Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper argues that juridical proof is best understood as inference to the best explanation (IBE), not primarily as Bayesian or probability-based modeling. It claims IBE better explains relevance, probative value, standards of persuasion, and institutional features such as reliance on jurors and sufficiency devices.
Key findings
- IBE accounts for both macro- and micro-level proof: relevance and probative value depend on how well evidence is explained by a party’s explanation, while preponderance is the better explanation favoring a party, beyond a reasonable doubt requires no plausible explanation consistent with innocence, and clear-and-convincing requires an explanation sufficiently more plausible than the other side’s.
- Probability accounts are “parasitic” on explanatory considerations: Bayesian approaches cannot generate potential theories, and explanatory criteria guide judgments about likelihood; IBE also avoids the formal conjunction paradox that Bayesian element-conjunction models create.
- The paper reports Bayesian conjunction-paradox numbers: for two elements the average probability for each element must be approximately .707; for three elements .794; for four elements .841. It gives the example that a plaintiff wins by proving each element to .6 despite a likelihood of .36, but loses when proving one element to .9 and the other to .5, with a likelihood of .45.
- In the Blue cab example, Bayes’ Theorem yields .41, while test subjects’ median answer was .80; when given causal base-rate framing, the median dropped to .60. The authors argue the difference is explanatory, not a mere error. In Nance’s street-light example, probabilities are red = .42, green = .30, yellow = .28; the probability approach says defendant wins, and the authors argue an explanation-based account can also support that result through the contrast “red” versus “green or yellow.”
Methods
- Conceptual and analytical essay in law and philosophy; no original empirical sample, dataset, or statistical analysis is reported.
- The argument applies IBE to trial proof, compares it with Bayesian/probability accounts, and uses legal doctrine plus hypothetical examples such as the maid/necklace, heartburn, Blue cab, and street-light cases.
- Main analysis is normative/descriptive: it claims IBE better describes and justifies evidence law, standards of proof, and judicial and juror decision-making.
Limitations
- The authors acknowledge vagueness in how “sufficiently plausible” an explanation must be for beyond-a-reasonable-doubt or clear-and-convincing standards, but argue that this vagueness inheres in the standards themselves. They also state there is no formula for combining explanatory criteria; criteria must be weighed contextually.
- The text makes evident that the paper offers no original empirical test or formal model of its account and relies on conceptual argument, hypotheticals, and cited empirical jury literature rather than new data.
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Claims the paper makes
0 of 29 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Premisecitation§ JURIDICAL PROOF AND THE BEST EXPLANATION · p. 2
Much theorizing about the law of evidence and the proof process has focused primarily on probability theories and Bayesian decision theory, neglecting explanation-based reasoning.
“Although juridical proof involves these inferential practices, much theorizing about the law of evidence and the proof process has focused attention elsewhere, primarily on probability theories in general and Bayesian decision theory in particular.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [2]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 18
Even if the strength of a party's total evidence could be quantified, the vagueness remains for a probability approach.
“Even if the strength of a party Õ s total evidence could be quantified, 49 the vagueness remains for such a probability approach as well.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ I. INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION · p. 5
Rarely, if ever, will the material inferences at trial involve deductive inferences from uncontested premises.
“Rarely, if ever, however, will the material inferences at trial involve deductive inferences from uncontested premises.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [11]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisereasoning§ A. Explanation as a Guide to Inference · p. 7
Practical considerations and interests affect both the generation and selection steps of inference to the best explanation.
“Practical considerations and interests affect both steps.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation§ I. INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION · p. 6
The pattern of inference at trial is primarily abductive rather than enumerative.
“The pattern of inference at trial is primarily abductive rather than enumerative.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [15]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation§ A. Explanation as a Guide to Inference · p. 11
Explanations are self-evidencing: what is explained (the evidence) provides a reason for believing that the explanation is correct.
“Explanations are ''self-evidencing'' in the sense that what is explained (the evidence) provides a reason for believing that the explanation is correct.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [27]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 14
In the context of juridical proof, two factors set the inferential interests and the appropriate level of detail at which fact finders should focus in evaluating explanations: the substantive law and the points of contrast between the versions of events offered by the parties (the disputed facts).
“In the context of juridical proof, two factors set the inferential interests and the appropriate level of detail at which fact finders should focus in evaluating explanations. These factors are the substantive law and the points of contrast between the versions of events offered by the parties (the disputed facts).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 12
In civil cases where the burden of persuasion is a preponderance of the evidence, proof depends on whether the best explanation of the evidence favors the plaintiff or the defendant.
“In civil cases where the burden of persuasion is a preponderance of the evidence, proof depends on whether the best explanation of the evidence favors the plaintiff or the defendant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [31]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisereasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 14
Where the parties choose to disagree focuses attention on the appropriate details for choosing among contrasting explanations.
“And second, where the parties choose to disagree focuses attention on the appropriate details for choosing among contrasting explanations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ A. Explanation as a Guide to Inference · p. 7
The domain of the inferential task provides guidance and constraints on what counts as a potential explanation.
“The domain of the inferential task will provide guidance and constraints with regard to what counts as a potential explanation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [17]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisereasoning§ A. Explanation as a Guide to Inference · p. 10
The inferential interests at stake pick out the appropriate contrasts (or foils) for an explanation.
“The inferential interests at stake pick out the appropriate contrasts (or ''foils'')-whether we want to explain why A rather than B or why A rather than C (or D, etc.).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 17
In defamation cases requiring actual malice, for a plaintiff to succeed there must be a theory that explains the evidence, incorporates actual malice by the defendant, and is clearly and convincingly a better explanation than those that do not include actual malice.
“In such cases, for a plaintiff to succeed there must be a theory that explains the evidence, which incorporates actual malice by the defendant, and which is not only the best explanation but is clearly and convincingly a better explanation than those that do not include actual malice.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisereasoning§ I. INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION · p. 5
The juridical proof process primarily involves inductive inferences, in the broad, non-demonstrative sense.
“The juridical proof process primarily involves inductive inferences, in the broad, non-demonstrative sense.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 14
The substantive law will require a sufficiently detailed explanation of the evidence to show the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
“First, the substantive law will require a sufficiently detailed explanation of the evidence to show the plaintiff is entitled to relief (E.g., explanations such as ''the defendant did something bad'' typically will not be detailed enough.).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 15
Through burdens of proof, the structure of civil trials assuages concerns associated with too few potential explanations.
