Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS): meaningful human Control, collective moral responsibility and institutional design
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Abstract
This article is concerned with three key ethical issues that arise from the use in military combat of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). The first issue concerns the unpredictability of LAWS in respect of the requirement of Meaningful Human Control (MHC) – as opposed to machine control - in theatres of war. It is argued that the unpredictability of (especially) ‘self-learning’ LAWS is not necessarily a barrier to their morally acceptable use under some restricted conditions. The second issue concerns a normative framework for ascribing moral and, potentially, legal responsibility in respect of LAWS, i.e., the so-called responsibility gap. It is argued that the notion of collective responsibility is potentially helpful here. The third issue concerns human on-the-loop LAWS. It is argued that whereas human out-of-the loop weapons should be prohibited, nevertheless, under certain restrictive conditions some human on-the-loop LAWSs (as well as human in-the-loop LAWSs) may be morally acceptable.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This article argues that unpredictability in self-learning LAWS does not necessarily rule out meaningful human control, and that collective moral responsibility plus institutional redesign can address responsibility gaps. It concludes that human out-of-the-loop LAWS should be prohibited, while some human in-the-loop and on-the-loop LAWS may be morally acceptable under restrictive conditions.
Key findings
- The paper’s central normative claim is that unpredictability of self-learning LAWS does not necessarily exclude meaningful human control; control is a matter of degree, and moral acceptability depends on factors including likely unpredictability, quantum of lethal force, geographical reach, sensory data, firing range, civilian proximity, and what is morally at stake.
- It argues the moral responsibility gap can be addressed through collective responsibility: authorities, designers, manufacturers, and operators who knew or should have known of unpredictable outcomes share joint moral responsibility; legal/regulatory gaps can be closed by institutional redesign creating collective institutional and moral responsibilities.
- It holds that AI-enabled robots cannot be morally responsible, cannot occupy full institutional roles involving moral decision-making, and cannot be criminally liable because they lack mental states such as mens rea; only human operators can understand and comply with moral principles as moral principles.
- It concludes human out-of-the-loop weapons should be prohibited, while human in-the-loop lethal weapons complying with IHL/LOAC and jus in bello principles are at least in principle morally permissible, and some human on-the-loop LAWS are morally acceptable under restrictive conditions; it also says nuclear-armed autonomous weapons ought to be prohibited.
Methods
- Conceptual/normative ethical analysis; no datasets were generated or analysed (stated in the Contribution section).
- Uses philosophical distinctions among causal, moral, and institutional responsibility; collective responsibility as joint responsibility; and human in-the-loop, on-the-loop, and out-of-the-loop control.
- Main analysis applies just war principles (military necessity, proportionality, discrimination), IHL/LOAC, meaningful human control, and the precautionary principle to hypothetical scenarios such as drone strikes, anti-aircraft defence, and kamikaze/suicide-bomber attacks.
Limitations
- The paper states no limitations section; it states that no datasets were generated or analysed.
- Evident from the text: the argument is conceptual and relies on hypothetical scenarios and stipulated assumptions about combat conditions, institutional arrangements, and the moral permissibility of human-in/on-the-loop systems, without empirical validation.
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Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 5 Not valid · 13 Not checked · 99 Own results and interpretations
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In the paper
“In this scenario there is a joint action that consists in part of, firstly, Analyst making a determination and communicating it to Operator (having as an individual end that Operator knows that the suspected terrorist is in fact placing an IED), and, secondly, Operator firing the weapon (having as an individual end to kill the target).”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Accordingly, for this reason alone, it would not be possible or, at least, it would be extremely dangerous, to try to get AI enabled robots to fill institutional roles that involve moral decision-making and do so by conferring institutional rights and duties (including legal rights and duties) upon them (Miller 2025).”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Miller 2025
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- Rests on 2 assumptions not shown here.
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In the paper
“It is argued that the notion of collective responsibility is potentially helpful here.”
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
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- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, the institutional rights and duties constitutive of an institutional role and conferred on the occupant of the role by virtue of his or her occupancy of the role, might also be moral rights and duties, e.g., the moral and institutional right of a combatant to shoot dead enemy combatants.”
hedgedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Moreover, if military leaders and others are to proceed to deploy such technology notwithstanding the risks, and in doing so ignore the precautionary principle, then they are, other things being equal, morally responsible for the bad outcomes that might ensure.”
plainstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
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- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
27 more claims
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- Probably not a substantial claim. 65
- It may state two separate claims as one. 37
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 5. LAWSs' applications: integrating technological, institutional and moral dimensions
“The third species of human in-the-loop LAWS is characterised by conditions (1) and (2) above but also by condition (3)(iii) (as opposed to condition (3)(i) or condition (3)(ii)).”
