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Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption

Azfar, Omar, Nelson, William Robert·2007·Public Choice

DOI 10.1007/s11127-006-9101-5

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CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION: WHAT HAS PAST DECADE'S EMPIRICAL RESEARCH TAUGHT US? A SURVEY
Dimant, E., & Tosato, G. (2018) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12198 · Cited by 342
“This theory received further support by a later study that also found that increasing government wages reduces corruption levels, based on an experimental game (Azfar and Nelson, 2007).”
Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works
Gans-Morse, J., Borges, M., Makarin, A., Mannah-Blankson, T., Nickow, A., & Zhang, D. (2018) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.12.015 · Cited by 157
Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments
Frank, B., Lambsdorff, J., & Boehm, F. (2011) · European Journal of Development Research · doi:10.1057/ejdr.2010.47 · Cited by 144
Corruption in Public Service delivery: an experimental Analysis
Barr, A., Lindelow, M., & Serneels, P. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.006 · Cited by 127
“Most recently, Azfar and Nelson (2007) developed a game designed to explore the effect of a division of power between an attorney-general (the monitor) and a president (the agent) on presidential resource expropriation.”
Background
In-Group Loyalty and the Punishment of Corruption
Solaz, H., de Vries, C. D., & de Geus, R. D. (2018) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414018797951 · Cited by 89
“We conduct laboratory experiments by using a variation of the Attorney General Game introduced by Azfar and Nelson (2007).”
Method
Anti-Corruption Policies: Lessons from the Lab
Abbink, K., & Serra, D. (2011) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1971779 · Cited by 89
“Monitoring by humans instead of exogenous lotteries has been introduced by Azfar and Nelson (2007), in an experimental design that was later also adapted by Barr, Lindelow, and Serneels (2009).”
Background
“Big Tigers, Big Data”: Learning Social Reactions to China's Anticorruption Campaign through Online Feedback
Zhu, J.-N., Huang, H., & Zhang, D. (2019) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.12866 · Cited by 86
“…; Neshkova and Kostadinova 2012 ), building strong anticorruption agencies (Klitgaard 1988 ; Quah 2011 ), and improving bureaucrats ’ quality and integrity by promoting civil servants ’ material incentives and intrinsic motivation (Azfar and Nelson 2007 ; Perry 1996 ; Perry and Hondeghem 2008 ).”
Background
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Corruption
Jancsics, D. (2014) · Sociology Compass · doi:10.1111/soc4.12146 · Cited by 125
“Empirical studies suggest that higher salaries of civil servants lead to lower corruption (Azfar and Nelson 2007; Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001).”
Background
Do transparency mechanisms reduce government corruption? A meta-analysis
Chen, C., & Ganapati, S. (2021) · International Review of Administrative Sciences · doi:10.1177/00208523211033236 · Cited by 77
“Only four studies used objective measures (Azfar and Nelson, 2007; Cordis and Warren, 2014; Etter, 2012; Olken, 2009).”
Background
Civil service management and corruption: what we know and what we don't
Meyer-Sahling, J.-H., Mikkelsen, K., & Schuster, C. (2018) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12404 · Cited by 74
Prospection in Individual and Interpersonal Corruption Dilemmas
Köbis, N., van Prooijen, J., Righetti, F., & van Lange, P. (2016) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/gpr0000069 · Cited by 74
Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review
Mugellini, G., Della Bella, S., Colagrossi, M., Isenring, G. L., & Killias, M. (2021) · Campbell Systematic Reviews: Better Evidence for a Better World · doi:10.1002/cl2.1173 · Cited by 60
Chapter 4 Anticorruption Policies: Lessons from the Lab
Abbink, K., & Serra, D. (2012) · Research in experimental economics · doi:10.1108/s0193-2306(2012)0000015006 · Cited by 46
The Influence of Wages on Public Officials' Corruptibility: A Laboratory Investigation
van Veldhuizen, R. (2013) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2013.09.009 · Cited by 45
Cracking down on bribery
Banuri, S., & Eckel, C. (2015) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0883-6 · Cited by 44
Chapter 10 Behavioral and Experimental Economics as a Guidance to Anticorruption
Lambsdorff, J. (2012) · Research in experimental economics · doi:10.1108/s0193-2306(2012)0000015012 · Cited by 30
“Azfar and Nelson (2007) let students play in groups of eight, one taking the role of an executive who faces corrupt incentives and another taking the role of a monitor. In one treatment this monitor was randomly determined, in another he was elected. The elected monitor was observed to be more vigilant and devoted mor…”
Influential
Physiological and behavioral patterns of corruption
Jaber-López, T., García-Gallego, A., Perakakis, P., & Georgantzís, N. (2014) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00434 · Cited by 24
“5 Based on a design by Azfar and Nelson (2007), focusing on the ease of corruption detection and the effect of wages on bribes, Barr et al. (2009) study the role of framing and identities in an experiment run in Ethiopia.”
