rising income levels, increases the price of a vote.Intuitively, radical voters value money less and so require a higher monetary compensation to shift their allegiance.This increases the cost of bribery for party E and it buys fewer votes.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Society has regular elections in which not only the old elite but also broader social classes can vote; suffrage is not universal and voting is initially open.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The choice of ballot system is endogenous.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Two parties, party E (old elite) and party R (radicals), compete in each election.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The old elite is outnumbered: N_R > N_E.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The party allegiance of a voter is observable and the parties share policy preferences with their core voters.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The policy with party R in power is better for voters of type R than the policy associated with party E and vice versa.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The utility loss per capita to the elite from a switch in power from party E to party R is equal to the gain per capita to the radicals (R = E).
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The society has an infinitely long time horizon and a common discount factor.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Under secret ballot, voters vote their preference and there is no electoral corruption; under open ballot, votes can be bought and sold in a vote market.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The initial ballot regime is open ballot, but it may be reformed to secret ballot if the majority party proposes such a reform and the opposition party is unwilling to pay the veto cost of preventing the reform.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Once secret ballot is introduced, it is not possible to go back to open ballot again.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Voters believe that the probability they will be offered a bribe is equal to the ratio of the number of bribes offered to voters of their type and the number of voters of their type.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Assumption 1: E R E ( +M ) + 1 2b E < R E R ( +M ) + 1 2b R.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The vote market shuts down with the arrival of the secret ballot.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The opposition can veto a ballot reform proposal at a cost > 0, and the normal case is < 1.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In the Western Europe plus offshoots event history study, real GDP per capita and urbanization rate have positive and statistically significant coefficients; when entered together they are jointly significant and real GDP per capita remains significant on its own.

    “We see that the coe¢ cients on real GDP per capita and urbanization rate are positive and statistically signi…cant (columns one and two).When they enter together (column three), they are jointly signi…cant and real GDP per capita remains signi…cant on its own.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Both countries and US states were at risk of adopting the secret ballot from the beginning of the relevant sample period.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The model demonstrates how and why modernization undermines the vote market and how this can trigger the secret ballot.

    “The model demonstrates amongst other things how and why modernization undermines the vote market and how this can trigger the secret ballot.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Society has regular elections in which not only the old elite but also broader social classes can vote; suffrage is not universal and voting is initially open.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The choice of ballot system is endogenous.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Two parties, party E (old elite) and party R (radicals), compete in each election.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The old elite is outnumbered: N_R > N_E.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The party allegiance of a voter is observable and the parties share policy preferences with their core voters.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The policy with party R in power is better for voters of type R than the policy associated with party E and vice versa.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The utility loss per capita to the elite from a switch in power from party E to party R is equal to the gain per capita to the radicals (R = E).
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The society has an infinitely long time horizon and a common discount factor.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Under secret ballot, voters vote their preference and there is no electoral corruption; under open ballot, votes can be bought and sold in a vote market.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The initial ballot regime is open ballot, but it may be reformed to secret ballot if the majority party proposes such a reform and the opposition party is unwilling to pay the veto cost of preventing the reform.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Once secret ballot is introduced, it is not possible to go back to open ballot again.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Voters believe that the probability they will be offered a bribe is equal to the ratio of the number of bribes offered to voters of their type and the number of voters of their type.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Assumption 1: E R E ( +M ) + 1 2b E < R E R ( +M ) + 1 2b R.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The vote market shuts down with the arrival of the secret ballot.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The opposition can veto a ballot reform proposal at a cost > 0, and the normal case is < 1.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Population size has a negative coefficient but is usually not statistically significant.

    “The control variable population always has a negative coe¢ cient, but is usually not signi…cant”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingreasoning

    An exogenous franchise extension (an increase in N_R) does not affect the absolute number of opposition voters party E wants to bribe, but the relative share drops and the win probability of party E falls.

