The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
STORK: a real, heterogeneous, large-scale eID management system
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“however it is also subject to security issues [87]”
From Privacy-Preserving Solutions for Blockchain: Review and Challenges (2019) · cites this paper as [87]
Citations
Cites
Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing
Pedersen, T. P. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-46766-1_9 · Cited by 2,448 · cited 1×
“Although, they are both computational hiding algorithms and, therefore, may be broken by an unbounded computational adversary, they may be replaced by an information theoretically hiding commitment scheme such as [41].”
BackgroundDesign of a role-based trust-management framework
Li, N., Mitchell, J. C., & Winsborough, W. H. (2005) · Proceedings 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/secpri.2002.1004366 · Cited by 750 · cited 1×
“In the federated and distributed models “delegation” takes the form of signed assertions, which are often implemented by attribute certificates [19], but may also be implemented by more complex assertions including full delegation logics [20,21].”
BackgroundThe ARBAC97 model for role-based administration of roles
Sandhu, R., Bhamidipati, V., & Munawer, Q. (1999) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/300830.300839 · Cited by 605 · cited 1×
“Delegation has been studied within the scope of isolated IdMs mainly in the context of RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) to delegate inter-organization roles to principals, either by creating delegation roles [16,17], or by defining an administrative role structure [18].”
BackgroundDesign and implementation of the idemix anonymous credential system
Camenisch, J., & Van Herreweghen, E. (2002) · Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/586110.586114 · Cited by 555 · cited 3×
“In particular, expressive delegation models are hard to implement in pure distributed models, especially the ones using attribute-based credentials [22,23], although not impossible [24,25].”
BackgroundDelegation logic: A logic-based approach to distributed authorization
Li, N., Grosof, B. N., & Feigenbaum, J. (2003) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/605434.605438 · Cited by 425
An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization
Farrell, S., Housley, R., & Turner, S. (2010) · doi:10.17487/rfc5755 · Cited by 416
An Accumulator Based on Bilinear Maps and Efficient Revocation for Anonymous Credentials
Camenisch, J., Kohlweiss, M., & Soriente, C. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-00468-1_27 · Cited by 288 · cited 1×
“This approach gives more control to the user over his credentials, in particular, it prevents the “calling home” traceability problem, provided that revocation is zero-knowledge [15], but has the drawback that SPs need to handle a possibly wide range of different tokens and the associated technologies and standards.”
BackgroundRandomizable Proofs and Delegatable Anonymous Credentials
Belenkiy, M., Camenisch, J., Chase, M., Kohlweiss, M., Lysyanskaya, A., & Shacham, H. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03356-8_7 · Cited by 269
The Venn of Identity: Options and Issues in Federated Identity Management
Maler, E., & Reed, D. (2008) · IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine · doi:10.1109/msp.2008.50 · Cited by 207 · cited 1×
“One is the IdP discovery problem [12]: how does the SP find the user’s IdP without compromising usability (i.”
BackgroundPBDM: a flexible delegation model in RBAC
Zhang, X., Oh, S., & Sandhu, R. S. (2003) · ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies (SACMAT) · doi:10.1145/775412.775431 · Cited by 205 · cited 1×
“Delegation has been studied within the scope of isolated IdMs mainly in the context of RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) to delegate inter-organization roles to principals, either by creating delegation roles [16,17], or by defining an administrative role structure [18].”
BackgroundThe Seven Flaws of Identity Management: Usability and Security Challenges
Dhamija, R., & Dusseault, L. (2008) · IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine · doi:10.1109/msp.2008.49 · Cited by 174 · cited 1×
“IdM models can be divided into four categories: isolated, centralized, federated [8] and decentralized (distributed) [9].”