Campaign Finance Transparency Affects Legislators’ Election Outcomes and Behavior
Wood, A. K., & Grose, C. R. (2019) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3236939 · Cited by 23
“In their subsequent campaigns, incumbents whose noncompliance was revealed should face tougher reelections (Azfar and Nelson 2007; Chong et al. 2014; Costas-Perez et al. 2012).”
Do women always behave as corruption cleaners?
Guerra, A., & Zhuravleva, T. (2020) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-022-00959-5 · Cited by 22
“Female and male voters may tolerate corrupt actors differently, punishing them by voting for another political party (e.g., Alexander et al., 2019; Chang, 2020; see also Azfar & Nelson, 2007; Arvate & Mittlaender, 2017).”
Background
Corruption investigated in the lab: a survey of the experimental literature
Bobkova, N., & Egbert, H. (2012) · doi:10.2047/ijltfesvol2iss4-337-349 · Cited by 21
“The positive effects of electing monitors have previously been analyzed by Azfar and Nelson (2007) as well.”
BackgroundMethod
Selection vs. accountability: An experimental investigation of campaign promises in a moral-hazard environment
Feltovich, N., & Giovannoni, F. (2015) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.03.008 · Cited by 19
Do bystanders react to bribery?
Guerra, A., & Zhuravleva, T. (2021) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2021.03.008 · Cited by 18
Corruption dynamics: Integrating structure, agency and institutional logics across contexts
Meyer, K. Z., Luiz, J., & Fedderke, J. (2025) · International Journal of Management Reviews · doi:10.1111/ijmr.12403 · Cited by 17
Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network
Ferrali, R. (2020) · Games Econ. Behav. · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.013 · Cited by 17
Deterrence, Contagion, and Legitimacy in Anticorruption Policy Making: An Experimental Analysis
Boly, A., Gillanders, R., & Miettinen, T. (2019) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/703128 · Cited by 15
Access to public information: a scientometric study of legal versus voluntary transparency in the public sector
Sáez-Martín, A., López-Hernández, A., & Caba-Pérez, C. (2017) · Scientometrics · doi:10.1007/s11192-017-2541-5 · Cited by 15
Increasing transparency is not always the panacea: An overview of alternative paths to curb corruption in the public sector
de Vries, M. D., & Sobis, I. (2016) · International Journal of Public Sector Management · doi:10.1108/ijpsm-11-2015-0197 · Cited by 15
Anti-corruption Strategies in Afghanistan: An Alternative Approach
Singh, D. (2016) · doi:10.1177/0169796x15609714 · Cited by 15
“Azfar and Nelson Jr (2007, p. 471) state that, “Increasing government wages and increasing the difficulty of hiding corrupt gains both reduce corruption.””
When do Citizens Demand Punishment of Corruption?
Yap, O. F. (2013) · doi:10.1080/10361146.2012.760525 · Cited by 15
Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology
Engel, C. (2016) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2769771 · Cited by 13
Corruption Control, Government Effectiveness and Banking Stability: Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels?
