Loving and knowing: reflections for an engaged epistemology
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In search of our highest capacities, cognitive scientists aim to explain things like mathematics, language, and planning (and while explaining them, they often imagine computers at work). But are these really our most sophisticated forms of knowing? In this paper, I point to a different pinnacle of cognition. Our most sophisticated human knowing, I think, lies in how we engage with each other, in our relating. Cognitive science and philosophy of mind have largely ignored the ways of knowing at play here. At the same time, the emphasis on discrete, rational knowing to the detriment of engaged, human knowing pervades societal practices and institutions, often with harmful effects on people and their relations. There are many reasons why we need a new, engaged—or even engag ing—epistemology of human knowing. The enactive theory of participatory sense-making takes steps towards this, but it needs deepening. Kym Maclaren’s (2002) idea of letting be invites such a deepening. Characterizing knowing as a relationship of letting be provides a nuanced way to deal with the tensions between the knower’s being and the being of the known, as they meet in the process of knowing-and-being-known. This meeting of knower and known is not easy to understand. However, there is a mode of relating in which we know it well, and that is: in loving relationships. I propose to look at human knowing through the lens of loving. We then see that both knowing and loving are existential, dialectic ways in which concrete and particular beings engage with each other.
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Citations
Cites
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Can social interaction constitute social cognition?
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Cited by
Algorithmic injustice: A relational ethics approach
Birhane, A. (2021) · Patterns · doi:10.1016/j.patter.2021.100205 · Cited by 707
Enactive Ethics: Difference Becoming Participation
Di Paolo, E. A., & De Jaegher, H. (2022) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-021-09766-x · Cited by 99
Laying down a forking path: tensions between enaction and the free energy principle
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Di Paolo, E. A. (2021) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-019-09654-1 · Cited by 89
“Interactions of this kind again demand an opening to others, a form of letting be (see De Jaegher 2019).”
BackgroundHuman innovation and the creative agency of the world in the age of generative AI
Peschl, M. F. (2024) · Possibility Studies & Society · doi:10.1177/27538699241238049 · Cited by 30
“…to be bodily grounded in the open and unbiased perception and understanding of the now and the present state of the actual world as suggested by the engaged epis-temology approach (De Jaegher, 2021), (b) to identify, understand, and learn from emerging future potentials (‘‘what ‘wants’ to emerge?”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- De Jaegher, H.
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2019-08-19
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 847-870
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W2969515456
- Cited by
- 132
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 15.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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