    “An exogenous franchise extension-an increase in N R -does not a¤ect the absolute number of opposition voters party E wants to bribe but the relative share drops and, as a consequence, the win probability of party E falls.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Society has regular elections in which not only the old elite but also broader social classes can vote; suffrage is not universal and voting is initially open.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The choice of ballot system is endogenous.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Two parties, party E (old elite) and party R (radicals), compete in each election.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The old elite is outnumbered: N_R > N_E.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The party allegiance of a voter is observable and the parties share policy preferences with their core voters.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The policy with party R in power is better for voters of type R than the policy associated with party E and vice versa.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The utility loss per capita to the elite from a switch in power from party E to party R is equal to the gain per capita to the radicals (R = E).
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The society has an infinitely long time horizon and a common discount factor.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Under secret ballot, voters vote their preference and there is no electoral corruption; under open ballot, votes can be bought and sold in a vote market.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The initial ballot regime is open ballot, but it may be reformed to secret ballot if the majority party proposes such a reform and the opposition party is unwilling to pay the veto cost of preventing the reform.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Once secret ballot is introduced, it is not possible to go back to open ballot again.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Voters believe that the probability they will be offered a bribe is equal to the ratio of the number of bribes offered to voters of their type and the number of voters of their type.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Assumption 1: E R E ( +M ) + 1 2b E < R E R ( +M ) + 1 2b R.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The vote market shuts down with the arrival of the secret ballot.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The opposition can veto a ballot reform proposal at a cost > 0, and the normal case is < 1.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The point estimate on electorate/adult population is positive but statistically significant only in specifications where real GDP per capita is excluded.

    “Although the point estimate on electorate/adult population is positive, it is only statistically signi…cant in speci…cations where real GDP per capita is excluded.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In Latin America, the two aspects of modernization (primary school enrollment and urbanization) affected adoption probability positively, but only education is statistically significant.

    “We see from Table 8 that the two aspects of modernization a¤ected the adoption probability positively, but only education is statistically signi…cant.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Both countries and US states were at risk of adopting the secret ballot from the beginning of the relevant sample period.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    There is little evidence that scale effects or social learning mattered among US states.

    “We …nd little evidence that scale e¤ects or social learning mattered amongst the US states.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The first principal component of urbanization rate and primary school enrollment correlates positively with both (correlation coefficient 0.91) and is statistically significant.

    “The …rst component correlates positively with urbanization rate and primary school enrollment, with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.91, and is statistically signi…cant (column three).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    IV estimates confirm the modernization hypothesis but reject the franchise hypothesis.

    “The IV estimates in column three con…rm the modernization hypothesis but reject the franchise hypothesis.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    IV estimates show the positive effect of average years of schooling is robust to instrumentation and the three instrumented modernization variables are jointly significant.

    “The IV estimates in column three shows that the positive e¤ect of average years of schooling is robust to instrumentation and that the three instrumented modernization variables are jointly signi…cant.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The results for the first principal component in Latin America are not robust to rare events estimation, though it remains significant at the ten percent level.

    “However, the results are not robust to rare events estimation, as shown in columns four to six, although we note that the …rst principal component remains signi…cant at the ten percent level.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Findingnone given

    In US states, male suffrage was broad already in the 1840s with 60-90 percent of adult white males enfranchised.

    “Unlike the countries in Western Europe (and Latin America), the male su¤rage was broad already in the 1840s with 60-90 percent of adult (white) males enfranchised.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In Latin America, population is occasionally significant at the 10 percent level while learning is not.

    “The variable population is occasionally signi…cant at the 10 percent level while learning is not.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In US states, landholding inequality is highly significant and exerts a negative impact on the secret ballot.

    “Yet, landholding inequality is highly signi…cant and exerts a negative impact on the secret ballot.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Galor et al., 2009

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Ziblatt (2008) source
    • cites Ansell and Samuels (2010)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In US states, each modernization variable (real income per worker, average years of schooling, urbanization rate) is positively and significantly correlated with the timing of the secret ballot; when included together, they are jointly significant and real income per worker and average years of schooling remain significant on their own.

    “Each of the modernization variables is positively and signi…cantly correlated with the timing of the secret ballot (columns one to three).When included together in column four, they are jointly signi…cant and real income per worker and average years of schooling remain signi…cant on their own.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    In US states, when all three interactions are included simultaneously, two remain significant at the ten percent level and they are jointly significant at the one percent level.

    “In column 5, we include all three interactions simultaneously.They are less precisely estimated but two of them remain signi…cant at the ten percent level and they are jointly signi…cant at the one percent level.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The combined estimate of the reform and the aggregate time effect is negative, consistent with a post-reform drop in turnout, but not statistically significant.

