Killing by Autonomous Vehicles and the Legal Doctrine of Necessity
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
How should autonomous vehicles (aka self-driving cars) be programmed to behave in the event of an unavoidable accident in which the only choice open is one between causing different damages or losses to different objects or persons? This paper addresses this ethical question starting from the normative principles elaborated in the law to regulate difficult choices in other emergency scenarios. In particular, the paper offers a rational reconstruction of some major principles and norms embedded in the Anglo-American jurisprudence and case law on the “doctrine of necessity”; and assesses which, if any, of these principles and norms can be utilized to find reasonable guidelines for solving the ethical issue of the regulation of the programming of autonomous vehicles in emergency situations. The paper covers the following topics: the distinction between “justification” and “excuse”, the legal prohibition of intentional killing outside self-defence, the incommensurability of goods, and the legal constrains to the use of lethal force set by normative positions: obligations, responsibility, rights, and authority. For each of these principles and constrains the possible application to the programming of autonomous vehicles is discussed. Based on the analysis, some practical suggestions are offered.
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Cites
The responsibility gap: Ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning automata
Matthias, A. (2004) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-004-3422-1 · Cited by 1,101 · cited 1×
“Whether this assumption about the traceability of responsibility is reasonable in relation to all possible future scenarios involving autonomous agents is a controversial issue (see the so-called Bresponsibility gap^ problem, as originally framed by Matthias (2004) and Sparrow (2007).”
BackgroundSPARROW, R. (2007) · Journal of Applied Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.2007.00346.x · Cited by 593
The Laws of Robots: Crimes, Contracts, and Torts
Pagallo, U. (2013) · Law, Governance and Technology Series · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6564-1 · Cited by 235
Why Ethics Matters for Autonomous Cars
Lin, P. (2015) · Autonomes Fahren · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-45854-9_4 · Cited by 189
Implementable Ethics for Autonomous Vehicles
Gerdes, J. C., & Thornton, S. M. (2015) · Autonomes Fahren · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-45854-9_5 · Cited by 127
Cited by
Taeihagh, A., & Lim, H. S. M. (2019) · Transport Reviews · doi:10.1080/01441647.2018.1494640 · Cited by 601
Four Responsibility Gaps with Artificial Intelligence: Why they Matter and How to Address them
Santoni de Sio, F., & Mecacci, G. (2021) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-021-00450-x · Cited by 490
“This is a too simple utilitarian approach, which tends to obfuscate the moral relevance of individual moral and legal duties and rights (Santoni de Sio, 2017).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Role of 5G Technologies in a Smart City: The Case for Intelligent Transportation System
Gohar, A., & Nencioni, G. (2021) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su13095188 · Cited by 325
Ethical Decision Making in Autonomous Vehicles: The AV Ethics Project
Evans, K., de Moura, N., Chauvier, S., Chatila, R., & Dogan, E. (2020) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-020-00272-8 · Cited by 82
A roadmap for evaluating moral competence in large language models
Haas, J., Bridgers, S., Manzini, A., Henke, B., May, J., Levine, S., Weidinger, L., Shanahan, M., Lum, K., Gabriel, I., et al. (2026) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-025-10021-1 · Cited by 25
Metadata
- Authors
- Santoni de Sio, F.
- Venue
- Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Published
- 2017-02-22
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 411-429
- ISSN
- 1386-2820 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8447
- OpenAlex
- W2589593208
- Cited by
- 106
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 57.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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