Cited by 80Cryptography and Data SecurityAdvanced Authentication Protocols SecurityQuantum Information and Cryptography

GNUC: A new universal composability framework

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Hofheinz, Dennis, Shoup, Victor·2015·Journal of Cryptology

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Crossref · 10.1007/s00145-013-9160-y

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  • Software engineering shows a constant trend to create conditions and frameworks for supporting component integration and communication.

    “From the Definition of Composability in Software [146] and some implementations [147] up to the Software Component Model [148] [149] [150] efforts, software engineering shows a constant trend to create conditions and frameworks for supporting component integration and communication, e.g., also in specific fields like CPS [151].”

    From Digital Twin in the IoT Context: A Survey on Technical Features, Scenarios, and Architectural Models (2020) · cites this paper as [147]

    The paper’s “Protocol hierarchy” section says its framework makes subprotocol composition easy to analyze and implement, so it supports an example of a composability framework. Its “Protocols” section defines composition for cryptographic protocols, not a general definition of software composability; it does not establish a constant trend across software engineering toward component integration and communication. No page number is available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.81)

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Research works printed but not linked: 31

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Cited by

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Authors
Hofheinz, D., & Shoup, V.
Affiliations
  • Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (DE)
  • New York University (US)
Corresponding author
Hofheinz, Dennis
Venue
Journal of Cryptology
Published
2013-10-05
Volume
28
Issue
3
Pages
423-508
ISSN
  • 0933-2790 (ISSN-L)
  • 1432-1378
OpenAlex
W2123352750
Cited by
80
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 1
FWCI
10.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Cryptology (publishedVersion)
  • IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (0716690)
  • Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Quantum Information and Cryptography
Keywords
universal composability, multi-party protocols, polynomial-time attack, corruption, modular protocol design, authenticated communication, secure function evaluation, commitment schemes

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