BackgroundDesign and implementation of the idemix anonymous credential system
Camenisch, J., & Van Herreweghen, E. (2002) · Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/586111.586114 · Cited by 169
Federated Security: The Shibboleth Approach
Morgan, R. L., Cantor, S. B., Carmody, S., Hoehn, W., & Klingenstein, K. (2004) · The EDUCAUSE quarterly/EDUCAUSE quarterly · Cited by 159
Usability and privacy in identity management architectures
Jøsang, A., Zomai, M. A., & Suriadi, S. (2007) · Cited by 130
Delegation in role-based access control
Crampton, J., & Khambhammettu, H. (2007) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-007-0044-8 · Cited by 123 · cited 1×
“Delegation has been studied within the scope of isolated IdMs mainly in the context of RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) to delegate inter-organization roles to principals, either by creating delegation roles [16,17], or by defining an administrative role structure [18].”
BackgroundIdentity Management: Concepts, Technologies, and Systems
Bertino, E., & Takahashi, K. (2010) · Cited by 107
Privacy and identity management for everyone
Camenisch, J. L., Shelat, A. A., Sommer, D., Fischer‐Hübner, S., Hansen, M., Krasemann, H., Lacoste, G., Leenes, R. E., & Tseng, J. (2005) · doi:10.1145/1102486.1102491 · Cited by 98 · cited 9×
“Several IdMs have been gravitating towards solutions that support federated environments: Shibboleth [2], PRIME [3,4] or SWIFT [5–7] are a few examples that propose solutions to solve the inherent technical challenges.”
BackgroundInfluentialTowards usable privacy policy display and management
Angulo, J., Fischer‐Hübner, S., Wästlund, E., & Pulls, T. (2012) · Information Management & Computer Security · doi:10.1108/09685221211219155 · Cited by 88
A Survey on Identity Management for the Future Network
Torres, J., Nogueira, M., & Pujolle, G. (2012) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/surv.2012.072412.00129 · Cited by 82 · cited 1×
“IdM models can be divided into four categories: isolated, centralized, federated [8] and decentralized (distributed) [9].”
BackgroundElectronic identity management in Estonia between market and state governance
Martens, T. (2010) · Identity in the Information Society · doi:10.1007/s12394-010-0044-0 · Cited by 79 · cited 1×
“The Estonia IDMmodel [27,28] is similar to the FINEID, except in what concerns accessing citizens’ data.”
MethodNational e-ID card schemes: A European overview
Arora, S. (2008) · Information Security Technical Report · doi:10.1016/j.istr.2008.08.002 · Cited by 73 · cited 1×
“The Austrian IdM solution [31,32] uses a mixture of the centralized and distributed model.”
MethodRevocation for Delegatable Anonymous Credentials
Acar, T., & Nguyen, L. D. (2011) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-19379-8_26 · Cited by 62 · cited 1×
“In particular, expressive delegation models are hard to implement in pure distributed models, especially the ones using attribute-based credentials [22,23], although not impossible [24,25].”
BackgroundAttribute Aggregation in Federated Identity Management
Chadwick, D. W., & Inman, G. (2009) · Computer · doi:10.1109/mc.2009.143 · Cited by 61 · cited 1×
“Another is that, since the user information might be scattered across different IdPs, a solution for attribute aggregation must be implemented [11,13], which may be complex because it further complicates the discovery problem and may defeat the privacy advantages of the federated model, given that it may disclose too…”
BackgroundAndersson, C., Camenisch, J. L., Crane, S., Fischer‐Hübner, S., Leenes, R. E., Pearson, S., Pettersson, J. S., & Sommer, D. (2006) · IEEE International Symposium on Signal Processing and Information Technology (ISSPIT) · doi:10.1109/isspit.2005.1577157 · Cited by 49 · cited 9×
“Several IdMs have been gravitating towards solutions that support federated environments: Shibboleth [2], PRIME [3,4] or SWIFT [5–7] are a few examples that propose solutions to solve the inherent technical challenges.”