“Through burdens of proof, the structure of civil trials thus assuages concerns associated with too few potential explanations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [42]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 12
The general structure of proof at trial instantiates the two-stage explanation-based inferential process: potential explanations are generated, and an inference is made to one of them on explanatory grounds.
“The general structure of proof at trial instantiates the twostage explanation-based inferential process discussed above. At the first stage, potential explanations are generated; at the second, an inference is made to one of the potential explanations on explanatory grounds.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ JURIDICAL PROOF AND THE BEST EXPLANATION · p. 3
Explanatory considerations provide a better account of the burden-of-proof standards employed in civil and criminal trials such as preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt.
“We also demonstrate how explanatory considerations provide a better account of the burden-of-proof standards employed in civil and criminal trials such as preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 15
If the proffered explanations truly are equally bad or good, including additionally constructed ones, judgment will and should go against the party with the burden of persuasion.
“If the proffered explanations truly are equally bad (or good), including additionally constructed ones, judgment will (and should) go against the party with the burden of persuasion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ JURIDICAL PROOF AND THE BEST EXPLANATION · p. 1
Because legal proof falls between science and managing everyday affairs, the juridical proof process involves inferential practices similar to abduction or inference to the best explanation.
“Because legal proof falls somewhere between science and managing one Õ s everyday affairs, it should perhaps not be surprising that the juridical proof process involves similar inferential practices.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 14
The IBE process accommodates the concern of too many explanations by showing how to aggregate and differentiate among them.
“The IBE process thus accommodates the concern of too many explanations by showing how to aggregate and differentiate among them.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisereasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 13
How fine grained an explanation must be depends on the context.
“In general, how fine grained the explanation must be will depend on the context.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ JURIDICAL PROOF AND THE BEST EXPLANATION · p. 2
Probability-based accounts are not an alternative to explanation-based accounts but are parasitic on more fundamental explanation-based considerations.
“Indeed, as we also attempt to show, the probabilitybased accounts, rather than being an alternative, are parasitic on the more fundamental explanation-based considerations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 12
Empirical evidence has confirmed that jurors formulate factual conclusions by constructing narrative versions of events to account for the evidence presented at trial based on criteria such as coherence, completeness, and uniqueness.
“Empirical evidence has confirmed that jurors 34 formulate factual conclusions by constructing narrative versions of events to account for the evidence presented at trial based on criteria such as coherence, completeness, and uniqueness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [35]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 15
In cases where each side has problems explaining critical items of evidence, a verdict will and should be rendered for the better or best available explanation, whether one of the parties' or another constructed by the fact-finder.
“In the first scenario-where each side has problems explaining the same or different critical items of evidence-the key point is the comparative aspect of the process. A verdict will (and should) be rendered for the better (or best available) explanation, whether one of the parties Õ or another constructed by the fact-finder.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisereasoning§ A. Explanation as a Guide to Inference · p. 7
In the legal context, the substantive law determines what conduct triggers liability and hence what potential explanations to look for.
“This is clear in the legal context, where the substantive law determines what conduct triggers liability and hence what potential explanations to look for (e.g., did the defendant cause the plaintiff Õ s injury).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ JURIDICAL PROOF AND THE BEST EXPLANATION · p. 3
Explanatory considerations provide a better account of micro-level proof issues regarding the relevance and probative value of evidence.
“We demonstrate how explanatory considerations provide a better account of microlevel proof issues regarding the relevance and probative value of evidence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ A. Explanation as a Guide to Inference · p. 8
There is no formula for combining the criteria for choosing among explanations; each criterion is a standard that must be weighed against the others.
“There is no formula for combining such criteria; rather, each criterion is a standard which must be weighed against the others.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [21]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 18
The vagueness in how sufficiently plausible an explanation must be to satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt or clear-and-convincing-evidence standard inheres in the standards themselves.
“We acknowledge there is vagueness in how ''sufficiently plausible'' an explanation must be in order to satisfy either the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt or the clear-convincing-evidence standard, but this vagueness inheres in the standards themselves. 48”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 15
In cases with too little evidence from which to differentiate among potential explanations, judgment should also end against the party with the burden of persuasion; they have failed to meet their burden of producing evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could differentiate among the potential, contrasting explanations.
“In the second scenario-too little evidence from which to differentiate among potential explanations-should also end in judgment against the party with the burden of persuasion; they have failed to meet their burden of producing evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could differentiate among the potential, contrasting explanations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ B. General Objections to IBE · p. 23
Of two explanations, other things being equal, the one that explains more of the evidence is better than the one that explains less.
“For example, of two explanations, other things being equal, the one that explains more of the evidence will be better than the one that explains less; the one that is more in accord with what else we know will be better than the one that isn Õ t; and so on.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 32
The explanation-based approach avoids the problem of dependence among elements because the accepted explanation must incorporate each of the elements.
“But we note that the explanation-based approach avoids this problem because the accepted explanation must incorporate each of the elements.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 41
In every case, the probative value of evidence will be determined by what best explains it.
“In every case, the probative value of evidence will be determined by what best explains it.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ B. General Objections to IBE · p. 24
The objection that an explanation appearing best is no guarantee of truth is aimed not at IBE but against any form of inductive inference.
“This objection, however, is aimed not at IBE but against any form of inductive inference.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ B. General Objections to IBE · p. 23
Once interests and other contextual factors are fixed, there are objective criteria for evaluating explanations.
“Although inferences will be relative to interests and other contextual factors, once these are fixed there are indeed objective criteria for evaluating explanations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 34
The Bayesian approach suffers from a disabling defect that the explanatory approach avoids: it essentially assumes that all possible explanatory hypotheses will be before the court and thus collectively add up to a probability of 1.0.
“The Bayesian approach also suffers from a disabling defect that the explanatory approach avoids. It essentially assumes that all the possible explanatory hypotheses will be before the court, and thus collectively add up to a probability of 1.0.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ B. General Objections to IBE · p. 23
The success of these explanatory inference practices best explains their ubiquity.
“In other words, their success best explains their ubiquity.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 32
The typical case, in which individual elements are not entailed by a more general one, leads to counterintuitive results under the Bayesian approach.
“The typical case-in which individual elements are not entailed by a more general one-leads to counterintuitive results.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 32
The case where additional elements merely divide up and logically entail a more general element is rare.