Alshubiri, F., Jamil, S., & Fekir, S. (2023) · Journal of the Knowledge Economy · doi:10.1007/s13132-023-01277-x · Cited by 12
“Popova and Podolyakina (2014) and Azfar and Nelson (2007) indicated that the root of corruption lies in ineffective institutional management, which leads to an increase in faulty public relations, which, in turn, causes societal problems (Dreber et al., 2013).”
The limits of transparency in reducing corruption
Parra, D., Muñoz-Herrera, M., & Palacio, L. A. (2021) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2021.101762 · Cited by 11
No Moral Wiggle Room in an Experimental Corruption Game
Balafoutas, L., Sandakov, F., & Zhuravleva, T. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.701294 · Cited by 10
“wages and appointment procedures of public officials (Azfar and Nelson, 2007), legal immunity for bribe givers (Abbink et al.”
Background
Identifying voter preferences: The trade-off between honesty and competence
Galeotti, F., & Zizzo, D. (2018) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.03.007 · Cited by 10
The Role of Framing, Inequity and History in a Corruption Game: Some Experimental Evidence
Chaudhuri, A., Paichayontvijit, T., & Sbai, E. (2016) · Games · doi:10.3390/g7020013 · Cited by 10
“(2002) [5] started off this line of inquiry, which includes other studies such as Azfar and Nelson (2007), [6], Barr et al.”
Result
Can Transparency of Information Reduce Embezzlement? Experimental Evidence from Tanzania
Falco, S. D., Magdalou, B., Masclet, D., Villeval, M., & Willinger, M. (2016) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2780818 · Cited by 10
“7 We also contribute to the expanding (and mixed) literature on the relationship between transparency and the performance of institutions (Azfar and Nelson, 2007; Olken, 2007; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Reinnika and Svenson, 2004, 2011) by exploring whether the impact of more transparent information…”
The New Institutional Economics Approach to Economic Development: A Discussion of Social, Political, Legal, and Economic Institutions
Azfar, O. (2006) · doi:10.30541/v45i4iipp.965-980 · Cited by 10
“In an experimental analysis Azfar and Nelson (2007) do find that directly elected attorney generals are more vigilant than appointed attorney generals.”
Self-citation
Audience effects and other-regarding preferences against corruption: Experimental evidence
García-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N., Jaber-López, T., & Michailidou, G. (2020) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.025 · Cited by 8
Committed to Reciprocate on a Bribe or Blow the Whistle: The Effects of Periodical Staff-Rotation in Public Administration
Fišar, M., Krčál, O., Staněk, R., & Špalek, J. (2020) · Public Performance & Management Review · doi:10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410 · Cited by 8
“Other experiments show that public officials are substantially less prone to accepting bribes if they receive a fair wage (Abbink et al., 2002; Armantier & Boly, 2011; Azfar & Nelson, 2007; Barr & Serra, 2009).”
Background
When Do Citizens Take Costly Action against Government Corruption? Evidence from Experiments in Australia, Singapore, and the United States
Yap, O. F. (2017) · Journal of East Asian Studies · doi:10.1017/jea.2017.1 · Cited by 8
Can Shorter Transfer Chains and Transparency Reduce Embezzlement?
Falco, S. D., Magdalou, B., Masclet, D., Villeval, M., & Willinger, M. (2020) · Review of Behavioral Economics · doi:10.1561/105.00000119 · Cited by 7
“Azfar and Nelson (2007) have shown that corruption is lower when hiding corrupt gains is more difficult.”
Background
When Local Models Fail
Epstein, B. (2008) · doi:10.1177/0048393107310873 · Cited by 7
Identity and political corruption: a laboratory experiment
Cubel, M., Papadopoulou, A., & Sánchez-Pagés, S. (2024) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-024-01589-2 · Cited by 6
Is corruption distasteful or just another cost of doing business?