BackgroundInfluentialElectronic identity in Finland: ID cards vs. bank IDs
Rissanen, T. (2010) · Identity in the Information Society · doi:10.1007/s12394-010-0049-8 · Cited by 45 · cited 5×
“The Estonia IDM model [27,28] is similar to the FINEID, except in what concerns accessing citizens’ data.”
BackgroundInfluentialPBDM: a flexible delegation model in RBAC
Zhang, X., Oh, S., & Sandhu, R. S. (2003) · ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies (SACMAT) · doi:10.1145/775427.775431 · Cited by 26
Giving an interoperable e-ID solution: Using foreign e-IDs in Austrian e-Government
Rößler, T. (2008) · Computer Law & Security Report · doi:10.1016/j.clsr.2008.07.006 · Cited by 24 · cited 1×
“An important feature of theAustrian solution is its compatibility with foreign eIDs [33].”
BackgroundA SWIFT Take on Identity Management
Lopez, G., Cánovas, Ó., Skármeta, A., & Girão, J. (2009) · Computer · doi:10.1109/mc.2009.141 · Cited by 20
ABC4Trust: Protecting Privacy in Identity Management by Bringing Privacy-ABCs into Real-Life
Sabouri, A., & Rannenberg, K. (2015) · IFIP advances in information and communication technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-18621-4_1 · Cited by 17 · cited 1×
“Another privacy issue results from the “calling home” traceability problem [14]—users’ IdPs get to know all users’ services requests because each request needs to be authenticated individually.”
BackgroundHarmonization and Interoperability of EU Environmental Information and Services
Perego, A., Fugazza, C., Vaccari, L., Lutz, M., Smits, P. C., Kanellopoulos, I., & Schade, S. (2012) · IEEE Intelligent Systems · doi:10.1109/mis.2012.22 · Cited by 16 · cited 1×
“Exchanging complex attributes like the European Diploma Supplement (EDS) between countries brings up heterogeneity problems that may be solved using specific sector standards, ontologies or common core vocabularies [42].”
BackgroundKoulolias, V., Kountzeris, A., Leitold, H., Zwattendorfer, B., Crespo, A., & Stern, M. (2011) · International Conference on Network and System Security (NSS) · doi:10.1109/icnss.2011.6060006 · Cited by 15 · cited 1×
“The STORK architecture [38,39] is comprised by two main components: the Middleware and the PEPS (Pan-European Proxy Service).”
MethodSelf-citationFormal description of the SWIFT identity management framework
Pérez, A., López, G., Cánovas, Ó., & Skármeta, A. (2011) · Future Generation Computer Systems · doi:10.1016/j.future.2011.04.003 · Cited by 11 · cited 2×
“In2001theSWIFT(SecureWidespreadIdentitiesforFed-erated Telecommunications) project [5–7] was created with the objective of creating an IdM architecture that, besides the privacy and user-centric goals of PRIME, would be compatible with both existing IdMs and with different network layers, and unify…”
BackgroundMethodModernization of the e-government in Estonia
Kalja, A., Pold, J., Robal, T., & Vallner, U. (2011) · Portland International Conference on Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET) · Cited by 8
Security and privacy enablers for future identity management systems
Barisch, M., Torroglosa, E., Lischka, M., Marques, R., Marx, R., Matos, A., Méndez, A. P., & Scheuermann, D. (2010) · Fraunhofer-Publica (Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft) · doi:10.24406/publica-fhg-366856 · Cited by 8
A Systematic Approach to Legal Identity Management – Best Practice Austria
Leitold, H., & Tauber, A. (2011) · Vieweg+Teubner eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-8348-8652-1_20 · Cited by 6 · cited 1×
“The Austrian IdM solution [31,32] uses a mixture of the centralized and distributed model.”
MethodSelf-citationMiddleware architecture for cross-border eID
Zwattendorfer, B., Sumelong, I., & Leitold, H. (2012) · International Conference on Computational Aspects of Social Networks (CASoN) · doi:10.1109/cason.2012.6412419 · Cited by 3 · cited 1×
“The STORK architecture [38,39] is comprised by two main components: the Middleware and the PEPS (Pan-European Proxy Service).”
