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Transitional justice and authoritarian backsliding

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Nalepa, Monika · 2021 · Constitutional Political Economy

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Abstract

Can a lack of transitional justice contribute to democratic backsliding? This paper uses the case of Poland to argue that selective enforcement of transitional justice can be linked to democratic erosion. In doing so, the paper adjudicates between two theories of democratic backsliding. The first, advanced by Milan Svolik, argues that elite polarization drives erosion: when political candidates are ideologically far apart, citizens who strongly prefer one over the other may turn a blind eye to antidemocratic transgressions by their preferred candidate to prevent the competing candidate from winning. The second theory, presented by Nalepa, Vanberg, and Ciopris (NVC), describes an equilibrium where voters are uncertain whether the candidate they are dealing with is a closet autocrat or an ideological incumbent, but reelect him into office regardless. This theory posits that a closet autocrat is reelected into office because his first period actions are identical to those of an ideological incumbent. I argue that judiciary reforms in Poland reflect exactly the kind of incumbent actions that are consistent both with the actions of an ideological incumbent and with the actions of a closet autocrat. Using survey data from Poland, I find evidence of elite polarization, offering support for the first theory, but also find ample evidence of polarization in the electorate and of a belief structure supportive of the equilibrium from NVC. I present Hungary’s experience with transitional justice and the rule of law as a shadow case to illustrate similar dynamics to those taking place in Poland.

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Metadata

Authors
Nalepa, M.
Affiliations
University of Chicago (US)
Corresponding author
Nalepa, Monika
Venue
Constitutional Political Economy
Published
2020-08-17
Volume
32
Issue
3
Pages
278-300
ISSN
  • 1043-4062 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-9966
OpenAlex
W3053151117
Cited by
21
References
26
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 4
FWCI
4.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Constitutional Political Economy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (1658170)
  • Center for International Social Science Research
  • Pozen Family Center for Human Rights
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
Keywords
transitional justice, democratic backsliding, authoritarian backsliding, selective enforcement, elite polarization, incumbent reelection, judicial reform, rule of law, electoral polarization, Poland, Hungary

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Transitional justice and authoritarian backsliding. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s10602-020-09315-5
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Nalepa, M. (2021). Transitional justice and authoritarian backsliding. Constitutional Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-020-09315-5

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