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Accountability in artificial intelligence: what it is and how it works
Open accessAbstract
Accountability is a cornerstone of the governance of artificial intelligence (AI). However, it is often defined too imprecisely because its multifaceted nature and the sociotechnical structure of AI systems imply a variety of values, practices, and measures to which accountability in AI can refer. We address this lack of clarity by defining accountability in terms of answerability, identifying three conditions of possibility (authority recognition, interrogation, and limitation of power), and an architecture of seven features (context, range, agent, forum, standards, process, and implications). We analyze this architecture through four accountability goals (compliance, report, oversight, and enforcement). We argue that these goals are often complementary and that policy-makers emphasize or prioritize some over others depending on the proactive or reactive use of accountability and the missions of AI governance.
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CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
The paper argues that accountability in AI is best understood as a relation of answerability, not as a vague umbrella term. It then proposes a seven-feature architecture and four goals of accountability, showing how proactive vs. reactive use and broader governance missions shape which goals policymakers emphasize.
## Key findings
- Accountability is defined as an answerability relation that requires three conditions of possibility: authority recognition, interrogation, and limitation of power.
- The paper identifies seven features of accountability: context, range, agent, forum, standards, process, and implications.
- It distinguishes four goals of accountability: compliance, report, oversight, and enforcement; the authors note these goals are often complementary and can be pursued disjointedly or simultaneously.
- For AI specifically, the paper argues that accountability should be analyzed in sociotechnical terms because AI systems can be opaque and unpredictable, leading to “many hands” and “many eyes” problems; poor administration can produce accountability gaps or accountability surpluses.
## Methods
- Conceptual/theoretical analysis of accountability, grounded in existing literature and European AI governance documents, including the GDPR, HLEG reports, and the AI Act.
- The paper first develops a general model of accountability, then applies it to AI using a sociotechnical approach and a goal-based analysis.
- It uses illustrative examples and typologies rather than original empirical data; the paper states that no datasets were generated or analyzed.
## Limitations
- The paper states that the balance among different accountability policies and implementations will remain a matter of ethical, legal, and political deliberation about preferred trade-offs.
- It notes that the AI Act and other regulatory materials leave some accountability questions undefined or still subject to political and legal settlement, especially regarding oversight and enforcement.
- Evident from the text: the paper is a conceptual framework paper, so it does not present original empirical testing of its proposed architecture or goals.
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0 Valid · 0 Not valid · 48 Not checked · 66 Own results and interpretations
In the paper
“At the same time, it is possible to overlook enforcement as analogous remedies can already be taken during oversight, e.g., when ombudsmen monitor public officials' performance and provide recommendations for improvement (Mulgan 2003).”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Mulgan 2003
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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In the paper
“The absence of one of these four goals does not invalidate accountability regimes but generates surrogates (Rubenstein 2007).”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Rubenstein 2007
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“However, recognition of the authority alone is not sufficient, because the legitimacy of standards and procedures of the accountability relation also needs to be recognized (Grant and Keohane 2005).”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Grant and Keohane 2005
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Limitation of power constrains the arbitrary exercise of delegated T by allowing F to monitor the A 's performance and evaluate its results (Lindberg 2013; Mulgan 2003).”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Lindberg 2013 source
- Not checked yetcites Mulgan 2003
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“Current AI policies, especially in the European context, acknowledge this aspect: 'If we are increasingly going to use the assistance of or delegate decisions to AIs, we need to make sure these systems are fair in their impact on people's lives, that they are in line with values that should not be compromised and able to act accordingly, and that suitable accountability processes can ensure this'.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites AI HLEG, European Commission (2019)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Claims other papers make about this one
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The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“The composite and gradient nature of openness can be grounded directly in prior work on openness and accountability in AI systems [29, 37, 42, 58].”
From Rethinking open source generative AI: open washing and the EU AI Act (2024) · cites this paper as [42]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Extending this perspective, Novelli et al. [26] contend that legitimate AI governance depends upon institutional mechanisms that ensure transparency, accountability, contestability, and meaningful human oversight.”
From Who speaks when machines read scripture: boundary-making and interpretive authority in AI-mediated religious knowledge (2026) · cites this paper as [26]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Recent work on AI governance emphasizes that legitimacy in automated knowledge systems depends on institutional mechanisms of answerability, contestability, and limitation of power, particularly in settings where interpretive claims carry pedagogical, legal, or moral consequences [26,36].”
From Who speaks when machines read scripture: boundary-making and interpretive authority in AI-mediated religious knowledge (2026) · cites this paper as [26]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“More recent governance frameworks extend this emphasis by prioritizing accountability, contestability, and meaningful human oversight [26].”
From Who speaks when machines read scripture: boundary-making and interpretive authority in AI-mediated religious knowledge (2026) · cites this paper as [26]
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“The proposed checklist introduces a formal mechanism for evaluating epistemic provenance, disclosure adequacy, and interpretive accountability, aligning with governance-oriented approaches to transparency in AI research [26].”
From Who speaks when machines read scripture: boundary-making and interpretive authority in AI-mediated religious knowledge (2026) · cites this paper as [26]
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Citations
Cites
Explanation in artificial intelligence: Insights from the social sciences
Miller, T. (2019) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2018.07.007 · Cited by 5,302 · cited 1×
“An explainable AIs does not report all available information, but only those conductive to contextual explanations, i.e., compared to counterfactual cases and relevant to the interaction between the agent and the forum (Miller 2019).”
Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework 1
Bovens, M. (2007) · European Law Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00378.x · Cited by 2,667 · cited 6×
“More formally, accountability denotes a relation between an agent A and (what is usually called) a forum F, such that A must justify A ’s conduct to F , and F supervises, asks questions to, and passes judgment on A on the basis of such justification (Bovens 2007, 450).”
InfluentialExplaining Explanations: An Overview of Interpretability of Machine Learning
Gilpin, L. H., Bau, D., Yuan, B. Z., Bajwa, A., Specter, M., & Kagal, L. (2018) · 2018 IEEE 5th International Conference on Data Science and Advanced Analytics (DSAA) · doi:10.1109/dsaa.2018.00018 · Cited by 2,507 · cited 2×
“An interpretable AIs describes its internals in a user-understandable way, thus sacrificing completeness to meet the user's cognition, knowledge, and biases (Gilpin et al., 2018).”
Socio-technical systems: From design methods to systems engineering
Baxter, G., & Sommerville, I. (2011) · Interacting with Computers · doi:10.1016/j.intcom.2010.07.003 · Cited by 1,642 · cited 1×
“It refers to complex hybrid systems in which human and technical resources are joined in goal-directed behavior (Baxter and Sommerville 2011; Long 2013).”
Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics
GRANT, R. W., & KEOHANE, R. O. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051476 · Cited by 1,620 · cited 2×
“However, recognition of the authority alone is not sufficient, because the legitimacy of standards and procedures of the accountability relation also needs to be recognised (Grant and Keohane, 2005).”
‘Accountability’: An Ever‐Expanding Concept?
Mulgan, R. (2000) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/1467-9299.00218 · Cited by 1,609 · cited 1×
“Accountability has many definitions but, at its core, is an obligation to inform about, and justify one’s conduct to an authority (Bovens 2007; Lindberg 2013; Mulgan 2000; Thynne and Goldring 1987).”
The chameleon of accountability: Forms and discourses
Sinclair, A. (1995) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/0361-3682(93)e0003-y · Cited by 1,103 · cited 1×
“This is due to the multifaceted nature of accountability—which is a context-dependent relation (Sinclair 1995), the inherent ambiguity of political processes (Olsen 2017), and to the sociotechnical structure of AIs (Theodorou and Dignum 2020).”
ENDSLEY, M. R., & KABER, D. B. (1999) · Ergonomics · doi:10.1080/001401399185595 · Cited by 1,088
Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy
Romzek, B. S., & Dubnick, M. J. (1987) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.2307/975901 · Cited by 1,042 · cited 1×
“source and degree of supervision, or spatial direction, contrasting upward and downward accountability (Lindberg, 2013; Romzek and Dubnick, 1987; Schedler, 1999).”
Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a Mechanism
Bovens, M. (2010) · West European Politics · doi:10.1080/01402382.2010.486119 · Cited by 1,018 · cited 2×
“From this stance, as Bovens points out, accountability: “is used as a normative concept, as a set of standards for the behavior of actors, or as a desirable state of affairs […] Accountability in this very broad sense […] comes close to ‘responsiveness’ and ‘a sense of responsibility’, a willingness to act in a transp…”
Research works printed but not linked: 5
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- Dubnick M (2005) Accountability and the promise of performance: in search of the mechanisms. Public Perform Manage Rev 28(3):376–417
- Hardin G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Sci New Ser 162(3859):1243–1248
- Long S (2013) Socioanalytic methods: discovering the hidden in organisations and social systems. Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/Socioanalytic-Methods-Discovering-the-Hidden-in-Organisations-and-Social/Long/p/book/9781780491325
- Mashaw JL (2006) Accountability and institutional design: some thoughts on the grammar of governance (SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 924879). Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=924879
Cited by
Díaz-Rodríguez, N., Del Ser, J., Coeckelbergh, M., López de Prado, M., Herrera-Viedma, E., & Herrera, F. (2023) · Information Fusion · doi:10.1016/j.inffus.2023.101896 · Cited by 800
Cheong, B. C. (2024) · Frontiers in Human Dynamics · doi:10.3389/fhumd.2024.1421273 · Cited by 445
Generative AI in Higher Education: The ChatGPT Effect
Chan, C. K. Y., & Colloton, T. (2024) · Routledge · doi:10.4324/9781003459026 · Cited by 203
Walter, Y. (2024) · Discover Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1007/s44163-024-00109-4 · Cited by 257
“• Accountability: Mechanisms to guarantee responsibility and auditability of AI systems [101].”
Williamson, S. M., & Prybutok, V. (2024) · Information · doi:10.3390/info15060299 · Cited by 146
Metadata
- Authors
- Novelli, C., Taddeo, M., & Floridi, L.
- Affiliations
- University of Bologna (IT)
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Novelli, Claudio
- Venue
- AI & SOCIETY
- Published
- 2023-02-07
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1871-1882
- ISSN
- 0951-5666 (ISSN-L)
- 1435-5655
- OpenAlex
- W4319348251
- Cited by
- 495
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2026: 191 · 2025: 186 · 2024: 95 · 2023: 22
- FWCI
- 88.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- AI & Society (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (publishedVersion)
- Archivio istituzionale della ricerca (Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Fujitsu Limited (rep. 95/2021)
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
- Keywords
- AI governance, answerability, interrogation, limitation of power, compliance, oversight, enforcement, socio-technical systems
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