MethodSelf-citationCurrent Trends in Pan-European Identity Management Systems
Garcia, S. S., Oliva, A. G., Belleboni, E. P., & Pau, I. (2012) · IEEE Technology and Society Magazine · doi:10.1109/mts.2012.2211154 · Cited by 2 · cited 3×
“Project GUIDE (Government User IDentity for Europe) [34] is a proposed architecture for federated IdMs that establishes how circles of trust between entities should be organized.”
BackgroundInfluentialThe INDI Ecosystem of privacy-aware, user-centric Identity
Leontaridis, L., Andersson, T., Leitold, H., Zwattendorfer, B., Yang, S., & Lindholm, P. (2013) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-03371-2_5 · Cited by 1 · cited 1×
“While STORK attempts to provide interoperability between existing national IdM systems by creating national proxies, the GINI project [36] assumes the existence of a cross-border network of private IdM operators, dubbed INDI operators, which assign and manage the, so-called INDI addresses to users.”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Modinis, I.D.M.: Consortium and others: Modinis study on identity management in eGovernment. Common terminological framework for interoperable electronic identity management consultation Paper, vol. 2 (2005)
- Rossnagel, H., Camenisch, J., Fritsch, L., Gross, T., Houdeau, D., Huhnlein, D., Lehmann, A., Shamah, J.: FutureID—shaping the future of electronic identity. In: Proceedings of Annual Privacy Foru (2012)
- European Parliament and Council of the European Union: Regulation (EU) No 1501/2015. Off. J. Eur. Union L(235), 1–6 (2015)
Cited by
Privacy-Preserving Solutions for Blockchain: Review and Challenges
Bernal Bernabe, J., Canovas, J. L., Hernandez-Ramos, J. L., Torres Moreno, R., & Skarmeta, A. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2950872 · Cited by 459
“Some federated IdM initiatives such as Stork [47], have gone a step forward implementing a cross-border and user-centric approach, since users are put in the middle to take control of their personal data.”
BackgroundThapa, C., & Camtepe, S. (2021) · Computers in Biology and Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.compbiomed.2020.104130 · Cited by 393
“…information and event management (SIEM) to include multiple independent monitoring nodes, – KONFIDO Secure Identity Across Borders Linked (STORK) [234] compliant eID support for authentication of the operators (developed an eIDAS-compliant eID for OpenNCP), and – blockchain-based log management…”
MethodAn overview of limitations and approaches in identity management
Pöhn, D., & Hommel, W. (2020) · International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) · doi:10.1145/3407023.3407026 · Cited by 48
“STORK [31] [60] is the eID federation based on eID.”
A Survey on Blockchain-Based Telecommunication Services Marketplaces
Tkachuk, R.-V., Ilie, D. I., Tutschku, K., & Robert, R. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management · doi:10.1109/tnsm.2021.3123680 · Cited by 45
Alonso, Á., Pozo, A., Choque, J., Bueno, G., Salvachúa, J., Diez, L. F., Marin, J., & Alonso, P. L. C. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2926556 · Cited by 33
Metadata
- Authors
- Ribeiro, C., Leitold, H., Esposito, S., & Mitzam, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Lisbon (PT)
- Corresponding author
- Ribeiro, Carlos
- ORCID
- Ribeiro, Carlos
- Venue
- International Journal of Information Security
- Published
- 2017-07-05
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 569-585
- ISSN
- 1615-5262 (ISSN-L)
- 1615-5270
- OpenAlex
- W2734116279
- Cited by
- 24
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 2
- FWCI
- 2.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Journal of Information Security (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (224993, 297263)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
- Keywords
- electronic identification, federated identity management, interoperability framework, eIDAS Regulation, e-health, privacy law, EU member states
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