“But this is a rare case that proves the general point.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 29
Friedman's criticism of IBE is based on a misconstruction of the substantive law.
“Friedman Õ s criticism of IBE is based on a misconstruction of the substantive law. 90”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 34
An explanatory account avoids the perverse result by focusing on the relative plausibility of the parties' explanations.
“By contrast, an explanatory account avoids this perverse result by focusing on the relative plausibility of the parties Õ explanations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 30
There is no reason to see explanatory and Bayesian approaches as necessarily incompatible.
“Indeed, there is no reason to see explanatory and Bayesian approaches as necessarily incompatible. 95”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 32
Under the Bayesian response, plaintiffs' likelihood of success depends on how the claim is defined; more elements means they have the burden of proving additional elements and their burden goes up even for other independent elements.
“But this creates its own problem. Plaintiffs Õ likelihood of success will depend on how the claim is defined; more elements means that they have the burden not only of proving the additional elements, but also that their burden goes up even with regard to the other (possibly independent) elements.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 39
At the macro-level, standards of persuasion are better understood in terms of explanations rather than in terms of cardinal probabilities.
“At the macro-level, we demonstrated that standards of persuasion are better understood in terms of explanations (rather than in terms of cardinal probabilities).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ B. General Objections to IBE · p. 24
Even if the plaintiff's explanation appears better than the defendant's but is so poorly probed that the jury concludes many other explanations favoring the defendant are equally or more plausible, judgment should go for the defendant.
“And even if the plaintiff Õ s explanation appears better than the defendant Õ s but is so poorly probed by the evidence that the jury concludes many other explanations (favoring the defendant) are equally or more plausible, then judgment again should go for the defendant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 30
Explanatory considerations drive key aspects of the Bayesian process.
“Indeed, explanatory considerations drive key aspects the Bayesian process.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 32
An explanatory approach based on relative plausibility avoids the formal conjunction paradox.
“By contrast, an explanatory approach based on relative plausibility avoids the formal paradox.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 29
Both the substantive law and the contrasting nature of the parties' explicit theories at trial help to sort potential explanations in a way that is useful based on the decision-maker's inferential interests.
“As explained in our basic account above, both the substantive law and the contrasting nature of the parties Õ explicit theories at trial help to sort potential explanations in a way that is useful based on the decision-maker Õ s inferential interests. 89”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 31
The law defines the burden of persuasion and instructs jurors by requiring that claimants prove each element to the requisite standard of persuasion, not by requiring the probability of the conjunction of elements to exceed the standard.
“One problem with this model is that this is not how the law defines the burden of persuasion or how it instructs jurors: it does so by requiring that claimants prove each element to the requisite standard of persuasion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 37
Without some guarantee that there is some degree of homogeneity within the reference class, the base-rate data may not be very useful in telling us about the particular event.
“The incidental base rates, thus, are subject to a particular reference class and without some guarantee that there is some degree of homogeneity within the class (e.g., are Green cabs 85% more prevalent everywhere in town?), the data may not be very useful in telling us about the particular event.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 44
In civil cases, instructions on the preponderance standard are generally 'unhappily pegged to a theory of subjective probability estimates.'
“In civil cases, instructions on the preponderance standard are generally ''unhappily pegged to a theory of subjective probability estimates.''”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Laudan, supra note 45
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 38
Given the stronger explanatory connection in scenario two, the subjects were justified in employing the strategy of inferring that a certain conclusion was more likely when there is a stronger explanation linking the evidence and the event at issue.
“But given the stronger explanatory connection in scenario two, we think the subjects were justified in employing the strategy of inferring that a certain conclusion was more likely when there is a stronger explanation linking the evidence and the event at issue.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 39
At the micro-level, the relevance and probative value of evidence depends on the explanatory relationships between evidence and facts of consequence in particular cases.
“At the micro-level, we demonstrated that the relevance and probative value of evidence depends on the explanatory relationships between evidence and facts of consequence in particular cases.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 45
In criminal cases jurors typically are given even less guidance in implementing the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard than in civil cases.
“In criminal cases jurors typically are given even less guidance in implementing the ''beyond a reasonable doubt'' standard.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 30
Nance is incorrect to assert that if relative plausibility is allowed to aggregate potential explanations, it must aggregate all of them, which leads to a probability of 1.
“Therefore, Nance, supra note 30, is incorrect to assert that if relative plausibility is allowed to aggregate potential explanations, it must aggregate all of them, which leads to a probability of 1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Nance, supra note 30
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ A. Objections to IBE in the Philosophy of Science · p. 21
Philosophy-of-science objections to IBE pose little if any threat to an explanation-based account of juridical proof.
“Now, these objections pose little if any threat to an explanation-based account of juridical proof.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Trials involve disputes over everyday objects such as people and property and contracts; rarely, if ever, will there be a litigated dispute over whether certain theoretically posited entities or theoretical laws actually exist or are only empirically adequate.
- Interpretationcitation§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 44
Jurors are already assessing the relative plausibility of competing explanations.
“Jurors are already assessing the relative plausibility of competing explanations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pennington and Hastie, supra note 3
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 32
Such counterintuitive results pose a serious challenge to the Bayesian approach.
“Such counterintuitive results pose a serious challenge to the Bayesian approach.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 29
Based on the substantive law in the street-light example, it is perfectly appropriate for the jury to contrast the explanation that the light was red against the explanation that the light was green or yellow.
“Based on the substantive law in the street-light example, it Õ s perfectly appropriate for the jury to contrast the explanation ''The light was red'' against the explanation ''The light was green or yellow.'' 91”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 30
The probabilists' criticism of Friedman's explanation-based accounts of juridical proof is equally applicable to their own probabilist account.
“This criticism of Friedman Õ s of explanation-based accounts of juridical proof, see supra note 37 and accompanying text, like most of the criticisms from the probabilists, is equally applicable to their own account.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 31
The explanation-based account does much better than the Bayesian in taming the conjunction paradox.
“By contrast with aggregation, the explanation-based account does much better than the Bayesian in taming the conjunction paradox.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 19
The strength of the inference to the truth of an explanation depends contextually on the other evidence and the presence of other, contrary explanations.
“The strength of that inference will depend contextually on the other evidence, and the presence of other, contrary explanations. 55”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 38
An explanation that Green drivers are bad potentially explains both the class data and the particular event under discussion, thereby suggesting the needed relative homogeneity.