Banerjee, R., Boly, A., & Gillanders, R. (2021) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-021-00913-x · Cited by 6
The Tragedy of Corruption Corruption as a social dilemmaPreprint
Chen, Y.-F., Jiang, S.-G., & Villeval, M. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2698050 · Cited by 6
“…to engage in corruption is affected by the level of wages (Abbink, 2005; Armantier and Boly, 2011; van Veldhuizen, 2013), the monitoring capacity (Azfar and Nelson, 2007; Olken, 2007; Barr et al., 2009; Serra, 2012), the risk of penalty (Abbink et al ., 2002), staff rotation (Abbink, 2004),…”
Competence Versus Trustworthiness: What Do Voters Care About?Preprint
Galeotti, F., & Zizzo, D. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2408914 · Cited by 6
“(2009) and Azfar and Nelson (2007) used a Public Servant’s Game to study corruption in service delivery.”
Method
Small sums, big impact: Corruption and microfinance institutions
Afrifa, G., Amankwah-Amoah, J., Acquaye, A., Yamoah, F., & Mwiti, F. G. (2022) · Economic and Industrial Democracy · doi:10.1177/0143831x221140155 · Cited by 5
“Empirically, the findings support the view reported by Azfar and Nelson (2007), who stated that the adverse behaviour of women towards corruption may be explained by the understanding that women react more strongly to the risk of detection were they to engage in corruption, and so desist from…”
BackgroundResult
Effects of subject pool culture and institutional environment on corruption: Experimental evidence from Albania
Harri, A., Zhllima, E., Imami, D., & Coatney, K. T. (2020) · Economic Systems · doi:10.1016/j.ecosys.2020.100783 · Cited by 5
‘I Gave You More’: Discretionary Power in a Corruption Experiment
Czap, H., & Czap, N. V. (2019) · Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics · doi:10.1177/0260107919848640 · Cited by 5
“…payoffs (e.g., Abbink, 2005; Armantier & Boly, 2008, 2011; Azfar & Nelson, 2007; Barr & Serra, 2009; Van Veldhuizen, 2013), and c) the risk of being caught (e.g., Abbink & Wu, 2017; Abbink et al., 2002; Armantier & Boly, 2011; Azfar & Nelson, 2007; Barr & Serra, 2009; Schulze & Frank, 2003).”
Leveraging social relationships and transparency in the insider game
Bolton, G. E., Ockenfels, A., & Werner, P. (2016) · Journal of the Economic Science Association · doi:10.1007/s40881-016-0030-x · Cited by 5
“…that are unaffected if small negative externalities on other subjects are introduced.1Moreover, the results of the experimental corruption game by Azfar and Nelson (2007) indicate the importance of social relations formonitoring: strongermonitoring can be achieved if the…”
Evaluating the Impact of Brazil's Central Audit Program on Municipal Provision of Health Services
Nishijima, M., Ellis, R. P. M., & Cati, R. C. (2016) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3104895 · Cited by 5
“Running an experiment, Azfar and Nelson Jr. (2007) find a positive relationship between the ease of detecting corruption and the corruption incidence.”
The influence of government budgets for anti-corruption efforts and government effectiveness on national transparency levels
Moss, S., & Buachoom, W. (2026) · Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management · doi:10.1108/jpbafm-04-2025-0105 · Cited by 4
Abuse of Power An Experimental Investigation of the Effects of Power and Transparency on Centralized Punishment
Hoeft, L., & Mill, W. (2017) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2024.02.003 · Cited by 17
Synergizing anti-corruption strategies: Group monitoring and endogenous crackdown – An experimental investigation
Jiang, S.-G., Wei, Q., & Zhao, L. (2024) · China economic review · doi:10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102158 · Cited by 4
Condemning corruption while condoning inefficiency: an experimental investigation into voting behavior
Arvate, P. R., & Mittlaender, S. (2017) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-017-0452-x · Cited by 4
Exploring the Current State of Forensic Accounting in Saudi Arabia and Possible Ways of Elevating It to Assist the Government Fighting Corruption
AlShaikh, A. M., & Al-Adeem, K. (2023) · Journal of Forensic Accounting Profession · doi:10.2478/jfap-2023-0001 · Cited by 3
Separation of Powers in the Kuwaiti Criminal Justice System: A Case Study
al-Hajri, A. (2018) · European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies · doi:10.26417/ejis.v4i2a.p59-79 · Cited by 3
Deterrence, peer effect, and legitimacy in anti-corruption policy-making: An experimental analysis
Boly, A., Gillanders, R., & Miettinen, T. (2016) · Working Paper Series · doi:10.35188/unu-wider/2016/181-9 · Cited by 3
“The effectiveness of this type of anticorruption policy is also evident in the complex experimental setting used in Azfar and Nelson (2007) and Barr et al. (2009).”
