A simulation framework for measuring robustness of incentive mechanisms and its implementation in reputation systems
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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“The resulting formation of cooperative clusters allows prosocial agents to reap the benefits of mutual cooperation and protect themselves from invasion by defectors [23, 29, 68].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [68]
Citations
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“A mechanism is always implemented in real time and players could dynamically adjust their strategies as time goes on, which has been modeled by the well-known replicator dynamics (RD) model [4, 8,17,18]—a representative model for evolutionary dynamics (population dynamics)—for capturing long-range evolutionary dynamic…”
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“where ρ is a positive constant, representing the intensity of variation [17,26].”
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“[2] propose a filtering approach to eliminate the impact of naive Byzantine (irrational) players who randomly deviate from equilibrium strategies.”
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“The existence of bounded rational players, who may make mistakes due to reasons unknown tomechanism designers, has beenwidely recognized bymany researchers [3,5,35].”
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“Instead, players learn to optimise their behaviors andmaximise their return through a process of trial and error [27].”
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“Another relevant concept in game theory is k−t robust Nash equilibrium (NE) [6].”
BackgroundTruthful reputation mechanisms for online systems
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“In reputation systems for e-marketplaces, many incentive mechanisms have been widely used to promote truthful feedbacks (ratings) from agents, such as side-payment mechanism [13], credibility mechanism [19], and trust-based incentive mechanism [36].”
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“For ease of presentation,we consider a two-player asymmetric game5 to introduce the simplex analysis which is a well-known approach for analyzing evolutionary dynamics [20], and we extend it to calculate the robustness of some representative games.”
MethodCOMBINING TRUST MODELING AND MECHANISM DESIGN FOR PROMOTING HONESTY IN E‐MARKETPLACES
Zhang, J., Cohen, R. A., & Larson, K. S. (2012) · Computational Intelligence · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8640.2012.00428.x · Cited by 34
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Self-citationApproximating Fixation Probabilities in the Generalized Moran Process
Díaz, J., Goldberg, L. A., Mertzios, G. B., Richerby, D., Serna, M., & Spirakis, P. G. (2012) · Cited by 23
Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms
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“Moreover, the qualitative analysis of the robustness against various attacks has been proposed, such as [34], where a mechanism is claimed to be either resistent or vulnerable with respect to an attacking strategy.”
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Sustaining cooperation on networks: an analytical study based on evolutionary game theory
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A mechanism that provides incentives for truthful feedback in peer-to-peer systems
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“Our robustness measure of incentive mechanisms is inspired by the concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) studied in evolutionary game theory—the application of game theory to biology [21,22,25,32]—to study the evolution of strategies in the population(s) of individuals who are competing with each other for surv…”
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Towards the design of robust trust and reputation systems
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I'm Doing as Well as I Can: Modeling People as Rational Finite Automata
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Cited by
PREStO: A Systematic Framework for Blockchain Consensus Protocols
Leonardos, S., Reijsbergen, D., & Piliouras, G. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management · doi:10.1109/tem.2020.2981286 · Cited by 67
“[120] define the robustness of an equilibrium as the maximum proportion of malicious nodes that the desired equilibrium strategy can tolerate, in the sense that this strategy remains the best strategy for rational players.”
BackgroundEmergence of Punishment in Social Dilemma with Environmental Feedback
Wang, Z., Song, Z., Shen, C., & Hu, S. (2023) · Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1609/aaai.v37i10.26383 · Cited by 50
“On the other hand, it has been implemented in various multi-agent systems, such as e-marketplace (Liu et al. 2016), online virtual agent societies (Savarimuthu, Padget, and Purvis 2013), and smart grids (Du et al. 2021); this renders the study of punishment to be of practical interest.”
BackgroundSocial Norms of Cooperation With Costly Reputation Building
Santos, F. P., Pacheco, J. M., & Santos, F. C. (2018) · Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11582 · Cited by 35
“, that used EGT in order to evaluate the robustness of incentive mechanisms based on reputations (Liu et al. 2016).”
MethodA dynamic reward-based incentive mechanism: Reducing the cost of P2P systems
Lu, K., Wang, S., Xie, L., Wang, Z., & Li, M. (2016) · Knowledge-Based Systems · doi:10.1016/j.knosys.2016.09.002 · Cited by 13
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“method used in [12], this method is more efficient.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Liu, Y., Zhang, J., An, B., & Sen, S.
- Affiliations
- Nanyang Technological University (SG)
- University of Tulsa (US)
- Corresponding author
- Liu, Yuan
- Venue
- Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
- Published
- 2015-04-03
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 581-600
- ISSN
- 1387-2532 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7454
- OpenAlex
- W1988121267
- Cited by
- 16
- References
- 43
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2016: 4
- FWCI
- 7.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (publishedVersion)
- DR-NTU (Nanyang Technological University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
- Keywords
- incentive mechanisms, robustness, reputation systems, evolutionary game theory, bounded rationality, equilibrium robustness, simulation framework, evolutionary dynamics, electronic markets, reputation management
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