“An explanation that Green drivers are indeed bad potentially explains both the class data and the particular event under discussion, thereby also suggesting the needed relative homogeneity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 37
The data in both cab scenarios are subject to a reference class problem, which undermines the conclusion that the correct answer is .41.
“Moreover, the data in the both scenarios are subject to a reference class problem, 120 which undermines the conclusion that the correct answer is .41.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Allen and Pardo, supra note 4
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 40
At the macro-level, the explanation-based account better explains reliance on jurors and the existence of devices such as summary judgment, judgment as a matter of law, and motions for a new trial.
“And at the macro-level, the explanation-based account better explains reliance on jurors in the first place and the existence of devices such as summary judgment, judgment as a matter of law, and motions for a new trial.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 40
Devices like summary judgment-including all measures of the sufficiency of the evidence to support judgments or verdicts-are necessary to ensure that the moving party has provided enough evidence to the jury such that they could reasonably infer the explanation that the moving party has provided.
“Devices like summary judgment-including all measures of the sufficiency of the evidence to support judgments or verdicts-are necessary to ensure that the moving party has provided enough evidence to the jury such that they could reasonably infer the explanation that the moving party has provided”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 34
At trial, parties often pick the best of the explanations rather than a series, in part because the presentation of a series may itself communicate to the fact finder that none of the series is to be believed.
“At trial, however, parties often pick the best of the explanations rather than a series, in part because the presentation of a series may itself communicate to the fact finder that none of the series is to be believed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ IV. CONCLUSION · p. 45
The process of inference to the best explanation illuminates the nature of juridical proof.
“We have attempted to demonstrate how the process of inference to the best explanation illuminates the nature of juridical proof.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 29
Sometimes a very detailed story or explanation will be necessary based on the appropriate contrast, for example whether the fire occurred the day before or the day after the insurance policy expired or whether the driver's blood alcohol level was .07 or .08.
“But sometimes a very detailed story (explanation) will be necessary based on the appropriate contrast-for example, whether the fire occurred the day before or the day after the insurance policy expired or whether the driver Õ s blood alcohol level was .07 or .08.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 39
The explanation-based account better explained the proof process at both the micro- and macro-levels than did the probability account.
“The explanation-based account better explained the proof process at both the microand macro-levels than did the probability account.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 41
In addition to providing a more accurate description of the proof process and a better explanation of its features, the explanation-based account also helps to guide and constrain legal decision-making.
“In addition to providing a more accurate description of the proof process and a better explanation of its features, the explanation-based account also helps to guide and constrain legal decision-making.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ B. General Objections to IBE · p. 23
The ubiquitous practices of inference based on explanatory considerations have likely evolved and remained around precisely because of their success in navigating our environments.
“What is more, these ubiquitous practices of inference based on explanatory considerations have likely evolved and remained around precisely because of their success in navigating our environments. 65”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Lipton, supra note 1 at 209
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Ilkka Niiniluoto, Ô Defending Abduction, Õ Philosophy of Science 66 (1999): S436
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 30
Explanatory considerations drive inferences as to the likelihood of various potential explanations.
“Moreover, as we have attempted to show throughout this article, explanatory considerations drive inferences as to the likelihood of various potential explanations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 29
These factors control how to aggregate stories under an explanation-based account.
“These factors control how to aggregate stories under an explanation-based account.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 42
In civil cases, the standard for both summary judgments and judgments as a matter of law turns on whether any reasonable jury must find for one side over the other.
“In civil cases, the standard for both summary judgments and judgments as a matter of law turns on whether any reasonable jury must find for one side over the other.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 250-57 (1986)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 29
Nothing in examining the relative plausibility of competing explanations prevents aggregation.
“But nothing in examining the relative plausibility of competing explanations prevents aggregation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ B. General Objections to IBE · p. 23
Of two explanations, other things being equal, the one that is more in accord with what else we know is better than the one that is not.
“For example, of two explanations, other things being equal, the one that explains more of the evidence will be better than the one that explains less; the one that is more in accord with what else we know will be better than the one that isn Õ t; and so on.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ IV. CONCLUSION · p. 45
The explanation-based account explains the law's reliance on jurors and the existence of devices such as summary judgments, judgments as a matter of law, and other 'sufficiency of the evidence' standards.
“In addition, it explains the law Õ s reliance on jurors and the existence of devices such as summary judgments, judgments as a matter of law, and other ''sufficiency of the evidence'' standards.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisenone given§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 41
The admissibility of all evidence depends on judgments about its relevance and probative value.
“First, the admissibility of all evidence depends on judgments about its relevance and probative value.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 37
Base-rate data regarding the prevalence of Green cabs in town is just one of the infinite number of classes of which the event may be an instantiation.
“Base-rate data regarding the prevalence of Green cabs in town is just one of the infinite number of classes of which the event may be an instantiation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 29
An explanation-based account also supports the conclusion that the defendant should win in the street-light example.
“Thus an explanation-based account also supports the conclusion that the defendant should win. 92”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 41
If either the party's explanation is not relevant to a fact of consequence in the case or a reasonable jury could not find that the explanation proffered explains the evidence, then the evidence is irrelevant.
“If either the party Õ s explanation is not relevant to a fact of consequence in the case or a reasonable jury could not find that the explanation proffered explains the evidence, then the evidence is irrelevant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 29
If a man gets heartburn only after he eats either chili cheeseburgers or spicy Thai food, and he now has heartburn, it is a perfectly good explanation that he must have eaten a chili cheeseburger or spicy Thai food, even though the two may be incompatible, if the appropriate contrast is why he now has heartburn rather than not now having heartburn.
“Likewise, if a man gets heartburn only after he eats either chili cheeseburgers or spicy Thai food, and he now has heartburn, it is a perfectly good explanation that ''he must have eaten a chili cheeseburger or spicy Thai food,'' even though the two may be incompatible, if, of course, the appropriate contrast is why he now has heartburn rather than not now having heartburn. 93”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 43
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 33
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ JURIDICAL PROOF AND THE BEST EXPLANATION · p. 3The better account of micro-level proof issues carries wide-ranging consequences for the admissibility of all types of evidence, from testimony to complex scientific evidence such as DNA to other kinds of statistical evidence, and explains and justifies the open-ended nature of the evidence rules in this area.
