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Cited by 600Ethics and Social Impacts of AILiterary and Philosophical StudiesPhilosophical Ethics and Theory

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

In AI We Trust: Ethics, Artificial Intelligence, and Reliability

Open access
Ryan, Mark·2020·Science and Engineering Ethics
DOI 10.1007/s11948-020-00228-yPMC PMC7550313
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Abstract

One of the main difficulties in assessing artificial intelligence (AI) is the tendency for people to anthropomorphise it. This becomes particularly problematic when we attach human moral activities to AI. For example, the European Commission’s High-level Expert Group on AI (HLEG) have adopted the position that we should establish a relationship of trust with AI and should cultivate trustworthy AI (HLEG AI Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI, 2019, p. 35). Trust is one of the most important and defining activities in human relationships, so proposing that AI should be trusted, is a very serious claim. This paper will show that AI cannot be something that has the capacity to be trusted according to the most prevalent definitions of trust because it does not possess emotive states or can be held responsible for their actions—requirements of the affective and normative accounts of trust. While AI meets all of the requirements of the rational account of trust, it will be shown that this is not actually a type of trust at all, but is instead, a form of reliance. Ultimately, even complex machines such as AI should not be viewed as trustworthy as this undermines the value of interpersonal trust, anthropomorphises AI, and diverts responsibility from those developing and using them.

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  • According to two of the most prevalent conceptions of trust, AIs are not capable of being trusted.

    “However, according to two of the most prevalent conceptions of trust, AIs are not capable of being trusted [39].”

    From Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy (2024) · cites this paper as [39]

  • AI lacks the capacity to be moved by trust or a sense of goodwill since it lacks any emotive states.

    “However, AI lacks the capacity to be moved by trust or a sense of goodwill since it lacks any emotive states [39].”

    From Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy (2024) · cites this paper as [39]

  • To be worthy of trust, a trustee must be capable of being trusted, which means having the competence to fulfil the trust placed in them.

    “To be worthy of trust, they must be capable of being trusted, which means that they must have the competence to fulfil the trust that is placed in them [39].”

    From Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy (2024) · cites this paper as [39]

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Metadata

Authors
Ryan, M.
Affiliations
KTH Royal Institute of Technology (SE)
Corresponding author
Ryan, Mark
ORCID
Ryan, Mark
Venue
Science and Engineering Ethics
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2020-06-10
Volume
26
Issue
5
Pages
2749-2767
ISSN
  • 1353-3452 (ISSN-L)
  • 1471-5546
DOI
10.1007/s11948-020-00228-y
PMC
PMC7550313
OpenAlex
W3033094275
Cited by
600
References
49
Citations by year
2026: 111 · 2025: 174 · 2024: 143 · 2023: 90 · 2022: 51 · 2021: 31
FWCI
58.53
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Science and Engineering Ethics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Socio-Environmental Systems Modeling (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Keywords
trustworthy AI, trust in AI, anthropomorphism of AI, reliance, moral responsibility, AI ethics guidelines, interpersonal trust
MeSH terms
Artificial Intelligence, Humans, Morals, Reproducibility of Results, Trust

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