    “The combined estimate of the reform and the aggregate time e¤ect is negative, consistent with a post-reform drop in turnout, but not statistically signi…cant.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingnone given

    In US states, women's suffrage, the poll tax, and the literacy requirement lower turnout.

    “We note that women's su¤rage, the poll tax, and the literacy requirement lower turnout.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data

    A formal test for duration dependency in the hazard rate cannot reject that the baseline hazard is constant over time.

    “A formal test for duration dependency in the hazard rate cannot reject that the baseline hazard is constant over time.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The second principal component is negatively correlated with urbanization rate (correlation coefficient -0.35) and positively correlated with GDP per capita (correlation coefficient 0.35).

    “the second principal component which is negatively correlated (correlation coe¢ cient=-0.35)with urbanization rate and positively correlated with GDP per capita (correlation coe¢ cient =0.35).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The first component is highly significant with a positive sign in Table 5, column 5.

    “As seen in Table5, column 5, the …rst component is highly signi…cant with a positve sign.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data

    Reporting specifications with duration dependence makes no difference to the results.

    “Our strong prior is that the hazard is increasing with time and we report speci…cations with duration dependence although it makes no di¤erence to the results.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data

    An alternative measure of electorate size, voters per MP, is insignificant.

    “This measure is also insigni…cant.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Adding an indicator variable for women's suffrage to the model: the indicator is insignificant and only matters little for the other results.

    “We have added an indicator variable for women's su¤rage to the model.The indicator is insigni…cant and only matters little for the other results.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data

    The results are unaffected if the secret ballot in the USA is dated to 1896 instead of 1891.

    “We have checked that the results are una¤ected if we, instead, date the secret ballot in the USA to 1896 (rather than 1891) when ninety percent of the states were using the secret ballot (Mackie, 2000).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Mackie, 2000

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The share of blacks in the population is insignificant and has no effect on the main results.

    “The share of blacks in the population is itself insigni…cant and it has no e¤ect on our main results.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data

    Using occupational diversification instead of urbanization rate gives a positive and marginally significant coefficient in specifications where occupation diversification is entered as the only modernization variable.

    “Using this variable instead of urbanization rate gives a positive and marginally signi…cant coe¢ cient in speci…cations where occupation diversi…cation is entered as the only modernization variable.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Vanhanen, 2003

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The results are robust to excluding the USA or all the off-springs from the estimations.

    “We have checked that the results are robust to excluding the USA or all the o¤-shoots from the estimations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Both primary school enrollment and the first principal component are significant at the 1 percent level in the rare events models.

    “and signi…cant at the 1 percent level in the rare events models.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Re-estimating the model for the period after the civil war and the 15th amendment (1870 onwards) and without population size matters little for the results.

    “We have re-estimated the model for the period after the civil war and the 15th amendment (1870 onwards) and without population size.Doing so, again, matters little for the results.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The coefficient on electorate/adult population is negative but insignificant.

    “The coe¢ cient on electorate/adult population is negative but insigni…cant.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Once other variables are included, the likelihood function becomes non-concave, and the study fails to find a maximum.

    “However, once we include other variables, the likelihood function becomes non-concave, and we fail to …nd a maximum.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Adding a linear trend to all specifications: the trend is not significant and makes no difference to the variables of interest.

    “We have added a linear trend to all the speci…cations.The trend is not signi…cant and it makes no di¤erence to the variables of interest.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    Both primary school enrollment and the first principal component become more significant in the logit models when not conditioning on population size.

    “both primary school enrollment and the …rst principal component becomes more signi…cant in the logit models, and signi…cant at the 1”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data

    Adding state-specific random effects has little effect on the results.

    “Adding state speci…c random e¤ects also has little e¤ect on the results.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data

    The coefficient on real GDP per capita is significant and the two modernization variables remain jointly significant when including share of family owned farms.

    “The coe¢ cient on real GDP per capita is signi…cant and the two modernization variables remain jointly signi…cant.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data

    Urbanization rate becomes marginally significant in specifications with random effects for the Latin American sample.

    “Urbanization rate also becomes marginally signi…cant in these speci…cations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingnone given

    For the Latin American sample, the random effects are significant and affect the magnitude of coefficients on the modernization variables.

    “For the Latin American sample, the random e¤ects are signi…cant, and a¤ect the magnitude of coe¢ cients on the modernization variables.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data

    Using a logit link for fractional variables instead of the linear estimator matters little for the results.

