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Cited by 1,322

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game

Open access
Alesina, Alberto·1987·The Quarterly Journal of Economics
DOI 10.2307/1884222
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Abstract

This paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward-looking wage-setters. If discretionary policies are followed, an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium. This cycle is significantly different from the traditional “political business cycle.” Reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations.

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Metadata

Authors
Alesina, A.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
1987-08
Volume
102
Issue
3
Pages
651
ISSN
0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/1884222
OpenAlex
W2146991276
Cited by
1,322
References
2
FWCI
59.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1884222
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Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884222

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.