Method
Higher official wages reduce petty not grand corruption: Evidence from China
Liu, W.-B., Liu, Q., & Wang, C. (2024) · International Public Management Journal · doi:10.1080/10967494.2024.2382722 · Cited by 2
“Moreover, laboratory experiments have also demonstrated that an increase in official wages has the potential to effectively mitigate corruption (Azfar and Nelson 2007; Van Veldhuizen 2013).”
Internalizing transparency and its relationship with corruption: insights from Colombian public servants
Astudillo-Rodas, M. (2022) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2022.2068051 · Cited by 2
“…research has found a negative correlation between transparency and corruption (Bastida and Benito 2007; Bauhr and Grimes 2014; Maria, Porumbescu, and Grimmelikhuijsen 2017) though its causal mechanism is still somewhat uncertain (Azfar and Nelson 2007; Costa 2012; Tejedo-Romero and de Araujo 2018).”
Background
Experimental Trends in Corruption and Tax Evasion
Rodríguez-Priego, N., & Pintér, Á. (2020) · Cuadernos Económicos de ICE · doi:10.32796/cice.2020.99.7007 · Cited by 2
Is Transparency an Anti-Corruption Myth?
Murray, C. K., Frijters, P., & Schaffner, M. (2017) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2938162 · Cited by 2
A Classroom Game on Sequential Enforcement
Hemenway, D., & Solnick, S. (2013) · Journal of Criminal Justice Education · doi:10.1080/10511253.2012.662238 · Cited by 2
“…used a complicated game in which one player had the choice of retaining valuable tiles for herself (or passing them to other players) and another player acting as monitor could, at a price, choose to check some or all of the tiles (Azfar & Nelson, 2007; Barr, Lindelow, & Serneels, 2009).”
Background
Jumping the queue: An experimental study on cultural differences in bribing attitudes among Greeks and Germans
Karakostas, A., Grimm, V., & Drichoutis, A. (2025) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107045 · Cited by 1
Local Government and Natural Resource Management in Madhya Pradesh, India: A Critical Institutional Analysis
Upadhyay, M., & Rajasekhar, D. (2024) · The Journal of Environment & Development · doi:10.1177/10704965241300211 · Cited by 1
“However, the studies show a negative relationship between wages and corruption in bureaucracy (Azfar & Nelson, 2007; Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001) and in political of ﬁ ces (Benito et al., 2015), and thereby suggest possible interactions between institutional conditions and corruption.”
An experimental study of auctioneers’ and bidders’ preferences over corruption in auctions
Cepeda, A. (2023) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2023.102141 · Cited by 1
Embezzlement, Whistleblowing, and Organizational Architecture: An Experimental InvestigationPreprint
Makowsky, M. D., & Wang, S.-Y. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2563849 · Cited by 1
Fighting Greed with Money: How Wage Levels Impact Corruption in the Private Purchasing Sector
Campos, G. D. L. T., Radler, K., & Saptoadi, B. U. (2017) · Management · doi:10.26493/1854-4231.12.355-374 · Cited by 1
“In addition, Azfar and Nelson (2007) found that corruption will be reduced by increasing government wages and the difficulty to hide a corrupt act or gain.”