    “We …nd that using this method matters little for the results.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Papke and Wooldridge (1993)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data

    The test of heterogeneous random effects across states fails to reject the null of no state-specific effects.

    “The test of heterogeneous random e¤ects across states fails to reject the null of no state speci…c e¤ects.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data

    A Logit model which includes GDP per capita as the only independent variable yields a positive and significant coefficient.

    “A Logit model which includes GDP per capita as the only independent variable yields a positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Income growth, urbanization, and rising education standards undermined vote markets and made electoral corruption uneconomical.

    “income growth, urbanization, and rising education standards undermined vote markets and made electoral corruption uneconomical”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Modernization tends to erode social control and the scope for economic sanction, to improve outside options for ordinary voters, or to undermine old norms of social deference.

    “Modernization tends to erode social control and the scope for economic sanction, to improve outside options for ordinary voters, or to undermine old norms of social deference.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Heckelman (1995) conjectures that electoral turnout falls as a consequence of the secret ballot.

    “Heckelman (1995) conjectures that electoral turnout falls as a consequence of the secret ballot.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Heckelman (1995) source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    The vote as a tradable commodity loses (much of) its value under secret ballot and voters have one less reason to show up and cast their largely inconsequential vote.

    “The reason is that the vote as a tradable commodity loses (much of) its value and voters have one less reason to show up and cast their largely inconsequential vote.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductreasoning

    The study instruments for real GDP per capita and electorate/adult population to address possible omitted variable bias from unobserved factors.

    “To show that this is most likely not the case, Table 3 shows some estimations in which we instrument for real GDP per capita and electorate/adult population.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The defenders of the open ballot become less stout defenders and ballot reform becomes more likely.

    “The defenders of the open ballot then become less stout defenders and ballot reform becomes more likely.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductown data

    The instruments are strong and the J-test for over-identification is passed.

    “The instruments are strong and the J-test for over-identi…cation is passed.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In some Latin American countries, the secret ballot was effective at reducing electoral corruption; in Chile in 1958 it broke pervasive patron-client relationships.

    “and, in some countries, the secret ballot was e¤ective at weeding out electoral corruption.Baland and Robinson (2008), for example, demonstrate how the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 broke pervasive patron-client relationships.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Drake (2009)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Baland and Robinson (2008) source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In Latin American elections during the 19th and early 20th centuries, voting was often a public, oral act, with registration rolls controlled by local government officials.

    “In the elections that did take place during the 19th and early 20th centuries, “voting was often a public, oral act, with registration rolls controlled by local government o¢ cials” (Hartlyn and Valenzuela, 1994).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Hartlyn and Valenzuela, 1994

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The evidence presented so far supports the view that rising incomes and education standards, and to a lesser extent urbanization-factors all related to modernization-systematically affected the timing of the introduction of the secret ballot.

    “The evidence presented so far supports the view that rising incomes and education standards, and to a lesser extent, urbanization-factors all related to modernizationsystematically a¤ected the timing of the introduction of the secret ballot.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Both countries and US states were at risk of adopting the secret ballot from the beginning of the relevant sample period.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductreasoning

    The study instruments for real income per worker, average years of schooling, and urbanization rate in US states using a weighted index of real income in other states and regional dummies.

    “In Table 6, we present estimations in which we instrument for real income per worker, average years of schooling, and urbanization rate.We use a weighted index of real income in other states and regional dummies for the eight economic areas of the USA as instruments.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductcitation

    Revolutionary pressures are unlikely to be a direct cause of ballot reform, so distance-weighted revolutionary events in other countries can be used as an instrument for suffrage reform.

    “Revolutionary pressures are unlikely to be a direct cause of ballot reform, and so we can use a measure of distance weighted revolutionary events, revolutionary threat, in other countries as an instrument for su¤rage reform in a particular country.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Aidt and Jensen (2011) source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    US states used poll taxes, literacy tests, and women's suffrage restrictions to de facto restrict the electorate, often aimed at disenfranchising African Americans.

    “These included requiring payment in full of poll taxes and literacy tests (columns four and …ve of Table 4).These steps served to keep poor and illiterate males o¤ the election roll, often aimed at disenfranchising African Americans (Keyssar, 2009, chapters 4 and 5).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Keyssar, 2009

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductown data

    The instruments are highly significant with large F-statistics for joint significance and the J-test for over-identification is passed.

