Causal and Constitutive Explanation Compared
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article compares causal and constitutive explanation. While scientific inquiry usually addresses both causal and constitutive questions, making the distinction is crucial for a detailed understanding of scientific questions and their interrelations. These explanations have different kinds of explananda and they track different sorts of dependencies. Constitutive explanations do not address events or behaviors, but causal capacities. While there are some interesting relations between building and causal manipulation, causation and constitution are not to be confused. Constitution is a synchronous and asymmetric relation between relata that cannot be conceived as independent existences. However, despite their metaphysical differences, the same key ideas about explanation largely apply to both. Causal and constitutive explanations face similar challenges (such as the problems of relevance and explanatory regress) and both are in the business of mapping networks of counterfactual dependence—i.e. mechanisms—although the relevant counterfactuals are of a different sort. In the final section the issue of developmental explanation is discussed. It is argued that developmental explanations deserve their own place in taxonomy of explanations, although ultimately developmental dependencies can be analyzed as combinations of causal and constitutive dependencies. Hence, causal and constitutive explanation are distinct, but not always completely separate forms of explanation.
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Citations
Cites
Social Theory of International Politics
Wendt, A. (1999) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511612183 · Cited by 7,664
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 · Cited by 1,302
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction
Rosen, G. (2010) · Modality · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0007 · Cited by 1,285
On constitution and causation in International Relations
Wendt, A. (1998) · Review of International Studies · doi:10.1017/s0260210598001028 · Cited by 523
Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States
Bechtel, W., & Mundale, J. (1999) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/392683 · Cited by 483 · cited 2×
“This continuum might help to make sense of the debates in philosophy of mind and cognitive science about multiple realization (Bechtel & Mundale 1999, Shapiro 2000, Aizawa 2008).”
BackgroundConstruction area (no hard hat required)
Bennett, K. (2011) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9703-8 · Cited by 252
Cited by
Mittelstadt, B., Russell, C., & Wachter, S. (2019) · Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3287560.3287574 · Cited by 794
“A given cause of set of causes may be incomplete insofar as they are not the sole cause of the event, but nonetheless convey useful information to the recipient in a given context or for a given purpose (Ylikoski, 2013).”
External representations and scientific understanding
Kuorikoski, J., & Ylikoski, P. (2015) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0591-2 · Cited by 71
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ylikoski, P.
- Venue
- Erkenntnis
- Published
- 2013-07-24
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- S2
- Pages
- 277-297
- ISSN
- 0165-0106 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8420
- OpenAlex
- W2042246549
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 37.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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