Cited by 13Regulation and Compliance StudiesMerger and Competition AnalysisTransport and Economic Policies

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Incentive Regulation: Expectations, Surprises, and the Road Forward

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Cave, Martin·2024·Review of Industrial Organization

Abstract

Forty years have passed since an inflation-adjusted price cap, widely called RPI-X, was proposed as a way of controlling prices in the UK’s newly privatised monopoly telecommunications company by a form of incentive regulation. The paper traces developments since then in several jurisdictions, within the context of a wider field of changing regulatory governance involving legislatures and governments as well as regulatory agencies. The focus is on, first, the experience of increasing complexity of the incentive schemes adopted, and second on the growing political salience of regulatory decisions which adds goals such as net zero, with more direct quantitative targets, to maximising consumer welfare. The implications of these changes for regulatory interventions are considered.

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Research works printed but not linked: 13

  1. Baldwin, R. (2012). Understanding regulation, 2nd edition Cambridge University Press.
  2. CEPA. (2018). review of the RIIO framework and RII0-1 performance. Cambridge Economic Policy Associates.
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  4. Consumer Council for Water (2020). independent review of water affordability
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  6. House of Commons Library, gigabit-broadband in the uk: government targets and policy, (February 2022). pp. 34–36.
  7. Joskow, P. (2006). incentive regulation in theory and practice: electric distribution and transmission, prepared for the National Bureau of Economic Research Regulation Project, 80–86. http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=1220 · DOI
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  9. Ofcom (2020)., promoting competition and investment in fibre networks: wholesale fixed telecoms market review, 2021-26, vol 1,2–3 and vol 3
  10. Posner, R. (1971). Taxation by Regulation. bell journal, 2(1), 22–50.
  11. Proctor, R. (Ed.). (2008). agnotology- the making and unmasking of ignorance, 2008. Stanford University Press.
  12. Sappington, D. (2002). Price Control. in M Cave et.al (Eds.) handbook of telecommunications economics (Vol. 1, pp. 227–296). North-Holland.
  13. Weisman, D. L. (2019). Regulatory Takings without confiscatory returns. Yale Journal on Regulation Bulletin, 36, 171–195.

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Metadata

Authors
Cave, M.
Affiliations
London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
Corresponding author
Cave, Martin
Venue
Review of Industrial Organization
Published
2024-08-19
Volume
65
Issue
2
Pages
431-453
ISSN
  • 0889-938X (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-7160
OpenAlex
W4401709309
Cited by
13
References
24
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 4
FWCI
4.39
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Review of Industrial Organization (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Public Administration › Regulation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Transportation › Transport and Economic Policies
Keywords
incentive regulation, price caps, telecommunications regulation, privatization, regulatory governance, net-zero targets, consumer welfare, regulatory complexity

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