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Cited by 59Philosophy and Theoretical SciencePhilosophy and History of ScienceEmbodied and Extended Cognition

Evolving across the explanatory gap.

Open access
Godfrey-Smith, Peter·2019·Philosophy Theory and Practice in Biology
DOI 10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0011.001
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Abstract

I attempt to narrow and reshape Levine's "explanatory gap" between mental and physical, by means of a dual use of the concept of subjectivity.First, subjectivity and the associated notion of "point of view" are helpful in defusing arguments against materialism.Second, subjectivity is an explicable evolutionary product; I discuss a series of events in the history of life that bear on the origins of subjective experience.

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Crossref · 10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0011.001

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56 of 56 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The distinction between position-dependent and non-position-dependent contents maps approximately to Godfrey-Smith's difference between contents representing the objective world and those required for evaluating percepts (affect or feelings).

    “The distinction I am making here, between contents that are position-dependent and those that are not, maps approximately to the difference pointed out by Godfrey-Smith (2019) among others, between contents responsible for percepts representing the objective world, external to the animal, and those required for evaluating those percepts, i.e., affect or feelings.”

    From The function(s) of consciousness revisited: insights from a modular/constitutive model using vision as a test case (2026) · cites this paper as Godfrey-Smith (2019)

    Section 3, “The Evolution of Subjectivity” (page unavailable), distinguishes tracking external objects and events from registering good and bad, broadly supporting the proposed mapping. It does not say feelings are required to evaluate percepts; it explicitly notes that evaluations need not be felt. (LLM, conf=0.82)

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  • Consciousness arguably requires that the subject has a single perspective or point of view on the environment.

    “Consciousness arguably requires that the subject has a single perspective or point of view on the environment, and this account aims to explain how embodied agency gives rise to such a perspective (Hurley 1998, Merker 2005, Godfrey-Smith 2019).”

    From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Godfrey-Smith 2019

  • Some spiders demonstrate complex perceptual capacities, but score low in respect to evidence for complex or varying motivational states.

    “Godfrey-Smith goes on to note that some spiders demonstrate complex perceptual capacities, but score low in respect to evidence for complex or varying motivational states.”

    From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Godfrey-Smith 2019

  • Godfrey-Smith argues that sensorimotor consciousness and evaluative consciousness may be separable dimensions of consciousness, raising the possibility of two types of phenomena that are grouped under subjective experience.

    “Godfrey-Smith (2019) argues that sensorimotor consciousness and evaluative consciousness may be separable dimensions of consciousness, raising the possibility of two types of phenomena that are grouped under ‘subjective experience’:”

    From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Godfrey-Smith 2019

  • Other creatures-such as certain gastropods-may have richer subjective valuation in the absence of more complex sensorimotor capacities.

    “Other creatures—such as certain gastropods—may have richer subjective valuation in the absence of more complex sensorimotor capacities.”

    From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as Godfrey-Smith 2019

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Cites

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9 of the 65 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. Dennett, D. C. 2004. " 'Epiphenomenal' Qualia?" In There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenome- nal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, edited by Y. Nagasawa, P. Ludlow, and D. Stoljar, 127-136. Cambridge MA: Bradford/MIT.
  2. Feigl, H. 1958. "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical.' " In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 2: Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem, edited by H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell, 370-497. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
  3. Feigl, H. 1967. "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical"': The Essay and a Postscript. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
  4. Feinberg, T., and J. Mallatt. 2016. The Ancient Origins of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  5. Kripke, S. A. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  6. Lewis, D. K. 1994. "Reduction of Mind." In A Companion to Philosophy of Mind, edited by Samuel Guttenplan, 412-431. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
  7. Lombrozo, T. 2006. Understanding Explanation: Studies in Teleology, Simplicity, and Causal Knowledge. PhD dissertation, Psychology Department, Harvard University.
  8. Nagel, T. 1965. "Physicalism." Philosophical Review 74: 339-356.
  9. Nagel, T. 1986. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Authors
Godfrey-Smith, P.
Venue
Philosophy Theory and Practice in Biology
Publisher
University of Michigan Library
Published
2019-01-16
Volume
11
Issue
20220112
ISSN
2475-3025 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0011.001
OpenAlex
W2911103390
Cited by
55
References
65
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 5
FWCI
6.75
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Philosophy Theory and Practice in Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • University of Michigan Library Repository (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • City University of New York
  • University of Pennsylvania
  • Graduate Center
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
explanatory gap, Levine, subjectivity, narrative perspective, materialism, evolution of consciousness, subjective experience, mind-body problem

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