Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, Incentives, and Learning Effects
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper examines the effectiveness of the use of executive compensation linked to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) goals across US firms. Empirical analysis of a cross-industry sample of 746 listed companies for the period 2002–2013 showed that the use of CSR-linked compensation contracts for Named Executive Officers (NEOs) promotes CSR performance. More specifically, we found that linking NEOs’ compensation to CSR goals produces positive effects in the 3rd year after adoption. As firms accumulate experience and learn how to use the system over the following eight periods, CSR performance increases monotonically. Furthermore, experience accumulated over time affects the different specifications of CSR performance asymmetrically, by reducing both environmental and social CSR concerns and increasing only environmental CSR strengths. Interestingly, we also found that the simultaneous use of other CSR-focused governance systems moderates the effect of a firm’s accumulated experience in using CSR-linked executive compensation on CSR performance: the existence of a CSR committee at the board level and the public release of a CSR report are likely to have a positive moderating effect, while the purchase of a CSR audit has no moderating effect.
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Cites
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“In this respect, individuals within firms perform tasks under the influence of two types of motivation: the intrinsic goals of their work and activities and the extrinsic incentives offered in exchange for their effort (Ryan and Deci 2000).”
BackgroundResultInvestigating causal relations by econometric models and cross-spectral methods
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Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338 · cited 6×
“These premises lead us to believe that as a firm accumulates experience in using CSR-linked executive compensation, it learns how to use this management practice more readily (Eisenhardt 1989).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialA Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance
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Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
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Corporate social responsibility and access to finance
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Metadata
- Authors
- Derchi, G.-B., Zoni, L., & Dossi, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Business Ethics
- Published
- 2020-07-07
- Volume
- 173
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 617-641
- ISSN
- 0167-4544 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0697
- OpenAlex
- W3040579375
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 16.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Derchi, G.-B., Zoni, L., & Dossi, A. (2021). Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, Incentives, and Learning Effects. Journal of Business Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-020-04556-8
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