    “The instruments are highly signi…cant with large F-statistics for joint signi…cance and the J-test for over-identi…cation is passed.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Modernization reduces the electoral advantage gained from the vote market (the gap between f OB E and f SB E narrows) while at the same time the frequency with which a veto is required goes up because party R is more likely to win office.

    “The reason is that modernization reduces the electoral advantage gained from the vote market (the gap between f OB E and f SB E narrows) while at the same time the frequency with which a veto is required goes up because party R is more likely to win o¢ ce.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Party E will veto when needed.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The vote-buying technology is such that it leads to the asymmetric outcome in the vote market with at most one party buying.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    The reason why political parties in Britain adopted legislation to limit electoral corruption and vote buying was that industrialization had made vote buying uneconomical.

    “She concludes that the reason why political parties in Britain adopted legislation to limit electoral corruption and vote buying was that industrialization had made vote buying uneconomical.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Stokes (2011)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The secret ballot reduces electoral turnout by eliminating the vote market and one reason to vote, as demonstrated by Heckelman (1995).

    “The logic behind this hypothesis is, we recall, that the secret ballot, by and large, eliminates the vote market and with it one reason to vote.This reduces electoral turnout, as …rst pointed out and demonstrated empirically by Heckelman (1995).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Heckelman (1995) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    In our theory the link between modernization and secret ballot reform is the vote market.

    “In our theory the link between modernization and secret ballot reform is the vote market.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductnone given

    The Ballot Act is used as a natural experiment.

    “We use the Ballot Act as a natural experiment.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Party R becomes more likely to win elections as N R increases, which increases the expected veto cost and makes party E less willing to protect the open ballot with a veto.

    “However, party R becomes more likely to win elections and, for that reason, the expected veto cost increases and this is what makes party E less willing to protect the open ballot with a veto.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Party E will veto when needed.
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The vote-buying technology is such that it leads to the asymmetric outcome in the vote market with at most one party buying.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Since the elite vetoes only if D( E ; R ; N R ) 0, any factor that reduces D(:) makes a veto less likely and ballot reform more likely.

    “Since the elite vetoes only if D( E ; R ; N R ) 0, any factor that reduces D(:) makes a veto less likely and ballot reform more likely.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Party E will veto when needed.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    The results are consistent with the causal mechanism suggested by the paper's theory and are corroborated by Stokes (2011) case study of the causes behind the introduction of the Ballot Act.

    “Overall, the results are consistent with the causal mechanism suggested by our theory and they are corroborated by the insightful case study by Stokes (2011) of the causes behind the introduction of the Ballot Act.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Stokes (2011)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The available quantitative evidence on the operation of vote markets comes from a handful of studies of particular markets and none of these consider the role of modernization.

    “The available quantitative evidence on the operation of vote markets comes from a handful of insightful studies of particular markets and none of these consider the role of modernization.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Ziblatt (2009)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Baland and Robinson (2008) source
    • cites Stokes (2005) source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Under Assumption 1, K E < K R and n b ER > 0 and n b RE = 0.

    “Under Assumption 1, K E < K R and n b ER > 0 and n b RE = 0.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductreasoning

    The direct effect of the Ballot Act on turnout cannot be identified independently of common time effects, but the interaction effect between reform and density can be identified.

    “Clearly, the direct e¤ect of the reform ( 1 ), which we expect to be negative, cannot be identi…ed independently of the common time e¤ects.However, we can identify 2 and in this way recover the interaction e¤ect between the reform dummy variable and the indicator of modernization.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: A constituency that is more densely populated is also more urbanized.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The only result that requires an additional assumption is the one regarding the effect of N R on the net value of a veto.

    “The only result that requires an additional assumption is the one regarding the e¤ect of N R on the net value of a veto.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data

    Urbanization undermines the voting market and, as a consequence, induces a fall in turnout.

    “This conclusion is supported by the negative coe¢ cient on change in density which we interpret as evidence that urbanization undermines the voting market and, as a consequence, induces a fall in turnout.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Switzerland adopted the secret ballot in 1872.

