The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Can we trust robots?
Open accessAbstract
Can we trust robots? Responding to the literature on trust and e-trust, this paper asks if the question of trust is applicable to robots, discusses different approaches to trust, and analyses some preconditions for trust. In the course of the paper a phenomenological-social approach to trust is articulated, which provides a way of thinking about trust that puts less emphasis on individual choice and control than the contractarian-individualist approach. In addition, the argument is made that while robots are neither human nor mere tools, we have sufficient functional, agency-based, appearance-based, social-relational, and existential criteria left to evaluate trust in robots. It is also argued that such evaluations must be sensitive to cultural differences, which impact on how we interpret the criteria and how we think of trust in robots. Finally, it is suggested that when it comes to shaping conditions under which humans can trust robots, fine-tuning human expectations and robotic appearances is advisable.
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Citations
Cites
Picard, R. W. (1997) · MIT Press · doi:10.7551/mitpress/1140.001.0001 · Cited by 7,382
On the Morality of Artificial Agents
Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (2004) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1023/b:mind.0000035461.63578.9d · Cited by 1,218
Affective computing: challenges
Picard, R. W. (2003) · International Journal of Human-Computer Studies · doi:10.1016/s1071-5819(03)00052-1 · Cited by 978
What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design
Verbeek, P.-P. (2005) · doi:10.1515/9780271033228 · Cited by 371
Cited by
In AI We Trust: Ethics, Artificial Intelligence, and Reliability
Ryan, M. (2020) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-020-00228-y · Cited by 600
“…claims that while artefacts, such as AI, do not meet the specific criteria for trust, we may still trust them because ‘they may nevertheless contribute to the establishment of ‘virtual trust’ or ‘quasi trust’ in so far that they appear as quasi-others or social others’ (Coeckelbergh 2012, p. 57).”
BackgroundEthical governance is essential to building trust in robotics and artificial intelligence systems
Winfield, A. F. T., & Jirotka, M. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences · doi:10.1098/rsta.2018.0085 · Cited by 493
Blockchain as a confidence machine: The problem of trust & challenges of governance
De Filippi, P., Mannan, M., & Reijers, W. (2020) · Technology in Society · doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2020.101284 · Cited by 406
An experimental study of public trust in AI chatbots in the public sector
Aoki, N. (2020) · Government Information Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.giq.2020.101490 · Cited by 350
Ethics of healthcare robotics: Towards responsible research and innovation
Stahl, B. C., & Coeckelbergh, M. (2016) · Robotics and Autonomous Systems · doi:10.1016/j.robot.2016.08.018 · Cited by 235
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Coeckelbergh, M.
- Venue
- Ethics and Information Technology
- Published
- 2011-09-03
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 53-60
- ISSN
- 1388-1957 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8439
- OpenAlex
- W2112880115
- Cited by
- 195
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 2.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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