Individuality, subjectivity, and minimal cognition
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There are agents at multiple levels of organisation within a system.
“This gives us the possibility of explaining how it can be that there are agents at multiple levels of organisation within a system which solves puzzles raised by colonies of single celled organisms such as slime moulds”
From Traces of thinking: a stigmergic approach to 4E cognition (2025) · cites this paper as Godfrey-Smith, 2016
Other theorists have not shied away from multiple levels of agency: Hutchins explores agents consisting of agents in distributed cognitive systems, Goldstone and Theiner offer a computational systems account of group cognition in such terms, and Godfrey-Smith explores the transition between single and multicelled organisms in terms of agency and subjectivity.
“Hutchins explores the dynamics of agents consisting of agents in distributed cognitive systems (Hutchins, 1995a) Goldstone and Theiner (2017 ) offer a computational systems account of group cognition in such terms, and Peter Godfrey-Smith (2016) explores the transition between single and multicelled organisms in terms of agency and subjectivity.”
From Traces of thinking: a stigmergic approach to 4E cognition (2025) · cites this paper as Godfrey-Smith (2016)
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Evolving across the explanatory gap.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2019) · Philosophy Theory and Practice in Biology · doi:10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0011.001 · Cited by 55 · see citing works
Dynamical Emergence Theory (DET): A Computational Account of Phenomenal Consciousness
Moyal, R., Fekete, T., & Edelman, S. (2020) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-020-09516-9 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
Is free-energy minimisation the mark of the cognitive?
Kiverstein, J., & Sims, M. (2021) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-021-09788-0 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Origins of biological teleology: how constraints represent ends
García-Valdecasas, M., & Deacon, T. W. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04705-w · Cited by 13 · see citing works
“On the other hand, defend-ers of what is described as the life-mind continuity principle (e.g., as developed in enactivism) assume that life and mind share the same set of basic organizational principles (e.g., Thompson, 2007, Froese & Di Paolo, 2011, and Godfrey-Smith, 2016, among others).”
BackgroundTraces of thinking: a stigmergic approach to 4E cognition
Sims, R. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-05074-8 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“Indeed, other theorists have not shied away from multiple levels of agency: Hutchins explores the dynamics of agents consisting of agents in distributed cognitive systems (1995a), Goldstone and Theiner (2017) offer a computational systems account of group cognition in such terms, and Peter Godfrey-Smith (2016) explore…”
- Authors
- Godfrey-Smith, P.
- Venue
- Biology & Philosophy
- Published
- 2016-10-25
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 775-796
- ISSN
- 0169-3867 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8404
- OpenAlex
- W2536874256
- Cited by
- 76
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 3
- FWCI
- 11.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Biology & Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- biological individuality, subjectivity, subjective experience, animal cognition, nervous system, evolution of consciousness
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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