    “Switzerland: 1872.Hewitt (1977) and Engerman (2003).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Hewitt (1977) source
    • cites Engerman (2003) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductown data

    Data limitations prevent the study from examining the effect of increasing education standards.

    “Data limitations prevent us from studying the e¤ect of increasing education standards.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductnone given

    Italy is not included in the sample because it de facto adopted the secret vote in 1861 at unification.

    “Italy is not included in the sample because it de facto adopted the secret vote in 1861 at unification.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The threat of revolution, more than income growth or urbanization, drove franchise extension in a historical sample of European countries.

    “Aidt and Jensen (2011) draw the same conclusion from a historical sample of European countries.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Aidt and Jensen (2011) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    New Zealand adopted the secret ballot in 1870.

    “New Zealand: 1870.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Mackie (2000)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    As long as one party has a clear advantage under open ballot and the other has an advantage under secret ballot, the logic of reform continues to apply and modernization continues to undermine the value of the vote market by pushing up prices and increasing transaction costs.

    “This makes the analysis more blurred, but as long as one of the parties has a clear advantage under open ballot and the other has an advantage under secret ballot, the logic of reform continues to apply and modernization continues to undermine the value of the vote market by pushing up prices and increasing transaction costs.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The vote-buying technology is such that it leads to the asymmetric outcome in the vote market with at most one party buying.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Total turnout is not random; it is simply a matter of some voters who turn out to vote randomly changing their mind at the polling station.

    “This means that total turnout is not random; it is simply a matter of some of the voters who turn out to vote randomly changing their mind at the polling station.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Other vote-buying technologies lead to situations where both parties buy votes.

    “Other technologies lead to situations where both parties buy votes.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The vote-buying technology is such that it leads to the asymmetric outcome in the vote market with at most one party buying.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The Netherlands adopted the secret ballot in 1849.

    “The Netherlands: 1849.Stuurman (1991, pp. 462-463) notes that”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Stuurman (1991, pp. 462-463)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The threat of revolution, more than income growth or urbanization, drove franchise extension in a large cross-national sample of countries after World War I.

    “Przeworski (2009) shows for a large cross-national sample of countries after World War I that the threat of revolution, to a greater extent than income growth or urbanization, drove the franchise extension.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Przeworski (2009)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    If reversals are allowed, there exist equilibria where society fluctuates between the two ballot systems, but there will also exist parameter values such that a transition to secret ballot is permanent.

    “If we allow for reversals, it is possible that there exist equilibria where the society ‡uctuates between the two ballot systems (this would for example be the case if = 0), but there will also exist parameter values such that a transition to secret ballot is permanent.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Secret ballot is an absorbing state.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The United Kingdom adopted the secret ballot in 1872.

    “United Kingdom: 1872.This was the year of the Ballot Act, which introduced the Australian Ballot (Asquith, 1888;Mackie, 2000, Seymour, 1915).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Asquith, 1888

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Mackie, 2000

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Seymour, 1915

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductnone given

    Australia is not included in the sample because the secret ballot was introduced at the time of independence.

    “Australia is not included in the sample because the secret ballot was introduced at the time of independence.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    If E < R, all results hold as long as this difference is not sufficient to violate Assumption 1.

    “If, for some reason, E < R , all results holds as long as this di¤erence is not su¢ cient to violate Assumption 1.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Since the economy is stationary, if the elite wants to veto at time t, it will veto again in the future.

    “Since the economy is stationary, if the elite wants to veto at time t, it will veto again in the future.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    It may be that the results reported in Table 8 reflect a precision issue.

    “When log(population) is excluded, results are robust to rare events, and it may therefore be that the results reported in Table8re ‡ect a precision issue.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    In some US states, the secret ballot was not initially applied uniformly throughout the entire state.

    “In some states, e.g., Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee, Texas, Missouri, and Wisconsin, the secret ballot was not initially applied uniformly throughout the entire state and the coding of these cases follow Heckelman (1995).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Heckelman (1995) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Belgium adopted the secret ballot in 1877.

    “Belgium: 1877.Seymour and Fray (1918, vol. II, p. 193) and Mackie (2000).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Seymour and Fray (1918, vol. II, p. 193)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Mackie (2000)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Canada adopted the secret ballot in 1874.

    “Canada: 1874.Pillon (2006) and Engerman (2003).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Pillon (2006)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Engerman (2003) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Norway adopted the secret ballot in 1884.

