Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Abstract
Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom; Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, The Journal of Law, Economics, and
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Holmström and Milgrom show that if the task where pay cannot explicitly be made contingent on performance is sufficiently important, it may even be better to provide no explicit incentives for any task.
“Holmström and Milgrom show that if the task, where pay cannot explicitly be made contingent on performance, is sufficiently important it may even be better to provide no explicit incentives for any task.”
From Psychological foundations of incentives (2002) · cites this paper as Holmström and Milgrom 1991
It is well known from practice and theory that explicit performance incentives may be harmful because they induce employees to concentrate only on rewarded tasks and neglect non-rewarded tasks.
“It is well known from practice (Kerr 1975) and from theory (Holmström and Milgrom 1991, Baker 1992) that in this situation explicit performance incentives may be harmful because they induce the employees to concentrate only on the rewarded tasks and to neglect the non-rewarded tasks.”
From Psychological foundations of incentives (2002) · cites this paper as Holmström and Milgrom 1991
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- Authors
- Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P.
- Affiliations
- Yale University (US)
- Stanford University (US)
- ORCID
- Milgrom, Paul
- Venue
- The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1991-01-01
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- special_issue
- Pages
- 24-52
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- 8756-6222
- OpenAlex
- W2149902237
- Cited by
- 6,046
- References
- 25
- Citations by year
- 2026: 240 · 2025: 227 · 2024: 200 · 2023: 217 · 2022: 179 · 2021: 216 · 2020: 189 · 2019: 251 · 2018: 236 · 2017: 250 · 2016: 242 · 2015: 234 · 2014: 261 · 2013: 249 · 2012: 262
- FWCI
- 29.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Law Economics and Organization (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- incentive contracts, asset ownership, job design, managerial incentives, agency theory
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