The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentive Regulation: Expectations, Surprises, and the Road Forward
Open accessAbstract
Forty years have passed since an inflation-adjusted price cap, widely called RPI-X, was proposed as a way of controlling prices in the UK’s newly privatised monopoly telecommunications company by a form of incentive regulation. The paper traces developments since then in several jurisdictions, within the context of a wider field of changing regulatory governance involving legislatures and governments as well as regulatory agencies. The focus is on, first, the experience of increasing complexity of the incentive schemes adopted, and second on the growing political salience of regulatory decisions which adds goals such as net zero, with more direct quantitative targets, to maximising consumer welfare. The implications of these changes for regulatory interventions are considered.
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“These observations apply as well to the evolving PBR mechanisms in some states in the U.S.”
From The Expansion of Incentive (Performance-Based) Regulation of Electricity Distribution and Transmission in the United States (2024) · cites this paper as Cave (2024)
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Cites
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Erbetta, F., & Cave, M. E. (2007) · Review of Network Economics · doi:10.2202/1446-9022.1128 · Cited by 128
Self-citationSappington, D. E. M., & Weisman, D. L. (2010) · Journal of Regulatory Economics · doi:10.1007/s11149-010-9133-0 · Cited by 112
Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?
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Productivity-incentive clauses and rate adjustment for inflation
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Regulatory Learning in the Face of Net Zero Climate Policy: The Case of the UK
Duma, D., Pollitt, M. G., & Covatariu, A. (2024) · Review of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1007/s11151-024-09972-y · Cited by 15
Vincent Rious, A., & Rossetto, N. (2018) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/9781786436092.00011 · Cited by 12
How can the concept of public value influence U.K. utility regulation?
Cave, M. E., & Wright, J. (2021) · Utilities Policy · doi:10.1016/j.jup.2021.101280 · Cited by 8
Self-citationThe rise and decline of the X factor in performance-based electricity regulation
Makholm, J. D. (2018) · The Electricity Journal · doi:10.1016/j.tej.2018.10.008 · Cited by 7
Incentive Regulation From the Inside: Resetting 12 RPI-X Price Caps in 1993–1995
Littlechild, S. (2024) · Review of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1007/s11151-024-09980-y · Cited by 6
The past and future of the X factor in performance-based regulation
Kaufmann, L. (2019) · The Electricity Journal · doi:10.1016/j.tej.2019.02.008 · Cited by 5
The achievement of digitalisation in the EU and its reliance on gigabit connectivity
Cave, M. E. (2023) · Telecommunications Policy · doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2023.102592 · Cited by 5
Self-citationBaldwin, R., & Cave, M. E. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198836186.001.0001 · Cited by 4
Self-citationLiberalizing network utilities: Economic principles and European regulatory experience
Cave, M. E. (2022) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/9781800888708.00010 · Cited by 4
Self-citation
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Joskow, P. L. (2024) · Review of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1007/s11151-024-09973-x · Cited by 37
“The TOTEX targets reflect, as well, 50 Cave (2024) discusses the increasing complexity of regulation in general under RIIO-1 and RIIO-2 and some of the potential implications for the performance of these more complex incentive regulation mechanisms.”
Regulatory Learning in the Face of Net Zero Climate Policy: The Case of the UK
Duma, D., Pollitt, M. G., & Covatariu, A. (2024) · Review of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1007/s11151-024-09972-y · Cited by 15
40 Years of Incentive Regulation: What Have We Learned, and What Questions Remain?
Sappington, D. E. M., & Weisman, D. L. (2024) · Review of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1007/s11151-024-09974-w · Cited by 7
Incentive Regulation From the Inside: Resetting 12 RPI-X Price Caps in 1993–1995
Littlechild, S. (2024) · Review of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1007/s11151-024-09980-y · Cited by 6
Monaco, R., Vilaplana, J. A. L., Bergaentzlé, C., Ackom, E. K., Zerriffi, H., & Nielsen, P. S. (2026) · Energy Research & Social Science · doi:10.1016/j.erss.2026.104652 · Cited by 2
Metadata
- Authors
- Cave, M.
- Affiliations
- London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Cave, Martin
- ORCID
- Cave, Martin
- Venue
- Review of Industrial Organization
- Published
- 2024-08-19
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 431-453
- ISSN
- 0889-938X (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7160
- OpenAlex
- W4401709309
- Cited by
- 13
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 4
- FWCI
- 4.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- dx.doi.org
- Locations
- Review of Industrial Organization (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Regulation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Transportation › Transport and Economic Policies
- Keywords
- incentive regulation, price caps, telecommunications regulation, privatization, regulatory governance, net-zero targets, consumer welfare, regulatory complexity
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