“This conclusion, in turn, carries wide-ranging consequences for the admissibility of all types of evidence, from testimony of first-hand observations to complex scientific evidence such as DNA to other kinds of statistical evidence. This conclusion also explains and justifies the open-ended nature of the evidence rules in this area.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [5]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ A. Explanation as a Guide to Inference · p. 11The circularity of self-evidencing explanations is not vicious or problematic; it helps illuminate how explanation can guide inference and is well supported by current scientific and everyday inferential practices.
“This circularity, however, is not vicious or problematic; rather, it helps to illuminate how explanation can guide inference and is well supported by current scientific and everyday inferential practices.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [28]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ JURIDICAL PROOF AND THE BEST EXPLANATION · p. 2The process of inference to the best explanation itself best explains both the macro-structure of proof at trial and the micro-level issues regarding the relevance and value of particular items of evidence.
“In this essay, we attempt to correct this neglect and to demonstrate that the process of inference to the best explanation itself best explains both the macro-structure of proof at trial and the micro-level issues regarding the relevance and value of particular items of evidence.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ JURIDICAL PROOF AND THE BEST EXPLANATION · p. 1In many areas of life, explanatory considerations help guide inference: from the fact that a proposition would explain a phenomenon, one infers that the proposition is true; when several propositions may explain a phenomenon, one infers the one that best explains it.
“In many areas of life, from hard science to managing one Õ s everyday affairs, explanatory considerations help to guide inference. From the fact that some proposition would explain a given phenomenon we infer that the proposition is true. And when several propositions may explain a given phenomenon we infer the one that best explains it.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [1]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Most readers have at least a basic intuitive grasp of the concept of explanation.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 18Simply defining the standards as a certain percentage does not explain them; it changes them by fiat.
“Moreover, simply defining the standards as a certain percentage does not explain them; it changes them by fiat. 52”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone given§ A. Explanation as a Guide to Inference · p. 7The process of inference to the best explanation occurs in two steps: generating potential explanations of the evidence and then selecting the best explanation from the list of potential ones as an actual explanation or as the truth.
“This process occurs in two steps: generating potential explanations of the evidence and then selecting the best explanation from the list of potential ones as an actual explanation or as the truth.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 17Under the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, fact-finders should infer a conclusion for the party with the burden of persuasion when there is an explanation sufficiently more plausible than those favoring the other side.
“Rather than inferring the best explanation from the available potential ones, fact-finders should infer a conclusion for the party with the burden of persuasion when there is an explanation that is sufficiently more plausible than those that favor the other side (not just when the party with the burden has offered a better one).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisereasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 15A complementary possible concern is having too few potential explanations.
“A complementary possible concern is having too few potential explanations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisereasoning§ A. Explanation as a Guide to Inference · p. 10Explanations do not explain evidence in its entirety; they explain aspects of evidence, and rarely explain why A simpliciter but why A rather than B.
“Explanations do not explain evidence in its entirety; explanations explain aspects of evidence. Explanations rarely explain why A; they explain why A rather than B.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationcitation§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 12These narratives function as self-evidencing explanations: the accepted version of events explains the evidence and the evidence provides reasons justifying acceptance of that version as the correct one.
“These narratives function as ''self-evidencing'' explanations: the accepted version of events explains the evidence and the evidence provides reasons justifying acceptance of that version as the correct one.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [36]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 16When there is a plausible explanation of the evidence consistent with innocence, there is a concomitant likelihood that this explanation is correct and thus that the defendant is innocent, which creates a reasonable doubt.
“When there is a plausible explanation of the evidence consistent with innocence, then there is a concomitant likelihood that this explanation is correct (the actual explanation) and thus that the defendant is innocent, which in turn creates a reasonable doubt (and thus should prevent the fact-finder from inferring guilt). 45”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ JURIDICAL PROOF AND THE BEST EXPLANATION · p. 3Conclusions about the nature of legal evidence and proof have implications for virtually every legal issue that requires evaluation of individual items of evidence, bodies of evidence, or judgments in civil and criminal cases.
“Conclusions about the nature of legal evidence and the process of proof have implications for virtually every legal issue that requires the evaluation of individual items of evidence, bodies of evidence, or judgments in civil and criminal cases.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 13Several distinct narratives (or theories) can be constructed to explain a given body of evidence, all of which are equally plausible; their number is infinite.
“Several distinct narratives (or theories) can be constructed to explain a given body of evidence, all of which are equally plausible. Indeed, as Richard Friedman has pointed out, their number is infinite-did the accident occur at noon or 12:01 or at one of the infinite slices of time in between (which Zeno taught us to notice)?, and so on.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [37]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 17To meet the clear-and-convincing standard, the explanation must be plausible enough that it is clearly and convincingly more plausible than those favoring the other side.
“The explanation must be plausible enough that is it clearly and convincingly more plausible than those favoring the other side. 46”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 18Lack of precision in the standards may be a critique of the standards, but it is not a critique of an explanation-based account.
“Lack of precision may thus be a critique of the standards, but it is not a critique of an explanation-based account.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 12The juror narrative process proceeds on explanatory grounds: jurors construct narratives to explain the evidence and choose among alternatives by applying similar criteria to those invoked in the philosophy of science.
“This process proceeds on explanatory grounds-jurors construct narratives to explain the evidence and choose among alternatives by applying similar criteria to those invoked in the philosophy of science.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ JURIDICAL PROOF AND THE BEST EXPLANATION · p. 2To the extent probability-based accounts take into account and supplement explanation-based considerations, they may be helpful; to the extent they ignore such explanatory considerations, they risk mismodeling the process.
“To the extent the former take into account and attempt to supplement the latter, they may be helpful; to the extent they ignore such explanatory considerations, they risk mismodeling the process.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 32The Bayesian response to the conjunction paradox is to declare that current practices are wrong and should be changed.
“The Bayesian response is to declare that current practices are wrong and should be changed.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Friedman, Infinite, supra note 37 at 97 n. 48
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 42In criminal cases, defendants may challenge a criminal conviction when, based on the evidence presented, no reasonable jury could find them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
“In criminal cases, defendants may challenge a criminal conviction when, based on the evidence presented, no reasonable jury could find them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 32In civil cases, fact finders infer the best explanation of the evidence as a whole; in doing so they have an accepted explanation that may or may not instantiate all of the formal elements of the claim.
“In civil cases, fact finders infer the best explanation of the evidence as a whole; in doing so they now have an accepted explanation that may or may not instantiate all of the formal elements of the claim.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 30Explanatory considerations are inherent and fundamental; to the extent Bayesian perspectives can clarify and improve on those considerations, they prove their worth, and to the extent they do not, they do not.