    “Norway: 1884.Nerbørvik (1986).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Nerbørvik (1986)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    For four of the countries the GDP per capita data go back to 1870; for three countries they are only available from 1920.

    “For four of the countries the data go back to 1870; for three countries they are only available from 1920.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Maddison (2003)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Maddison reports GDP per capita data for nine countries before secret ballot adoption.

    “Maddison (2003) reports GDP per capita data for nine countries before secret ballot adoption.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Maddison (2003)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    For Peru, the GDP per capita data can be tracked back to 1896.

    “For Peru, the data can be tracked back to 1896.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Maddison (2003)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    For Chile the GDP per capita data go back to 1820.

    “For Chile the data go back to 1820.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Maddison (2003)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

96 of 96

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Society has regular elections in which not only the old elite but also broader social classes can vote; suffrage is not universal and voting is initially open.

    “We consider a society with regular elections in which not only the old elite but also broader social classes can vote.The su¤rage is not universal and voting is, initially, open.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The choice of ballot system is endogenous.

    “While we take the su¤rage as given, the choice of ballot system is endogenous.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Two parties, party E (old elite) and party R (radicals), compete in each election.

    “In each period, two parties-party E and party R-compete in an election.Party E represents the old elite, while party R represents the (enfranchised) middle or working classes, which, for concreteness, we refer to as the radicals.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The old elite is outnumbered: N_R > N_E.

    “The old elite is outnumbered N R > N E .”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The party allegiance of a voter is observable and the parties share policy preferences with their core voters.

    “The party allegiance of a voter is observable and the parties share policy preferences with their core voters.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The policy with party R in power is better for voters of type R than the policy associated with party E and vice versa.

    “we focus on the distributive con ‡ict between the old elite and the majority of the electorate and assume that the policy with party R in power is better for voters of type R than the policy associated with party E and vice versa.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The utility loss per capita to the elite from a switch in power from party E to party R is equal to the gain per capita to the radicals (R = E).

    “A neutral assumption is that gains and loses are of equal size and, as nothing of substance depends on it, we let R = E .”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The society has an infinitely long time horizon and a common discount factor.

    “The society has an in…nitely long time horizon.We index time by t and assume a common discount factor 2 (0; 1).”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Under secret ballot, voters vote their preference and there is no electoral corruption; under open ballot, votes can be bought and sold in a vote market.

    “Under secret ballot (SB), voters vote their preference and there is no electoral corruption; under open ballot (OB), votes can be bought and sold in a vote market.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The initial ballot regime is open ballot, but it may be reformed to secret ballot if the majority party proposes such a reform and the opposition party is unwilling to pay the veto cost of preventing the reform.

    “The initial ballot regime is open ballot, but it may be reformed to secret ballot if the majority party proposes such a reform and the opposition party is unwilling to pay the veto cost of preventing the reform.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Once secret ballot is introduced, it is not possible to go back to open ballot again.

    “We assume that once secret ballot is introduced, it is not possible to go back to open ballot again.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Voters believe that the probability they will be offered a bribe is equal to the ratio of the number of bribes offered to voters of their type and the number of voters of their type.

    “We assume that each voter believes that the probability he will be o¤ered a bribe (if he shows up at the polling station) is equal to the ratio of the number of bribes o¤ered to voters of his type (n b jj ) and the number of voters of his type (N j ).”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Assumption 1: E R E ( +M ) + 1 2b E < R E R ( +M ) + 1 2b R.

    “Assumption 1 E R E ( +M ) + 1 2b E < R E R ( +M ) + 1 2b R :”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The vote market shuts down with the arrival of the secret ballot.

    “We make, for simplicity, the extreme assumption that the vote market shuts down with the arrival of the secret ballot, but it would be su¢ cient to assume that it is harder to buy votes under secret than under open ballot.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The opposition can veto a ballot reform proposal at a cost > 0, and the normal case is < 1.

    “the opposition can, at a cost > 0, veto such a proposal.The idea we want to capture with the veto is that reforming the ballot system is fundamentally di¤erent from day-to-day policy making and needs to pass a stricter test than the simple majority rule.18 Of course, if ! 1, then the veto becomes irrelevant but we expect the normal case to be one with < 1.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The historical process of democratization was gradual, with restrictions on participation, contestation, and civil liberties relaxed step by step.

