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Cited by 12Social Robot Interaction and HRIPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceCybernetics and Technology in Society

Anthropomorphizing Machines: Reality or Popular Myth?

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Coghlan, Simon·2024·Minds and Machines
DOI 10.1007/s11023-024-09686-w
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Abstract

According to a widespread view, people often anthropomorphize machines such as certain robots and computer and AI systems by erroneously attributing mental states to them. On this view, people almost irresistibly believe, even if only subconsciously, that machines with certain human-like features really have phenomenal or subjective experiences like sadness, happiness, desire, pain, joy, and distress, even though they lack such feelings. This paper questions this view by critiquing common arguments used to support it and by suggesting an alternative explanation. Even if people’s behavior and language regarding human-like machines suggests they believe those machines really have mental states, it is possible that they do not believe that at all. The paper also briefly discusses potential implications of regarding such anthropomorphism as a popular myth. The exercise illuminates the difficult concept of anthropomorphism, helping to clarify possible human relations with or toward machines that increasingly resemble humans and animals.

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  • When chatbot users ascribe feelings, understanding, or consciousness to a chatbot, they may treat the relevant proposition as true in their imagination-a domain of cognition-to make interactions with the system more enjoyable.

    “Moving from merely practically committal consciousness attributions to cases when such attributions rest on an at least partially epistemically committal attitude, when chatbot users ascribe feelings, understanding, or consciousness to a chatbot (e.g., Replika), they may treat the relevant proposition as true in their imagination -a domain of cognition -to make interactions with the system more en”

    From Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent? (2026) · cites this paper as Coghlan, 2024

    Section 5, “Questioning the A-Claim” (page unavailable), allows that imaginative suspension of disbelief may apply to some machines, but says it is less apt for many cases. Section 5.4 discusses imagining a robot’s feelings without believing them, while Section 2 mentions Replika; neither passage says chatbot users imagine such propositions to make interactions more enjoyable. (LLM, conf=0.78)

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Authors
Coghlan, S.
Affiliations
The University of Melbourne (AU)
Corresponding author
Coghlan, Simon
ORCID
Coghlan, Simon
Venue
Minds and Machines
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2024-06-20
Volume
34
Issue
3
ISSN
  • 0924-6495 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8641
DOI
10.1007/s11023-024-09686-w
OpenAlex
W4399860463
Cited by
12
References
5
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 1
FWCI
5.73
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Minds and Machines (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Minerva Access (University of Melbourne) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
University of Melbourne
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
Keywords
anthropomorphism, machines, robots, artificial intelligence, mental states, phenomenal experience, human-machine relations, human-animal relations, folk psychology

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