The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
Open accessAbstract
The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. This book looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? The book brings together developments in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. It concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.
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Cites
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
Nash, J. F. (1950) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907266 · Cited by 7,840
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302760193904 · Cited by 3,970
Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization
Strotz, R. H. (1955) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2295722 · Cited by 2,834
A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks
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The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., & Rob, R. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951777 · Cited by 2,044
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Cited by
Coalitional game theory for communication networks
Saad, W., Han, Z., Debbah, M., Hjorungnes, A., & Basar, T. (2009) · IEEE Signal Processing Magazine · doi:10.1109/msp.2009.000000 · Cited by 1,051
On the Salience of Ethnic Conflict
Esteban, J., & Ray, D. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.5.2185 · Cited by 315
Self-citationAxtell, R. (2018) · Handbook of Computational Economics · doi:10.1016/bs.hescom.2018.05.001 · Cited by 13
Metadata
- Authors
- Ray, D.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2007-11-01
- OpenAlex
- W38206204
- Cited by
- 379
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 20.26
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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