Background
When reciprocity becomes back-scratching: an economic inquiry
Murray, C. K. (2016) · The University of Queensland · doi:10.14264/uql.2016.88 · Cited by 1
The Behavioral Foundations of International Anti-Bribery Laws: Results From an International Lab-Type ExperimentPreprint
Alysandratos, T., Barr, A. M., Bryce, C., Chmura, T., David-Barrett, E., & Giamattei, M. (2024) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4752776 · Cited by 1
A Market for Integrity - An Experiment on Corruption in the Education SectorPreprint
Soraperra, I., Köbis, N., Efferson, C., Shalvi, S., Vogt, S., & Offerman, T. (2019) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3409962 · Cited by 1
“While some studies reveal no corruption-reducing effects of higher wages (Abbink, 2002), others show (small) reductions of corrupt behavior (Jacquemet, 2005; Barr et al., 2009)— in particular when wage increases are combined with effective punishment (Van Veldhuizen, 2013; Azfar and Nelson, 2007).”
Let’s Play: Bribery Games in the US and Germany
Kubbe, I. (2018) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66254-1_9 · Cited by 1
“There are also individual forms of corruption where a power holder individually abuses power (e.g. see Azfar and Nelson 2007; Abbink and Ellman 2005; Barr et al. 2009) I have run bribery games in the U.S. and Germany in 2013/2014, comparing individual decisionmaking of over 700 participants.”
Background
The influence of government ideology on corruption: the impact of the Great Recession
Bellido, H., Olmos, L. H., & Román-Aso, J. A. (2021) · Economia Politica · doi:10.1007/s40888-020-00212-6
To Bribe or Not to Bribe? An Experimental Analysis of Corruption
Castro, M. F. (2020) · Italian Economic Journal · doi:10.1007/s40797-020-00129-w
The dynamics of anti-corruption: a multi-level framework for intervention design
Rotinwa-Oseni, B., Chmura, T., Orlandi, L., & Dixon, L. (2026) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137426100642
“…cluster represents the most theoretically grounded stream, combining game-theoretic models of bribery intermediation (Hasker and Okten, 2008) with experimental tests of behavioural deviations from rational choice (Azfar and Nelson, 2007; Barr et al ., 2009; Cooter and Garoupa, 2014; Zhang, 2015).”
Conflict of interest in the civil service: factors of effective regulation
Krikunov, K. A. (2024) · Общественные науки и современность · doi:10.31857/s0869049924010105
Administrative Burden in the Semarang City One-Stop Integrated Service Unit
Primantari, F. P. A., & Meliala, A. P. P. S. (2023) · Arkus · doi:10.37275/arkus.v10i1.437
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García-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N., Jaber-López, T., & Michailidou, G. (2019) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3376728
Approaches to Corruption: a Synthesis of the Scholarship
Prasad, M., da Silva, M. B. M., & Nickow, A. (2018) · Studies in comparative international development · doi:10.1007/s12116-018-9275-0
Corruption, Social Judgment and Culture: An ExperimentPreprint
Salmon, T. C., & Serra, D. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2383903
“For studies attempting to identify social norms in various pro-social games see Krupka and Weber (2013), Reuben and Riedl (2013) and Schram and Charness (2012) See for instance Bardsley (2008) and List (2007).”
Group Monitoring, Endogenous Crackdown and Anti-corruption: An ExperimentPreprint
Jiang, S.-G. (2019) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3398729
Incentives and the Corruption Market
Sekkat, K. (2018) · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-98518-3_11
Essays in Experimental Economics
Chen, I. (2015) · doi:10.14711/thesis-991012753258103412
Citizens’ Response to Government Corruption: Experimental Evidence from Australia, Singapore, and the United StatesPreprint
Yap, O. F. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2455174

Authors: Azfar, O., & Nelson, W. R.
Affiliations: The Graduate Center, CUNY (US)
George Mason University (US)
Corresponding author: Nelson, William Robert
Venue: Public Choice
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published: 2007-01-06
Volume: 130
Issue: 3-4
Pages: 471-493
ISSN: 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
1573-7101
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9101-5
OpenAlex: W2070017865
Cited by: 113
References: 28
Citations by year: 2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 6
FWCI: 4.50
Type: journal article
Language: en
Open access: closed
Licence: www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
Locations: Public Choice (publishedVersion)
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Funders: Institute for Humane Studies, George Mason University
Topics: Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
Keywords: corruption, transparency, separation of powers, law enforcement officers, direct elections, appointment of officials, re-election, political accountability

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Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption

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