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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 87 of the 89 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 7 of the 53 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Four Responsibility Gaps with Artificial Intelligence: Why they Matter and How to Address them

Open access
Santoni de Sio, Filippo, Mecacci, Giulio · 2021 · Philosophy & Technology

Abstract

The notion of “responsibility gap” with artificial intelligence (AI) was originally introduced in the philosophical debate to indicate the concern that “learning automata” may make more difficult or impossible to attribute moral culpability to persons for untoward events. Building on literature in moral and legal philosophy, and ethics of technology, the paper proposes a broader and more comprehensive analysis of the responsibility gap. The responsibility gap, it is argued, is not one problem but a set of at least four interconnected problems – gaps in culpability, moral and public accountability, active responsibility—caused by different sources, some technical, other organisational, legal, ethical, and societal. Responsibility gaps may also happen with non-learning systems. The paper clarifies which aspect of AI may cause which gap in which form of responsibility, and why each of these gaps matter. It proposes a critical review of partial and non-satisfactory attempts to address the responsibility gap: those which present it as a new and intractable problem (“fatalism”), those which dismiss it as a false problem (“deflationism”), and those which reduce it to only one of its dimensions or sources and/or present it as a problem that can be solved by simply introducing new technical and/or legal tools (“solutionism”). The paper also outlines a more comprehensive approach to address the responsibility gaps with AI in their entirety, based on the idea of designing socio-technical systems for “meaningful human control", that is systems aligned with the relevant human reasons and capacities.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that the AI responsibility gap is not one problem but at least four interconnected gaps—culpability, moral accountability, public accountability, and active responsibility—arising from technical, organisational, legal, ethical, and societal sources. It critiques fatalist, deflationist, and solutionist responses and sketches a comprehensive approach based on designing sociotechnical systems for meaningful human control.

Key findings

  • The responsibility gap should be reframed as at least four interconnected problems: gaps in culpability, moral accountability, public accountability, and active responsibility; these can occur with non-learning systems too and have multiple sources, some technical, organisational, legal, ethical, and societal.
  • Current partial approaches distort the problem: “fatalism” treats it as new and intractable; “deflationism” dismisses it as not new and not a problem; “solutionism” treats it as solvable by simply introducing new technical and/or legal tools, with risks of “technical solutionism” and “legal solutionism.”
  • The paper proposes meaningful human control (MHC) as a more comprehensive design-oriented approach, with two major conditions: “tracking” (the sociotechnical system responds to relevant human reasons and facts) and “tracing” (for each relevant action, at least one human agent along the design, development, and use chain has sufficient knowledge and moral awareness/capacity).
  • It illustrates the gaps and proposed approach with examples including automated driving systems, AI-driven medical diagnosis, algorithmic public administration, and the Uber automated vehicle accident.

Methods

  • Conceptual/normative analysis and critical literature review in moral and legal philosophy and ethics of technology; no empirical data collection or sample is reported.
  • The analysis draws on philosophical, legal, and sociological theories of responsibility (e.g., Hart, Bovens, van de Poel, Gardner) to distinguish four forms of responsibility and map corresponding gaps and causes.
  • It uses illustrative cases—automated driving, medical diagnosis, public administration, and the Uber accident—to show how gaps arise and how MHC tracking/tracing might address them.

Limitations

  • Stated: the MHC proposal is a sketch; future research will develop it in more detail, and future philosophical, empirical, and technical work must clarify which responsibility gaps emerge in different systems and contexts and the extent to which MHC may effectively address them.
  • Evident: the paper is conceptual and does not empirically test or operationalize MHC; its examples are illustrative rather than a systematic empirical sample.
  • Evident: the critical review is described as a “representative sample” of the literature, not a systematic review.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s13347-021-00450-x

Cites

87 of 87 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Fig. 1 Partial answers to responsibility gaps and their limits
Fig. 1 Partial answers to responsibility gaps and their limitsFrom the PDF

Verification

Claims the paper makes

6 Valid · 3 Not valid · 27 Not checked · 62 Own results and interpretations

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 37
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 25
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1

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Citations

Cites

Show all 89 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Zouridis, S., Bovens, M., & Van Eck, M. (2019). Digital discretion. In T. Evans & P. Hupe (Eds.), Discretion and the quest for controlled freedom. Palgrave/MacMillan.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Santoni de Sio, F., & Mecacci, G.
Affiliations
Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
Venue
Philosophy & Technology
Published
2021-05-14
Volume
34
Issue
4
Pages
1057-1084
ISSN
  • 2210-5433 (ISSN-L)
  • 2210-5441
OpenAlex
W3160005967
Cited by
490
References
89
Citations by year
2026: 165 · 2025: 117 · 2024: 88 · 2023: 72 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 13
FWCI
64.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Philosophy & Technology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion)
  • Research Repository (Delft University of Technology) (submittedVersion)
  • Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (MVI.16.044)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
  • Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
Keywords
responsibility gap, artificial intelligence, moral culpability, accountability, learning automata, fatalism, deflationism, solutionism, meaningful human control, socio-technical systems, ethics of technology, legal theory, ethics

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Four Responsibility Gaps with Artificial Intelligence: Why they Matter and How to Address them. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s13347-021-00450-x
The paper
Santoni de Sio, F., & Mecacci, G. (2021). Four Responsibility Gaps with Artificial Intelligence: Why they Matter and How to Address them. Philosophy & Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-021-00450-x

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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