“Explanatory considerations, however, are inherent and fundamental; to the extent Bayesian perspectives can clarify and approve on those considerations, they prove their worth. To the extent they do not, they do not.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone given§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 31Under the Bayesian approach, the probability of the claimant's claim must exceed the probability of the standard of persuasion.
“As noted above, the Bayesian approach requires that the probability of the claimants Õ claim must exceed the probability of the standard of persuasion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 42A focus on competing explanations helps to explain and clarify the summary judgment standard: a judge ought to grant such a motion only if a jury would have to find one side's explanation more plausible than the other side's explanation.
“But a focus on competing explanations helps to explain and clarify it. In explanatory terms, it means that a judge ought to grant such a motion only if a jury would have to find one side Õ s explanation more plausible than the other side Õ s explanation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 40If the probability account were true, then the sum total of the moving party's evidence could be quantified and compared with a similarly quantified standard of persuasion, and the jury (and a fortiori the above-mentioned devices) would become superfluous.
“If the probability account were true, then the sum total of the moving party Õ s evidence could be quantified and compared with a similarly quantified standard of persuasion. If this could be done, then the jury (and a fortiori the above-mentioned devices) would become superfluous.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 25Probability accounts typically employ Bayes' Theorem to guide, measure, or critique combinations of evidence and to compare the strength of evidence once a new item is introduced with the strength without that item.
“The accounts typically employ Bayes Õ Theorem as a way to guide, measure, or critique combinations of evidence in general and to compare in particular the strength of evidence once a new item is introduced as compared with the strength of the evidence without that item. 72”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 40The explanatory nature of the proof process explains why the Federal Rules employ an open-ended system: if the value of evidence depends on how it supports the relative plausibility of competing explanations as determined by jurors based on background knowledge, then it would be impossible to specify detailed rules for determining such value in advance.
“The explanatory nature of the process explains why. If the value of evidence depends on how it supports the relative plausibility of the competing explanations the parties offer, as determined by jurors based on the background knowledge they each bring to court, then it would be impossible to specify detailed rules for determining such value in advance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 32If the accepted explanation instantiates all formal elements, the claimant ought to win; if not, not.
“If it is does, then the claimant ought to win; if not, not.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 44A typical jury instruction defines 'preponderance of the evidence' as 'When you have considered all the evidence in the case, you must be persuaded that it is more probably true than not true.'
“For example, a typical jury instruction defines ''preponderance of the evidence'' as ''When you have considered all the evidence in the case, you must be persuaded that it is more probably true than not true.''”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Federal Civil Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit 34
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 38Probability-based approaches must respect how explanatory considerations guide inference and likelihood assessments; they risk rendering erroneous conclusions when they do not.
“Probability-based approaches must respect how explanatory considerations guide inference and likelihood assessments 125 ; they risk rendering erroneous conclusions when they do not.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 39The strength of the inference depends on how well it explains the evidence, which is determined by the inferential interests of the decision-maker and the contrasting explanations at issue in the case.
“The strength of this inference will depend on how well it explains the evidence, and this in turn will be determined by the inferential interests of the decision-maker and the contrasting explanations at issue in the case (recall the maid example).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ B. Explanation as a Guide to Inference at Trial · p. 18However the current standards are defined, they are met when explanations are plausible enough to cause and justify the desired inferences.
“However the current standards are defined, they are met when explanations are plausible enough to cause and justify the desired inferences.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 34There is good reason to believe the standard problem of trials is not to accumulate all the stories for the parties and see which collectively adds up to greater than .5; rather, the standard problem may be something like the probability of the plaintiff's case being .4, and the respective probabilities of the two defenses each being .1.
“Thus, there is good reason to believe the standard problem of trials is not to accumulate all the stories for the parties and see which collectively adds up to great than .5. Rather, the standard problem may be something more like the probability of the plaintiff Õ s case being .4, and the respective probabilities of the two defenses each being .1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ B. General Objections to IBE · p. 24The evidence will always underdetermine the conclusions of inductive inferences; this level of Humean skepticism does not single out IBE as inferior to any other inductive strategies, including Bayesian.
“The evidence will always underdetermine the conclusions of inductive inferences: this level of Humean skepticism does not single out IBE as inferior to any other inductive strategies (including Bayesian). 66”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lipton, supra note 1 at 142-63
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 40If the probability account were true at the micro-level, and the value of evidence could be quantified, then the law could create more-detailed evidence rules specifying admissibility criteria, or lists of admissible evidence, based upon its quantified value.
“If the probability account were true at the microlevel, and the value of evidence could be quantified, then the law could create more-detailed evidence rules specifying admissibility criteria, or lists of admissible evidence, based upon its quantified value.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 25Probability-based accounts attempt to assign a cardinal probability between 0 and 1 to account for both the strength of individual items of evidence and the strength of a party's case as a whole.
“They attempt to assign a cardinal probability of between 0 and 1 to account for both the strength of individual items of evidence and the strength of a party Õ s case as a whole. 70”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 34In a case where the plaintiff's case probability is .4 and each of two defenses is .1, the Bayesian approach would result in a defense verdict (plaintiff has not satisfied its burden of persuasion), yet that is perverse from the point of view of reducing errors.
“In such a case, the Bayesian approach would result in a defense verdict (plaintiff has not satisfied its burden of persuasion), yet that is perverse from the point of view of reducing errors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 31A probability approach based on proof of discrete elements to the standard of persuasion does not distribute errors evenly among parties and is therefore unlikely to increase the accuracy of outcomes.
“A probability approach based on the proof of discrete elements to the standard of persuasion does not distribute errors evenly among parties and therefore is unlikely to increase the accuracy of outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ B. General Objections to IBE · p. 24In civil cases, if the plaintiff's explanation appears no more likely than the defendant's, judgment should be for the defendant.
“In civil cases, if the plaintiff Õ s explanation appears no more likely than the defendant Õ s, judgment should be for the defendant.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone given§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 44Jurors are not generally given any further guidance in how to implement the preponderance standard.
“Jurors, however, are not generally given any further guidance in how to implement the standard.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ IV. CONCLUSION · p. 46The article has attempted to provide a better explanation of the legal proof process and its features than current extant explanations, which rely on concepts from probability theory, by providing a more accurate description, explaining more of the phenomena, and demonstrating the epistemically justified implications that flow from this account.
