The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model
Open accessAbstract
The literature on the rational PBC suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chances of reelection. Most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre-election distortions in fiscal policy. We propose a new test that explores the two-way interaction between the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion and the margin of victory. The test is implemented using a large panel of Portuguese municipalities. The results show that opportunism leads to a larger win-margin for the incumbent and that incumbents behave more opportunistically when their win-margin is small. These results are consistent with the theoretical model.
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Cites
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Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy
Bucovetsky, S., Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2002) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061733 · Cited by 3,748
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Hibbs, D. A. (1977) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400269712 · Cited by 3,368
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Cho, I.-K., & Kreps, D. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885060 · Cited by 3,201
Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles
Rogoff, K. (1987) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2428 · Cited by 1,877
Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
Rogoff, K., & Sibert, A. (1988) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297526 · Cited by 1,607
Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964
Kramer, G. H. (1971) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1955049 · Cited by 1,596
Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game
Alesina, A. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884222 · Cited by 1,322
Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson
Mueller, J. E. (1970) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1955610 · Cited by 1,289
Metadata
- Authors
- Aidt, T. S., Veiga, F. J., & Veiga, L. G.
- Venue
- Public Choice
- Published
- 2010-04-10
- Volume
- 148
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 21-44
- ISSN
- 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7101
- OpenAlex
- W2110405856
- Cited by
- 279
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 34.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Aidt, T. S., Veiga, F. J., & Veiga, L. G. (2011). Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model. Public Choice. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9644-3
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