Shooting to Kill: The Ethics of Police and Military Use of Lethal Force
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Abstract
Terrorism, the use of military force in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, and the fatal police shootings of unarmed persons have all contributed to renewed interest in the ethics of police and military use of lethal force. In this book the various moral justifications and responsibilities involved in the use of lethal force by police and military combatants are analyzed, relying on a distinctive normative teleological account of institutional roles. The resulting conception provides a novel theoretical alternative to prevailing reductive individualist and collectivist accounts. Police and military uses of lethal force are morally justified in part by recourse to fundamental natural moral rights and obligations, especially the right to personal self-defense and the moral obligation to defend the lives of innocent others. Yet the moral justification for police and military use of lethal force is to some extent role-specific. Police have an institutionally based moral duty to use lethal force to uphold the law, and military combatants have an institutionally based moral duty to use lethal force to win just wars. Two key notions in play are joint action and the natural right to self-defense. A relational individualist theory of joint actions is used to construct the notion of multilayered structures of joint action in order to explicate organizational action. A novel theory of justifiable killing in self-defense is also provided. Specific topics covered include: police shootings of armed offenders and suicide bombers; military necessity; targeted killing, autonomous weapons, humanitarian armed intervention, and civilian immunity.
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“Moreover, others who had this information, such as designers, manufacturers and operators, would also have a share in the collective (i.e., joint -see below) moral responsibility for the bad outcomes in question (Miller 2016: 279).”
From Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS): meaningful human Control, collective moral responsibility and institutional design (2025) · cites this paper as Miller 2016: 279
In the citing paper
“Given the non-reducibility of moral concepts and properties to nonmoral ones and, specifically, to physical ones, at best computers can be programmed to comply with nonmoral proxies for moral requirements (Arkin, 2010;Miller 2016: 279-281).”
From Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS): meaningful human Control, collective moral responsibility and institutional design (2025) · cites this paper as Miller 2016: 279-281
In the citing paper
“Thirdly, war is quite unlike programming a destination into a robot-driven car with a detailed and fixed roadmap, or, for that matter, a flight path into an AI-enabled fighter aircraft.Nor is it even like playing a game such as chess, albeit it is analogous in some ways.For unlike in war, in chess there is a single, definite, unchanging, and mutually known”
From Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS): meaningful human Control, collective moral responsibility and institutional design (2025) · cites this paper as Miller 2016: 272-273
In the citing paper
“Thus, LAWSs do not have a moral right, let alone a moral duty, to kill enemy combatants and, therefore, ought not to occupy the institutional role of a combatant (or be treated as if they did occupy that role) (Miller 2016: Ch. 10).”
From Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS): meaningful human Control, collective moral responsibility and institutional design (2025) · cites this paper as Miller 2016: Ch. 10
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Cited by
Miller, S. (2025) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-025-09874-x · Cited by 11
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Metadata
- Authors
- Miller, S.
- Affiliations
- Professorial Research Fellow, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2016-11-17
- Cited by
- 40
- References
- 0
- Language
- en
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- Miller, S. (2016). Shooting to Kill: The Ethics of Police and Military Use of Lethal Force. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780190626136.001.0001
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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