“We have attempted to provide a better explanation of the legal proof process and its features than current extant explanations, which rely on concepts from probability theory. We have done this by providing a more accurate description, explaining more of the phenomena, and demonstrating the epistemically justified implications that flow from this account.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 37In the first cab scenario, no explanatory connection exists: the fact that a Green cab caused the accident does not explain why Green cabs own 85% of the cabs in town, nor is another explanation readily apparent that would explain both pieces of data.
“By contrast, no such explanatory connection exists in the first scenario-the fact that a Green cab caused the accident simply does not explain why they own 85% of the cabs in town, nor is another explanation readily apparent that would explain both pieces of data.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ IV. CONCLUSION · p. 45The strengths and weaknesses of competing explanations also illuminate macro-level issues regarding standards of persuasion in both civil and criminal cases, and the explanation-based account of these phenomena accords with the best understanding of the reasoning processes of jurors, avoids the formal conjunction paradox, and allows the standards to distribute errors among the parties.
“The strengths and weaknesses of competing explanations also illuminate macro-level issues regarding standards of persuasions in both civil and criminal cases, and the explanation-based account of these phenomena accords with the our best understanding of the reasoning processes of jurors, avoids the formal conjunction paradox, and allows the standards to distribute errors among the parties.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 31Under the Bayesian model, as the number of elements increases, the probability needed for each element increases.
“This would mean that as the number of elements increases, the probability needed for each element would increase as well”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 45Instructing the jury to consider whether there is a plausible explanation or version of events consistent with innocence, whether the prosecution's explanation is the only plausible one, or whether all plausible explanations imply guilt may provide much needed guidance and clarity to the beyond a reasonable doubt area.
“It may not be necessary, or helpful, to define ''reasonable doubt'' in terms of explanations, but instructing the jury to consider, for example, ''whether there is a plausible explanation or version of events consistent with innocence'' or ''whether the prosecution Õ s explanation or version of events is the only plausible one'' or ''whether all plausible explanations or versions imply guilt'' may”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 30Just like a Bayesian approach, an explanation-based approach can account for aggregation of potential stories or theories and explain how and why it should proceed in the way that it does.
“Just like a Bayesian approach, an explanation-based approach can account for aggregation of potential stories or theories and explain how and why it should proceed in the way that it does”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ IV. CONCLUSION · p. 45The strengths and weaknesses of competing explanations illuminate micro-level issues regarding relevance and probative value, and the explanation-based account of these phenomena explains the evidence law regulating these issues, in particular the open-ended rules regarding admissibility.
“The strengths and weaknesses of competing explanations illuminate micro-level issues regarding relevance and probative value, and the explanation-based account of these phenomena explains the evidence law regulating these issues, in particular the open-ended rules regarding admissibility.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 30The aggregation issue scores no additional points for the Bayesian, but the connection between explanatory and Bayesian approaches is closer and deeper.
“This issue thus scores no additional points for the Bayesian, but the connection between the two is closer, and deeper.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisereasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 40The Federal Rules of Evidence reject the approach of detailed quantified evidence rules and instead employ an open-ended system.
“The Federal Rules of Evidence reject this approach, and instead employ an open-ended system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 35Relative plausibility provides an easy, non-perverse answer: plaintiff wins.
“Relative plausibility provides an easy, non-perverse answer: plaintiff wins.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisereasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 25Because such decision procedures are rarely if ever followed at trial, the primary motivation of such projects is to illuminate how an ideal rational fact-finder would behave, and perhaps to offer normative advice on how that ideal may be closer realized or how the law ought to be changed.
“Because such decision procedures are rarely if ever followed at trial, the primary motivation of such projects is to illuminate how an ideal rational fact-finder would behave, and perhaps to offer normative advice on how that ideal may be closer realized or how the law ought to be changed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ B. General Objections to IBE · p. 24The plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could differentiate among the potential, contrasting explanations.
“This is so because the plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could differentiate among the potential, contrasting explanations. 68”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 39Understanding the standards in terms of competing explanations more accurately describes what occurs at trial, is consistent with the best understanding of the reasoning processes of jurors, avoids the formal conjunction paradox, and allows the standards to fulfill their function of distributing errors among the parties and ultimately increasing the accuracy of outcomes.
“Understanding the standards in terms of competing explanations more accurately describes what occurs at trial, is consistent with the our best understanding of the reasoning processes of jurors, avoids the formal conjunction paradox, and allows the standards to fulfill their function of distributing errors among the parties and ultimately increasing the accuracy of outcomes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 30The Bayesian approach cannot offer advice on how to generate potential theories; explanatory considerations guide this process.
“The Bayesian approach, for example, cannot offer advice on how to generate potential theories; explanatory considerations guide this process.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 40Under the explanation-based account, jurors are necessary to provide the background knowledge to make contextual judgments about the strength of competing explanations and to suggest new ones.
“By contrast, under the explanation-based account, jurors are necessary to provide the background knowledge to make contextual judgments about the strength of competing explanations and to suggest new ones-the confluence between this process and everyday judgments based on similar explanatory considerations is precisely what explains and justifies its use.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 36The explication of probative value demonstrates that probability models have it backwards, for these models do not capture the objective value of legal evidence; instead, they err to the extent they deviate from the results generated by explanatory criteria and are useful to the extent they respect and supplement those results.
“The explication of probative value, rather than providing a telling critique of explanatory approaches, demonstrates that probability models have it backwards, for these models do not capture the objective value of legal evidence. Instead, they err to the extent they deviate from the results generated by explanatory criteria and are useful to the extent they respect and supplement those results.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 37In the cab example, the difference between the two scenarios is explanatory: a causal explanation explains why more Green cabs are involved in accidents and why the one involved in this crash is more likely to be Green-namely, that Green cabs are driven by bad drivers.
“The difference, in other words, is explanatory. A causal explanation explains why more Green cabs are involved in accidents and also why the one involved in this crash is more likely to be Green-namely, that Green cabs are driven by bad drivers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Tversky and Kahneman
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 39Neglect of explanatory considerations, and focus instead on probability models, has obscured aspects of the proof process and offered misleading advice to guide and constrain legal decision-makers.
“Neglect of explanatory considerations, and focus instead on probability models, has obscured aspects of the proof process and offered misleading advice to guide and constrain legal decision-makers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisereasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 25The strength of the evidence may then be compared with standards of persuasion, which are also interpreted in terms of cardinal probabilities.