§ 5. LAWSs' applications: integrating technological, institutional and moral dimensions
“Accordingly, there are three species of human on-the-loop LAWs identified.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 5. LAWSs' applications: integrating technological, institutional and moral dimensions
“The human in-the-loop lethal weapon application outlined in (3)(ii) manifests a moral dilemma”
§ 5. LAWSs' applications: integrating technological, institutional and moral dimensions
“The second species of human on-the-loop LAWS is characterised by conditions (1) and ( 2) above but also by condition (3)(ii) (as opposed to condition (3)(i)).”
Citations
Cites
SPARROW, R. (2007) · Journal of Applied Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.2007.00346.x · Cited by 593 · cited 1×
“Note that this unpredictability does not exclude the pos - sibility of ascribing moral responsibility; arguably, there is not a moral responsibility gap (Sparrow, 2007 ; Steinhoff, 2013) (as opposed to a legal or regulatory responsibility gap of which more below).”
Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical Account
Santoni de Sio, F., & van den Hoven, J. (2018) · Frontiers in Robotics and AI · doi:10.3389/frobt.2018.00015 · Cited by 566 · cited 2×
“Here the notion of meaningful human control (MHC) is relevant (Roff & Moyes, 2016; Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven 2018).”
The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems
Arkin, R. C. (2010) · Journal of Military Ethics · doi:10.1080/15027570.2010.536402 · Cited by 259
Smith, N. (1982) · Cited by 198
The Moral Foundations of Social Institutions
Miller, S. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818622 · Cited by 127
Self-citationTerrorism and Counter‐Terrorism: Ethics and Liberal Democracy
Miller, S. (2008) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781444302837 · Cited by 96
Self-citationCollective Moral Responsibility: An Individualist Account
MILLER, S. (2006) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2006.00134.x · Cited by 72
Self-citationJoint Epistemic Action and Collective Moral Responsibility
Miller, S. (2015) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2014.971908 · Cited by 56
Self-citationMiller, S. (1992) · Philosophical Papers · doi:10.1080/05568649209506386 · Cited by 41
Self-citationShooting to Kill: The Ethics of Police and Military Use of Lethal Force
Miller, S. (2016) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190626136.001.0001 · Cited by 40
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Fischer, J. M. (Ed.). (1986). Moral responsibility. Cornell University Press.
- IEEE SA Research Group on Issues of Autonomy and AI in Defense Systems. (2024). A framework for human decision making through the lifecycle of autonomous and intelligent systems in defense applications. IEEE SA.
- Miller, S. (1995). Corporate Crime, the Excesses of the 80's and Collective Responsibility. Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 5(2), 39–51.
- Russell, S., & Norvig, P. (1995). Artificial intelligence: A modern approach. Prentice Hall.
Cited by
Begishev, I. R. (2026) · Journal of Digital Technologies and Law · doi:10.21202/jdtl.2026.6 · Cited by 1
Cipriani, E., Justesen, H. J., Menicucci, D., & Grassini, S. (2026) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-026-68067-8 · Cited by 1
Impact of Emerging Technologies in Modern Warfare
Shrivastava, S. K., & Shrivastava, C. (2026) · International Journal of Emerging Science and Engineering · doi:10.35940/ijese.f2644.14050426
Autonomous Weapons Systems and Victims’ Rights: Assessing the Role of Meaningful Human Control
Rinaudo, S. (2026) · Lund University Publications Student Papers (Lund University)
Governing Artificial Intelligence: Public Preferences and Regulatory OptionsPreprint
Lundgren, M., & Tallberg, J. (2026) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2607.14585
Metadata
- Authors
- Miller, S.
- Affiliations
- Charles Sturt University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Miller, Seumas
- ORCID
- Miller, Seumas
- Venue
- Ethics and Information Technology
- Published
- 2025-10-28
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 4
- ISSN
- 1388-1957 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8439
- OpenAlex
- W4415602593
- Cited by
- 11
- References
- 18
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11
- FWCI
- 1.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Ethics and Information Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (publishedVersion)
- Charles Sturt University Research Output (CRO) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Charles Sturt University
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Military Strategy and Technology
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › War, Ethics, and Justification
- Keywords
- autonomous weapons, meaningful human control, collective moral responsibility, responsibility gap, institutional design, ethics of autonomous weapons, military ethics
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- The paper
- Miller, S. (2025). Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS): meaningful human Control, collective moral responsibility and institutional design. Ethics and Information Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-025-09874-x
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