    “Historically, however, the process of democratization was a more gradual process where restrictions on participation, on contestation, and on civil liberties were relaxed step by step to eventually reach what we today recognize as democracy.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Both countries and US states were at risk of adopting the secret ballot from the beginning of the relevant sample period.

    “We assume that both countries and US states were at 'risk' of adopting the secret ballot from the beginning of the (relevant) sample period.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    A constituency that is more densely populated is also more urbanized.

    “We conjecture that a constituency that is more densely populated is also more urbanized.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Party E will veto when needed.

    “Under the assumption that party E will veto when needed, we can write the value of calling a veto at the end of the current period as follows:”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The inequality p R E b E ( E + M ) + 1 2 @n R @n b ER < p E R b R ( R + M ) + 1 2 @n E @n b RE holds.

    “Under the assumption that p R E b E ( E + M ) + 1 2 @n R @n b ER < p E R b R ( R + M ) + 1 2 @n E @n b RE ; it remains true that only party E is active in the vote market.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The vote-buying technology is such that it leads to the asymmetric outcome in the vote market with at most one party buying.

    “The vote buying technology.This is the critical assumption that leads to the asymmetric outcome in the vote market with at most one party buying.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Voters believe that their chance of getting a bribe is proportional to turnout rather than to the size of their group.

    “If voters believe that their chance of getting a bribe is proportional to turnout rather than to the size of their group, then the expected utility value of the bribe is”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Secret ballot is an absorbing state.

    “Secret ballot as an absorbing state.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    E = R, or alternatively E > R, for per capita benefits.

    “E = R .Since these represent per capita bene…ts, the natural alternative is that E > R , i.e., each member of the (small) elite stands to lose a lot more than each member of the (large) majority.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Parties can observe who the opposition voters are.

    “Voter type is observable.We assume that the parties can observe who the opposition voters are and so o¤er them their reservation price in exchange for their vote.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Voters expect that everyone shows up when they calculate their own chances of being offered a bribe.

    “In stage B, we maintain the assumption that voters expect that everyone shows up when they calculate their own chances of being o¤ered a bribe.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    A voter cannot get bribed twice.

    “this assumes he cannot get bribed twice”
27 of 27

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Western European urbanization exceeds its stated percentage scale

    Minor

    Urbanization is defined as a percentage of the population, but its reported maximum is 631, which exceeds 100 percent.

  • Latin American urbanization exceeds its stated percentage scale

    Minor

    The Latin American urbanization measure is also defined as a percentage, yet its reported maximum is 446.

  • A negative turnout coefficient has a positive reported test statistic

    Minor

    In Table 9's fifth specification, the secret-ballot coefficient is −133.60, but its reported z-statistic is positive 3.43. A coefficient divided by a positive standard error must have the same sign as its test statistic.

3 of 3

Cites

The publisher hasn’t deposited this paper’s reference list.

Research works printed but not linked: 27

  1. [1]1. Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A., 2006. Economic origins of dictatorship and democ- racy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
  2. [4]4. Aidt, T.S., Eterovic, D., 2011. Political competition, participation and public …nance in 20th Century Latin America. European Journal of Political Economy 27(1), 181- 200.
  3. [7]7. Anderson, G.M., Tollison, R.D., 1990. Democracy in the marketplace. In W.M. Crain and R.D. Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Public Choice, 285-303. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
  4. [9]9. Ansell, B., Samuels, D. 2010. Inequality and democratization: A contractarian ap- proach. Journal of Comparative Politics 20(10), 1-32.
  5. [12]12. Banks, A. S., 2003. Cross-national Time Series 1815-2003. ICPSR (ed.). Inter- university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI.
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Authors
Aidt, T. S., & Jensen, P. S.
Affiliations
  • University of Cambridge (GB)
  • University of Southern Denmark (DK)
ORCID
Venue
Faculty of Economics
Publisher
Faculty of Economics
Published
2012-04-25
DOI
10.17863/cam.1045
OpenAlex
W3125475237
Cited by
18
References
0
Citations by year
2023: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 2 · 2014: 1
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion)
  • Apollo
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
Keywords
secret ballot, ballot reform, vote buying, electoral corruption, modernization, income growth, urbanization, voter turnout, democracy, Western Europe, United States states

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