The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption
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In the citing paper
“Their results are contradictory. While four studies demonstrate that increasing public officials’ wages greatly reduces their corruptibility (Armantier & Boly, 2008; Azfar & Nelson, 2007; Songchoo & Suriya, 2012; Van Veldhuizen, 2013), others find no robust results (Banerjee & Mitra, 2018, Barr et al., 2009).”
From Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review (2021) · cites this paper as Azfar & Nelson, 2007
Citations
Cites
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Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?
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The Causes and Consequences of Corruption
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Self-citationRate Filing Policies for Inland Water Transportation: An Experimental Approach
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Cited by
CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION: WHAT HAS PAST DECADE'S EMPIRICAL RESEARCH TAUGHT US? A SURVEY
Dimant, E., & Tosato, G. (2018) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12198 · Cited by 342
“This theory received further support by a later study that also found that increasing government wages reduces corruption levels, based on an experimental game (Azfar and Nelson, 2007).”
Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works
Gans-Morse, J., Borges, M., Makarin, A., Mannah-Blankson, T., Nickow, A., & Zhang, D. (2018) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.12.015 · Cited by 157
Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments
Frank, B., Lambsdorff, J., & Boehm, F. (2011) · European Journal of Development Research · doi:10.1057/ejdr.2010.47 · Cited by 144
Corruption in Public Service delivery: an experimental Analysis
Barr, A., Lindelow, M., & Serneels, P. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.07.006 · Cited by 127
“Most recently, Azfar and Nelson (2007) developed a game designed to explore the effect of a division of power between an attorney-general (the monitor) and a president (the agent) on presidential resource expropriation.”
BackgroundIn-Group Loyalty and the Punishment of Corruption
Solaz, H., de Vries, C. D., & de Geus, R. D. (2018) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414018797951 · Cited by 89
“We conduct laboratory experiments by using a variation of the Attorney General Game introduced by Azfar and Nelson (2007).”
Method
Metadata
- Authors
- Azfar, O., & Nelson, W. R.
- Affiliations
- The Graduate Center, CUNY (US)
- George Mason University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nelson, William Robert
- Venue
- Public Choice
- Published
- 2007-01-06
- Volume
- 130
- Issue
- 3-4
- Pages
- 471-493
- ISSN
- 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7101
- OpenAlex
- W2070017865
- Cited by
- 113
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 9 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 6
- FWCI
- 4.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Public Choice (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Institute for Humane Studies, George Mason University
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Keywords
- corruption, transparency, separation of powers, law enforcement officers, direct elections, appointment of officials, re-election, political accountability
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