“The strength of the evidence may then be compared with standards of persuasion, which are also interpreted in terms of cardinal probabilities (e.g., preponderance = .5; clear and convincing = .60-.70; beyond a reasonable doubt = .9, or something similar). 71”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 37A Green cab either was involved or it was not, meaning the probability is 0 or 1.
“A Green cab either was involved or it was not, meaning the probability is 0 or 1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisereasoning§ B. General Objections to IBE · p. 24In the legal context, parties' explanations or theories must first pass the test of explaining the key, contested items of evidence in a given case.
“In the legal context, parties Õ explanations or theories must first pass the test of explaining the key, contested items of evidence in a given case.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 39When assessing the probative value of items of evidence, one must focus on explanatory criteria.
“When it comes, therefore, to assessing the probative value of items of evidence, one must focus on explanatory criteria.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ IV. CONCLUSION · p. 45Explanatory considerations guide the inferential processes at trial, and the trial's structural features may be explained in terms of these considerations.
“Explanatory considerations guide the inferential processes at trial, and the trial Õ s structural features may be explained in terms of these considerations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisereasoning§ B. General Objections to IBE · p. 24Parties are then given the responsibility of further probing the other side's explanation, either through cross-examination or by offering rebuttal evidence.
“And parties are then given the responsibility of further probing the other side Õ s explanation, either through cross-examination or by offering rebuttal evidence.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 45Making the explanatory task explicit provides the missing guidance for the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
“Making the explanatory task explicit provides this missing guidance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 32Under the Bayesian approach, if a plaintiff must prove injury and one other independent element, they would have to show the probability of injury was around .707; if two additional unrelated elements are added, the plaintiff's burden with regard to injury shoots up on average to around .841.
“For example, suppose a plaintiff has to prove injury and one other independent element-they would have to show the probability of injury was around .707. But suppose two additional elements are added in that have nothing to do with whether the plaintiff suffered an injury. The plaintiff Õ s burden with regard to injury now shoots up on average to around .841.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisecitation§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 45Much of the confusion surrounding the beyond a reasonable doubt standard arises because instructions focus more on the subjective mental state the jurors ought to have rather than on providing them with guidance in how to draw conclusions from the evidence.
“As Larry Laudan has recently argued, much of the confusion surrounding the standard arises because instructions focus more on the subjective mental state the jurors ought to have rather than on providing them with guidance in how to draw conclusions from the evidence (other than consulting their subjective mental states).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Laudan, supra note 48 at 51-62
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEBATE · p. 42In explanatory terms, the criminal sufficiency standard means that no reasonable jury could find the defendant's explanation to be implausible or that all of the plausible explanations imply his guilt.
“In explanatory terms, this means that no reasonable jury could find his explanation to be implausible or that all of the plausible explanations imply his guilt.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ C. Probability-Based Objections and the Bayesian Alternative · p. 31The probability approach leads to paradoxical conclusions such as: the plaintiff in a two-element claim wins when proving each element to .6 (despite a likelihood of .36) and loses when proving one element to .9 and the other to .5 (and having a likelihood of .45).
“Rather, it leads to paradoxical conclusions such as the following: the plaintiff in a twoelement claim wins when proving each element to .6 (despite a likelihood of .36) and loses when proving one element to .9 and the other to .5 (and having a likelihood of .45).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The authors state this as an assumption.
Most readers have at least a basic intuitive grasp of the concept of explanation.
“It is a concept of which we assume most readers have at least a basic intuitive grasp.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Trials involve disputes over everyday objects such as people and property and contracts; rarely, if ever, will there be a litigated dispute over whether certain theoretically posited entities or theoretical laws actually exist or are only empirically adequate.
“Trials involve disputes over everyday objects such as people and property and contracts; rarely, if ever, will there be a litigated dispute over whether certain theoretically posited entities or theoretical laws actually exist or are only empirically adequate. 64”
The paper relies on this without support.
The relative plausibility theory rests upon inference to the best explanation.
“Professor Friedman presents his hypothetical as a criticism of the relative plausibility theory, which in turn rests upon IBE.”
The paper relies on this without support.
IBE is at root based on the notion that explanatory success tracks likelihood of truth: the better the explanation, the more likely true.
“IBE is, at root, based on the notion that explanatory success tracks likelihood of truth-the better the explanation, the more likely true.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The criminal standard distributes errors unevenly in favor of the defendant.
“Because the criminal standard distributes errors unevenly (in favor of the defendant), it should not be surprising that the quality of the explanation needed for a pro-defendant verdict should therefore be lower.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The structure of proof accommodates deficiencies in how well the evidence probes explanations.
“During this process, the evidence may fail to adequately probe either explanation sufficiently, but the structure of proof accommodates such deficiencies.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The elements of a claim are independent from one another: the likelihood of one element being true does not affect the likelihood of any other element being true.
“This assumes that the elements are independent from one another (viz., that the likelihood on one element being true does not affect the likelihood of any other element being true), which often will not be the case in the law.”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Tversky and Kahneman cited as note 114 instead of note 115
MinorThe cited work appears in note 115; note 114 discusses Nance and Morris.
“Tversky and Kahneman, supra note 114 at 160.”
“115 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Ô Evidential Impact of Base Rates, Õ in Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Tversky eds.) (Cambridge University Press, 1982).”
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ATOMISMO Y HOLISMO EN LA JUSTIFICACIÓN PROBATORIA
Accatino, D. (2014) · Isonomía - Revista de teoría y filosofía del derecho · doi:10.5347/40.2014.97 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
- Authors
- Pardo, M. S., & Allen, R. J.
- Affiliations
- University of Alabama (US)
- Northwestern University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Pardo, Michael S.
- ORCID
- Allen, Ronald J.
- Venue
- Law and Philosophy
- Published
- 2007-09-21
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 223-268
- ISSN
- 0167-5249 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0522
- OpenAlex
- W2051652878
- Cited by
- 181
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 16 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 46.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Law and Philosophy (publishedVersion)
- bepress Legal Repository (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Law › Legal processes and jurisprudence
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Law › Criminal Law and Evidence
- Keywords
- legal proof, inference to the best explanation, abduction, burden of proof, summary judgment, sufficiency of evidence, admissibility of evidence, evidentiary value, scientific evidence, statistical evidence, civil and criminal cases
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-28.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-28.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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